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SUMMARY 
 
Interpretationism about the mind claims that we can gain a philosophical understanding of 
the nature of thought by considering how we interpret the thoughts of others.  My thesis 
aims to develop a version of this theory which is plausible in the sense that: 
 
(1)  it has the potential to retain certain advantages attaching to theories of mind 
which focus on the behaviour, rather than the internal make-up of candidate thinkers;  
(2) it can fend off certain apparent counterexamples. 
 
The thesis is split into four parts. 
 
Part I explains why one might want to answer ‘No’ to the question ‘Are there particular 
sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order to count as a thinker?’  It 
then introduces interpretationism as a position which will allow us to answer ‘No’ to this 
question.  My version of interpretationism claims that a being has a thought iff it is 
interpretable as having that thought, and that all thinkers are rational.  Both claims face 
several apparently obvious counter-examples.  Parts II and III address these 
counterexamples by developing the crucial notions of interpretability and rationality. 
 
Part II starts by considering the problem of seemingly hidden thoughts which occur during 
dreams, and uses this to develop an account according to which a subject is interpretable as 
having a thought if either a) there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the 
subject’s actual situation and actions, or b) there would be sufficient evidence in at least one 
suitable counterfactual situation.  I consider and reject an objection that this understanding 
of interpretability is incompatible with a commitment to the holism of interpretation, and 
then show how it can be used to address further proposed counter-examples, such as cases 
involving deception or paralysed thinkers.  However, I agree with Block (1981) and 
Peacocke (1983) that their string-searching machine and Martian marionette must be 
counted as thinkers by this account.  I argue that these are not counterexamples to the theory, 
however, because the intuitions against counting such beings as thinkers can be discredited. 
 
Part III uses considerations about human limitations and propensities towards reasoning 
errors to argue that the interpretationist cannot adopt a deontological understanding of 
rationality that seems prevalent in the literature, nor a purely consequentialist account of 
rationality.  I explain how Cherniak’s (1986) conception of minimal rationality may be 
adapted for the interpretationist’s purposes.  I then consider and reject the idea that the 
emphasis on the rationality of thinkers will leave us unable to fit paradigmatically non-
rational thoughts and thought processes (dream thoughts, imaginings and association) into 
our account. 
 
Part IV shows why interpretationism so developed is well placed to retain the advantages of 
a theory of mind which focuses on behaviour, and outlines potential avenues for further 
research. 
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PART I: INTRODUCING INTERPRETATIONISM 
 
Interpretationism is a position in the philosophy of mind which claims that we can 
gain a philosophical understanding of the nature of thought by considering how we 
interpret the thoughts of others.  The purpose of this thesis is to argue that a kind of 
interpretationism is plausible in the sense that:   
1. it has the potential to retain some advantages attaching to theories of mind 
which focus on the behaviour, rather than the internal make-up of 
candidate thinkers; 
2. it can fend off certain apparent counterexamples. 
Part I introduces the interpretationist approach.  I begin, in chapter 1, by identifying 
a philosophical question to which interpretationism provides a response, 
distinguishing between two varieties of answer that have been given to this question, 
and then explaining some advantages of the type of answer which focuses the 
behaviour of thinkers.   
Chapter 2 then argues that interpretationism provides just such an answer, while 
also improving upon analytic behaviourism.  However, it admits that two notions 
which are central to interpretationism, interpretability and rationality, require further 
explanation, and that the theory faces several apparently obvious counterexamples.  
Part I therefore ends with an outline of how, in the rest of the thesis, I tackle these 
problems. 
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Are there particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order 
to count as a thinker? 
 
Chapter 1 – A Central Question 
1.  Visit to an alien earth 
 
Imagine that some humans visit an Earth-like planet called Analog.  On Analog, the 
explorers find life, and not only the simplest forms of life (creatures like viruses or 
amoeba in our own world); they discover creatures who are thinkers, who have 
intentional states such as beliefs and desires.  Call these the Analogoids. 
 A group of humans, then, discover that Analogoids can think.  How could 
this discovery be made?  What sort of evidence would be relevant in making such a 
discovery?  What evidence would be necessary for the humans to reasonably draw 
this conclusion?  How certain could they be about their conclusion?  And what 
consequences would the discovery have for how the explorers could then interact 
with the Analogoids? 
 I will use this thought experiment to guide an investigation into the nature of 
thinking.  This will concern those mental states most uncontroversially taken to have 
intentional content: to be about something.  This includes beliefs, desires, hopes, 
entertainings, imaginings and so forth.  I call such states ‘thoughts’.   
My project, then, is to investigate what it takes to be a thinker, and this 
investigation will proceed via consideration of the following central question: 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, the word ‘internal’ indicates that the organisation of states, mechanisms etc. in 
question are supposed to be internal to the creature’s thinking apparatus, and 
should not be behavioural events.  It is not supposed to rule out that, even while 
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answering ‘Yes’ to the above question, we might hold that some being does its 
thinking outside of its body, for example because it thinks using a computer which is 
connected by radios to a robot body.   
The phrase ‘particular sorts’ indicates that the question concerns whether our 
concept of thought includes (or should include – the idea that our concept may need 
revision should not be ruled out at this stage) a commitment to the idea that thinking 
involves certain kinds of organisation which must be described by talking about 
more than just the behaviour and possible behaviour of the thinker.  Such an 
organisation and the states which constitute it will probably be taken to cause, or to 
have the potential to cause, certain behaviours.  However, the person who answers 
‘yes’ to the above question and then gives an account of what is needed in order for 
a being to be a thinker must, as Jackson and Pettit (1993) say, ‘tak[e] on a substantial 
commitment to the nature of the underlying causes of behaviour.’ (299)  Some 
examples of such commitments are given in the next section.       
If we answer ‘Yes’ to this question then the humans, when they say they have 
discovered that the Analogoids are thinkers, are saying that they have discovered 
that the Analogoids have such particular sorts of internal organisation (although this 
need not be inside anything recognisable as a head).  Anything that is evidence of 
the existence of such inner stuff is relevant for the making of this discovery.  The 
behaviour of the Analogoids may therefore be relevant as evidence of what is going 
on inside them.  It may even be very good evidence, strong enough to warrant 
reasonable belief in the explorer’s conclusion.  However, no matter how much 
behavioural evidence the humans have, they need more information to guarantee 
that the Analogoids are thinkers.  In particular, somehow looking more directly into 
the creatures’ thinking apparatus and finding out what is happening in there is also 
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relevant – and on most accounts in the ‘Yes’ camp necessary – to guarantee the 
conclusion about Analogoid thinking.1 
 On the other hand, if we answer ‘No’ to this question, we presumably have to 
say that the behaviour of a creature is more than mere fallible evidence of whether 
that creature is thinking.  We are then left with some further difficult questions to 
answer, about the nature of the relationship between behaviour and thought, about 
what behaviour is relevant to discovering whether or not a creature has a mind (or a 
particular thought), and about what that behaviour needs to be like in order for the 
creature to have a mind (or particular thought). 
 
2.  Two camps in the philosophy of mind 
 
The central question of the previous section could be used to split philosophers of 
mind into two camps. 2   There is a strong tradition which says, ‘Yes, there are 
particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order to count as 
a thinker.’  
 There are many very different positions within this ‘Yes’ camp: the tradition 
includes substance dualists, who say that thinking must take place ‘in’ a special, 
non-physical substance; it includes the attempts of type-type identity theorists to 
identify types of mental states with types of brain states; and it includes at least some 
brands of functionalism, namely those which see the independently describable 
internal causal organisation of states of the brain as important.  The important point 
                                                     
1 See positions 2 and 3 at the end of the next section for examples of theories which answer ‘Yes’ to the 
central question but nevertheless would not require us to look inside a creature’s thinking apparatus 
to guarantee that it was a thinker. 
2 Of course, these are only two camps into which we could divide such philosophers.  There are other 
important and central questions which could be used to divide up the field in different ways, for 
example the question of whether statements about the mind can be reduced to statements in the 
language of the hard sciences, and the question of whether we should be realists or anti-realists about 
the mind.  I believe it is possible to be a realist or an anti-realist and a reductionist or an anti-
reductionist in both the camps I describe, but will not argue for this in this thesis.   
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of agreement among all these positions is that what is happening inside a creature’s 
thinking apparatus is of utmost importance. 
From the writings of contemporary philosophers, a paradigm example of 
such a theory is offered by Fodor, who claims that understanding the mental 
requires us to postulate internal representational systems which utilise a language of 
thought.3  Searle is another ‘Yes’ camp member, stating that ‘Epistemically, we do 
learn about other people’s conscious mental states in part from their behaviour… But 
ontologically speaking, the phenomena in question can exist completely and have all 
of their essential properties independent of any behavioural output.’ (1992: 69)  
Block should also be counted as a member of the ‘Yes’ camp, due to his claim that 
‘whether behaviour is intelligent4 behaviour depends on the character of the internal 
information processing that produces it.’ (1981: 5)  Block cautions against giving a 
positive characterisation of the sort of information processing required for thought, 
and argues only that certain types of information processing cannot involve thought, 
regardless of the behaviour they produce.5  Still, he makes a commitment to the 
nature of the underlying cause of intelligent behaviour, and this is enough to place 
him in the ‘Yes’ camp.  There are numerous other examples, which I will not list here. 
 There is, however, a second camp in the philosophy of mind, members of 
which answer, ‘No, there are no particular sorts of internal organisation which a 
being must have in order to count as a thinker.’  What unities the members of this 
camp, then, is the denial of the central claim of the ‘Yes’ camp. 
 One example of this tradition is Turing’s approach to artificial intelligence.  
In his (1950) paper ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Turing proposed that 
we could replace the question ‘Can machines think?’ with ‘Are there imaginable 
digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?’(442)  The idea was 
that if a machine could fool a human conversational partner into thinking that it was 
                                                     
3 See for example his (1976). 
4 Intelligence here refers to the capacity for thought or reason. 
5 See chapter 7. 
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another human in a text only conversation, then we could count that machine as 
intelligent.  Turing took it that his test was overly stringent: he thought that 
computers might possess thought without being able to pass the imitation test.  
Nevertheless, passing the imitation test was supposed to be sufficient as a 
demonstration of intelligence: no matter what was going on inside the computer, if it 
could pass this test, it was a thinker. 
Another philosopher who placed himself firmly in the ‘No’ camp was 
Wittgenstein, as reflected in the following comments from Zettel: 
608.  No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in 
the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be 
impossible to read off thought processes from brain processes.  I mean this: if 
I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my 
brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts.  But why should 
the system continue further in the direction of the centre?  Why should this 
order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?   
609.  It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot 
be investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds 
to them. (1981: 106) 
Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological 
regularity corresponds? (Ibid.) 
Wittgenstein’s point here appears to be, not that he thinks that there couldn’t be any 
causal regularity at the neural level, but that there needn’t be.  And presumably, since 
psychological phenomena could turn out not to correspond systematically to 
anything at the physiological level, something other than the kinds of internal states 
and mechanisms a creature has must determine which mental states the creature has. 
 Two more recent philosophers who have answered ‘No’ to the question are 
Donald Davidson and Daniel C. Dennett.   Davidson, for example, says ‘What a fully 
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informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; 
the same goes for what the speaker believes.’ (2001: 148)  Given the context, and 
Davidson’s philosophy as a whole, it is clear both that this fully informed interpreter 
is not supposed to have information about the inner workings of the subject’s 
thinking apparatus, and that Davidson intends the claim to apply to more than just 
beliefs.  Dennett, on the other hand, says that ‘all there is to really and truly believing 
that p (for any proposition p) is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a 
belief in the best (most predictive) interpretation.’ (1987: 29)  Again, given the 
context, it is clear that coming up with an interpretation is not supposed to involve 
finding out about the inner workings of the creature’s thinking apparatus, and that 
the claim is supposed to apply not just to beliefs, but to thoughts more generally.  
Indeed, Dennett says that his theory of mind is ‘maximally neutral about the internal 
structures that accomplish the rational competences it presupposes’.  (2009: 346)  
Davidson and Dennett’s views are considered in more detail in chapter 2, and in 
later parts of this thesis. 
  
One might object that the central question introduced above does not divide the 
philosophical landscape neatly in two, because it is possible for a philosopher to sit 
on the fence between the two camps.  For example, a philosopher might say that 
certain behaviour is not merely a sign of certain inner states and processes, but a 
guarantee of a particular interior organisation, so that inner structure and outer 
behaviour cannot be separated in the way that both camps assume. 
To answer this criticism, we must distinguish three of the ways in which a 
philosopher might link internal organisation to behaviour or the potential for 
behaviour, and to thought.  These three positions are outlined below: 
 
1) According to our concept of thought, what is really important about thought 
is the sort of behaviour that results or can result from it.  Inner stuff is only 
relevant insofar as it has the potential to affect outer stuff.    However, it just 
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so happens (for example, because of empirically discoverable laws of nature) 
that the behaviour that is important to thought can only result from a specific 
kind of inner stuff, and so we can know, given the relevant behaviour, what 
the inner stuff producing it is like too.  Nevertheless, inner stuff is not a part 
of our concept of thought.6 
2) According to our concept of thought, thinking has to involve particular kinds 
of internal organisation.  However, it also just so happens that this inner stuff 
is the only thing which can produce behaviour of a particular kind, and so 
this sort of behaviour guarantees that the right sort of inner stuff is present.  
However, this behaviour is no part of our concept of thought. 
3) Our concept of thought involves both the idea of particular sorts of internal 
organisation, and the potential for a certain sort of behaviour.  Each also 
happens to guarantee the existence of the other. 
 
I count the second two options above as positions within the ‘Yes’ camp: they 
involve saying that a being must, according to our (or a related and better) concept 
of thought, possess particular sorts of internal organisation in order to count as a 
thinker, even though they allow that (the possibility of) certain behaviours might be 
an infallible indication of thought, and (in the case of position 3) also necessary for 
thought.  Only the first answer, which says that our concept of thought either does 
or perhaps should contain no commitment to any particular sort of inner stuff, 
counts as a position within the second camp.  To be in the ‘No’ camp, one must 
answer that, for all that is contained in the appropriate concept of thought, a thinker 
does not need to possess any particular sort of internal organisation. 
 Given the assumption that we want to give the same account for all kinds of 
thought, I therefore conclude that the two camps I have distinguished within the 
                                                     
6 For example, it might turn out that, in this world, only carbon based beings can produce behaviour 
complicated enough to warrant the attribution of thought.  Still, a silicon-based thinker is not 
conceptually impossible. 
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philosophy of mind provide a reasonable way to divide the terrain, since given this 
assumption one can only enter the second camp by denying the central claim of the 
first camp.  However, there is at least one possible position which still resists this 
sort of classification.  This position is discussed in Appendix 1.  For now, I proceed 
on the assumption that the central question I have identified is a useful question to 
ask. 
 
Since there are many philosophers who fall into the ‘Yes’ camp, someone who 
answers ‘No’ to the central question is making a contestable and interesting claim.  
The next section explores some reasons why someone might want to make such a 
claim. 
 
3.  Reasons for answering ‘No’ 
 
Recall that we are considering how to answer the following question: 
 
Are there particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in 
order to count as a thinker? 
 
There are various reasons why one might answer ‘No’ to this question, and some of 
them have to do with long philosophical arguments and/or complicated 
constellations of other philosophical commitments.  However, there are three quite 
intuitive considerations which may make a ‘No’ answer seem preferable.  I will focus 
on these. 
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3.1 Knowledge of minds 
If commonsense, everyday thinking about the mind involves a commitment to the 
existence of particular sorts of internal organisation, then we might worry that, given 
the lack of access the ordinary person has to such inner stuff, this leaves our beliefs 
about minds very vulnerable to sceptical attack. 
 In the first instance, this worry may present itself as a version of the problem 
of other minds: if when I suppose that you think x, I am supposing that an event y 
with such and such properties is taking place within your brain, but I have no 
evidence that this is occurring save for your behaviour, which by hypothesis cannot 
be enough to ensure the existence of event y, then how can I have sufficient 
justification for my belief?  The standard answers to the problem of other minds may 
then be employed: we can suggest that we justifiably believe that other people have 
certain thoughts, or indeed any thoughts at all, by an analogy with our own case, or 
because it is the hypothesis that best explains their behaviour, just like unobservable 
entities are justifiably postulated in scientific theories. 
 However, if we adopt certain positions within the ‘Yes’ camp, namely those 
which identify mental events with certain independently identifiable physical states, 
events, etc. – or at least say that mental events must involve such states, event etc. – 
then there is also a more radical problem for us to face.  If we say that when we think 
about minds we are speculating about such inner, physical stuff, then it seems that 
we may not even have unproblematic access to our own mental lives.  This further 
threatens our knowledge of other minds: the argument from analogy cannot work if 
we do not have a case to make an analogy from.   But it also suggests that we might 
be substantially mistaken about even our own mental lives.   
The idea that we are radically mistaken about our own and other’s thoughts is 
accepted by eliminativists about the mind, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland.  
Given the assumption that thought about the mind involves speculation about 
physical goings on inside a creature, they suggest the possibility that when we 
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develop the tools to look inside and attempt to gain independent confirmation of 
folk psychology (the things ordinary people believe about minds), we won’t find 
what we are expecting.  Indeed, the Churchlands argue that there are already 
reasons to doubt that our commonsense ideas about the mind constitute a good 
theory.7 
Of course, there are also dualist theories within the ‘Yes’ camp.  However, 
quite apart from seeming unappealing for other reasons, it is not clear that these can 
help us with this problem.  As well as potentially failing to find the physical 
structures that physicalist Yes-campers posit, advancing science might also reveal 
that there is no place in the causal chain for an immaterial substance to cause our 
behaviour.8 
 We are left with the possibility that our mentalistic talk just fails to refer: that 
there aren’t really any beliefs and desires or hopes and dreams, in ourselves or in 
other people.  Another possibility is that although our mentalistic talk does refer, we 
have radically mistaken beliefs about the things it refers to: for example, perhaps we 
are wrong about what beliefs and desires influence our actions, perhaps wrong 
about the idea that beliefs aim at truth, or wrong about the idea that reasoning ever 
precedes actions, rather than merely providing post hoc justifications.  
 Now, one might reply to this sort of worry (as some have replied to the 
Churchlands) by saying that we have good reason to think that our commonsense 
ideas about the mind won’t be undermined in this way.  We might say that the truth 
of commonsense psychology is the best explanation of how useful we find it, how 
good it is at generating predictions, and so on.  Such a reply agrees that 
commonsense psychology is a theory which postulates unobservable things whose 
existence we can and should be able to confirm in other ways.  It just argues that it is 
such a good theory that we can be very confident about finding such independent 
confirmation, and are already quite justified in employing it. 
                                                     
7 See for example Churchland (1989). 
8 Cf. Lewis (1966). 
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This response, however, concedes that all our most cherished beliefs about the 
mind are vulnerable to scientific refutation, even if such refutation looks unlikely.  We 
might think that this already concedes too much, that we can already be certain that 
we know some things about minds. 
 A line of thought that at least some will find intuitive, then, says that there is 
something special about minds and our knowledge of them in comparison to other 
unobservable things dealt with by scientific theorising.  According to this line of 
thought, we have to be substantially right about at least some important aspects of 
thought.  We do not need to worry about turning out to be drastically wrong about 
these things, not just because it’s unlikely, but because these ideas are not vulnerable 
to refutation in the same way that some of our other beliefs are.  This line of thought 
might also suggest that we do not need to show that commonsense thinking about 
the mind is good in the same way that some scientific theories are good. 
 It would, of course, be possible to push this line of thought too far.  We do not 
want to deny that there are many similarities between the ways we interact with and 
find out about other people and the ways we interact with and find out about other 
sorts of things.  We also shouldn’t deny that our beliefs about minds, even our own 
minds, are fallible.  We should accept that we can fail to understand other people or 
misjudge their motives and feelings, and that we sometimes engage in self-deception 
or display an unfortunate lack of self-knowledge.  Still, this does not mean that there 
is nothing to the idea that our beliefs about the mind have some immunity from 
scientific refutation.  And the inhabitants of the ‘No’ camp seem to face an easier task 
in explaining what is right about this idea.  If being a thinker consists in being 
disposed to or having the capacity to behave in certain sorts of ways given certain 
circumstances, then in a lot of cases we already have the evidence that we need to be 
sure of the existence of (and important aspects of the nature of) minds.  And if what 
goes on inside a person doesn’t matter as long as they (could) display the right 
behaviour, then we can be totally relaxed in our theory of mind regardless of what 
scientists may or may not find inside our heads. 
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This isn’t supposed to be a conclusive argument, and there are of course things that 
members of the ‘Yes’ camp can say about our knowledge of minds.  Nevertheless, 
this offers us a reason why, at least at first glance, the ‘No’ camp might look like an 
attractive place to be. 
 
3.2 Avoiding chauvinism 
Suppose that humans do, in fact, have the right sort of inner stuff to count as 
thinkers according to your chosen ‘Yes’ camp theory.  In that case, our claims to 
knowledge of human minds might be a little shaky, but at least our beliefs about our 
own and other humans’ mental states could be largely true.  Even so, the ‘Yes’ camp 
theory might still get the extension of ‘thinker’ wrong. 
Return to the example of the Analogoids.  Suppose that the explorers meet 
them, make contact, develop a way of communicating with them, enter into trade 
relations with them, enjoy social occasions with them, and believe that they have 
developed relationships of trust and friendship with them (a belief with which the 
Analogoids seem to claim to concur).  Then one day, a human scientist has an 
opportunity to look inside an Analogoid’s head-equivalent, and discovers that what 
is going on in there is totally different from what goes on inside a human brain, in 
such a way that the Analogoids do not fulfil your chosen ‘Yes’ camp theory’s 
conditions for being a thinker.  Suppose, in fact, that Wittgenstein’s hypothesis holds 
true of the Analogoids: there seems to be no inner physiological regularity correlated 
with their outer behaviour at all.  I take it that this would mean that the Analogoids 
would not fulfil the conditions for being a thinker on any materialist ‘Yes’ camp 
theory.  
It seems as though, if you have answered ‘Yes’ to the central question above, 
and you reject dualism, you ought to say that the scientist has discovered that the 
party of explorers were wrong about the existence of Analogoid thought: and 
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therefore wrong that what they had developed with them was a system of 
communication, and wrong that they had built relationships with them.  And if you 
accept that conclusion, it seems as if this should have a knock-on effect on how the 
humans should then treat the Analogoids: for example, perhaps it should mean that 
they are not morally obligated to honour trade agreements. 
But this seems both implausible and very unfair.  Surely scientific evidence 
about what goes on inside the Analogoids shouldn’t be able to undermine the 
significance of the Analogoids’ ability to interact with us?  This result suggests that 
theories in the ‘Yes’ camp are what Block calls ‘chauvinist’ (Block defines 
chauvinism by saying that ‘theories are chauvinist insofar as they falsely deny that 
systems have mental properties.’ (1980b: 292)) 
 An easy way to avoid the problem would be to move into the ‘No’ camp.  If 
the explorers’ conclusions about Analogoid thought weren’t conclusions about the 
existence of particular sorts of inner states, mechanisms, structures (etc.) in the first 
place, then the discovery that such inner stuff does not exist wouldn’t threaten the 
conclusion about thought. 
 
Again, there may be ways to try to avoid this problem from within the ‘Yes’ camp.  
However, for the moment we can take this as another prima facie advantage of 
answering ‘No’: it seems to make it easier to avoid chauvinism. 
 
3.3 Origins and uses of psychological concepts  
Ordinary conversation is replete with psychological concepts: we talk about what we 
and other people think and want, what we intend to do, how we feel about various 
situations, how sure we are about the things we believe or want to do.  We are 
taught to use such language as children, and the relevant terms (‘think’, ‘want’, 
‘hope’, ‘intend’, ‘fear’, etc.) are introduced to us in the context of certain behaviours 
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in certain environments.  This is true both of being taught to apply such words to 
other people, and being taught to apply them to ourselves. 
 In the case of applying such terms to other people, the confirmation and 
disconfirmation conditions we use in everyday life for the application of 
psychological concepts involve behaviour, not the inner workings of those other 
people’s brains.  This is so simply because we do not ordinarily have any access to 
the inner workings of their brains, except insofar as this results in behaviour.  Our 
only option is to watch what people do and listen to what they say.  In our own case, 
things seem to be somewhat different.  It appears that we don’t usually need to look 
at our own behaviour in order to discover what we think.  However, even if we do 
have a special sort of access to our own thoughts, it is difficult to explain how this 
can play a role in fixing the content of shared concepts, expressed by words in a 
shared language, except insofar as it results in behaviour. 
 Given certain theories of meaning, most notably verificationist theories, these 
sorts of considerations might be enough to establish that psychological concepts 
concern behaviour, rather than hidden inner states or mechanisms.  However, one 
does not have to be a verificationist in order to think that the circumstances in which 
a concept is introduced and learned are relevant to its meaning, and one might 
further think that reasons need to be given for thinking that the meaning goes 
beyond such considerations in a particular case. 
 Such a reason might be found in the use to which we put particular concepts.  
But in the case of psychological concepts, when we look at the role they play in our 
lives, we might think that we find further reason to suppose that these concepts do 
not need to concern inner stuff.  Many philosophers have emphasised the role such 
concepts play in explaining, predicting and manipulating the behaviour of other 
people.9  Others, for example Heal (2003), suggest that there is something wrong 
with taking our dealings with each other to be so similar to the ways in which we 
                                                     
9 Cf. Dennett (1987) and Cherniak (1986). 
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explain, predict and manipulate ordinary physical objects.  Still, they emphasise the 
role of psychological concepts in structuring our interactions with each other: they 
just think that a broader understanding of these interactions is needed.10   
Support for the idea that this is indeed how we use psychological concepts, 
and that this use should incline us towards positions in the ‘No’ camp, can again be 
found by looking at our reaction to the Analogoid case in the previous section.  It 
seems plausible that it is the fact that psychological concepts provide such satisfying 
explanations of Analogoid behaviour, and facilitate fruitful interaction, that makes it 
seem so reasonable to apply the concepts to them and so unreasonable to withdraw 
attributions of thought, regardless of what is going on inside. 
 
Once again, I don’t pretend to have offered anything like a knock-down argument 
here.  Rather, I present these thoughts as another source of prima facie support for a 
‘No’ answer, suggesting merely that certain facts about the origins and uses of 
psychological concepts might be easier to account for if we situate ourselves in the 
‘No’ camp.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
I conclude that there is some intuitive plausibility to the claim that is definitive of 
what I have called the ‘No’ camp – i.e. the claim that our concept of thought does or 
perhaps should not entail that there are particular sorts of internal organisation that 
a creature must have in order to count as a thinker.  If we want to give this answer, 
however, some difficult questions arise, as outlined in section 1: questions about the 
relationship between behaviour and mind; about what sort of behaviour is relevant 
to whether or not a creature has a particular thought; and about what that behaviour 
needs to be like in order for the creature to have a mind or particular thought.  In 
                                                     
10 This issue will be discussed further in chapter 10, section 6. 
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order to capitalise on the suggested advantages of being in the ‘No’ camp, we need 
to show that something can be said in response to these questions. 
  
In the next chapter, I introduce interpretationism as a position in the ‘No’ camp. 
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Chapter 2 - Interpretationism 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to characterise interpretationism in enough detail that 
it becomes clear: 
 
1. What its central features are; 
2. How it differs from another, more famous, theory in the ‘No’ camp, namely 
analytic behaviourism; 
3. What varieties of interpretationism are on offer; and 
4. How we need to develop interpretationism if we are to produce a clear and 
plausible theory. 
 
I present the central features of interpretationism in sections 1 and 2.  Section 1 
characterises the position very roughly through two positive and two negative 
claims, and section 2 shows why the two positive claims come together through a 
consideration of the kind of interpretation that interpretationism takes to be so 
important in the philosophy of mind.   Together, these sections illustrate the 
difference between interpretationism and analytic behaviourism, understood as the 
thesis that statements containing mentalistic terminology can be paraphrased or 
translated into statements which only use behavioural terminology. 
However, at the end of section 2 important questions remain about the precise 
content of interpretationism’s central claims and the kind of account of thought that 
interpretationism is trying to give.  In section 3 I show that there is no one answer to 
such questions, because interpretationism as I have characterised it can be broken 
down into four sub-categories.  One of these also exhibits a further difference from 
analytic behaviourism. 
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Finally, in section 4 I introduce some apparently obvious counterexamples to 
interpretationism, and outline my plan for tackling them and developing 
interpretationism further through the rest of this thesis.  
 
1.  Four claims 
 
The position that I am interested in when I use the name ‘interpretationism’ is a 
position within the ‘No’ camp.  It therefore denies the central claim of the ‘Yes’ camp, 
and so says that our concept of thought either does not or should not entail that 
there are particular sorts of internal organisation that a being must have in order to 
count as a thinker.  It also makes four more distinctive claims, as I outline in this 
section. 
The first positive claim is that a being has a thought iff it is interpretable as 
having that thought.  I will call this the Availability Claim.  There is much to be said 
about what interpretation and interpretability amount to, and this is discussed in 
some detail in section 2 below and throughout this thesis.  In Part II, I distinguish 
different kinds of interpretability, and argue that the interpretationist should adopt a 
weak notion of it. However, for the purposes of outlining the central features of 
interpretationism, it is only necessary to say that the information required for the 
sort of interpretation in question concerns only the being’s environment, its 
interactions with that environment and possibly some other behaviour.  It does not 
concern the things happening inside the being’s thinking apparatus.11  Characterised 
in this sparse way, the Availability Claim is something that the analytic behaviourist 
agrees with.   
                                                     
11 Unless the being in question has some manner of access to the stuff happening within its thinking 
apparatus using those of its senses which register things about its environment.  Suppose, for 
example, that a creature had a transparent head, and that parts of its brain lit up when active.  
Suppose that this creature were to stand in front of a mirror watching a part of its brain that was 
alight and wondering whether the wondering it was engaged in had a spatial location within the 
glowing lobe.  Aspects of the inner workings of the creature’s thinking apparatus would then count as 
a part of the creature’s environment and so some information about them should be allowed in 
determining whether their thoughts were interpretable.   
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It should be noted that the insistence on the sufficiency of interpretability is 
the major difference between Child’s (1994) characterisation of interpretationism and 
my own: Child, being concerned with any view in which considering interpretation 
plays a central role in our understanding of thought, is also interested in those views 
on which interpretation of behaviour must be supplemented with other information, 
including information about the inner states, processes etc. that are picked out as 
important by people in the ‘Yes’ camp.  What I simply call ‘interpretationism’, Child 
refers to as ‘pure interpretationism’. (1994: 40)  The claim about the necessity of 
interpretability, on the other hand, is important to my kind of interpretationism for 
the same reason that it is important to Child: because it allows us to say that 
interpretationism tells us something positive about the nature of thought.12    
  The second positive claim that interpretationism makes is that all thinkers are, 
in some sense, rational.  I will call this the Rationality Claim.  This is not something 
that analytic behaviourism needs to commit itself to, and indeed behaviourism has 
not generally been taken to make any claims about the rationality of thinkers.  
Nevertheless, a commitment to rationality could easily be added to the traditional 
analytic behaviourist theory.  The Rationality Claim does not, therefore, immediately 
mark an important difference between interpretationism and analytic behaviourism. 
The most important differences between analytic behaviourism and 
interpretationism are contained within two negative claims that I take 
interpretationism to make.  The first of these involves interpretationism’s answer to 
a question, posed in chapter 1, for anyone in the ‘No’ camp: what is the nature of the 
relationship between behaviour and mind?  The analytic behaviourist says that the 
relationship is one of identity, whereas interpretationism, as I define it, denies this.   
 What then does the interpretationist say that thoughts are?  I take it that 
different interpretationists might give different answers to this, but that one of the 
answers open to them is to say that individual thoughts (such as my current belief 
                                                     
12 Cf. Child (1994: 23-4, 27 and 31-32). 
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that it is raining) are identical to inner states, events etc. (such as some particular 
current state of my brain).  Interpretationism does not thereby pass into the ‘Yes’ 
camp, however, because it says that all that is important about such states, insofar as 
they count as thoughts, is what environmental factors produce them, what 
behaviours they do or could result in, and how the subject can therefore be 
interpreted.  Thus, interpretationism makes no substantial commitments concerning 
the nature of the inner states, beyond their connection to the subject’s surroundings 
and behaviour.  If the interpretationist can make this proposal work, then they avoid 
an objection that is sometimes13 levelled at analytic behaviourism: that it wrongly 
denies that our thoughts cause our actions.  The interpretationist will be able to 
allow that thoughts cause the behaviours that we commonly suppose them to. 
The second negative claim of interpretationism involves denying that there is 
anything useful to say about the behaviour connected to a particular thought (such 
as a desire for ice cream) or even a kind of thought (such as desire).  Here again, 
interpretationism directly denies one of the claims of analytic behaviourism.  Unlike 
behaviourism, interpretationism demands only that each thought be interpretable, 
and so it can accept that there could be many, even an infinite number, of total 
situated behavioural states which would allow an interpreter to interpret one 
particular thought (such as the desire for an ice cream).  Of course, given each total 
situated behavioural state, the interpreter also needs to interpret many other 
thoughts as well, as I discuss further in the next section. 
 Since interpretationism does not try to analyse our talk about thought into 
talk about behaviour, this makes it look much less vulnerable to another objection 
that is sometimes levelled at analytic behaviourism: the Chisholm-Geach objection.14  
This objection accuses analytic behaviourism of circularity by arguing that for any 
particular thought or kind of thought, we cannot link it to behaviours or potentials 
for behaviour without talking about other mental states or kinds of mental state.  
                                                     
13 See, for example, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007).  
14 See for example Block (1981). 
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Interpretationism cannot suffer from the kind of circularity attributed to 
behaviourism if it does not give the analyses in which this circularity was uncovered. 
 
Interpretationism, then, is a position which says that thinkers are fully interpretable 
and in some sense rational, and which explicitly rejects two of the commitments of 
analytic behaviourism which triggered problems for that theory.   
 However, even while admitting that interpretationism is an alternative to 
analytic behaviourism, some philosophers would argue that it remains a brand of 
behaviourism.  For example, Block (1981) and Davies (1991) appear to class any 
position within the ‘No’ camp as a kind of behaviourism.  Davies would count a 
position like my version of interpretationism as a kind of ‘supervenient 
behaviourism’ (255), and based on the comments in his (1998) paper, I take it that 
Alex Byrne would agree.   
 I do not disagree that in some ways ‘supervenient behaviourism’ is an 
appropriate way to categorise interpretationism as I have characterised it.  However, 
given the unpopularity of traditional behaviourism, it would be an off-putting label 
for many, and would perhaps discourage people from giving interpretationism the 
further consideration I think it deserves.  Therefore, I will not be using that label.   
 
So far, I have only explained interpretationism in very rough terms.  To understand 
it better, and to show how its claims are connected and why it exhibits some of the 
differences from analytic behaviourism that it does, we must look more closely at the 
kind of interpretation that it takes to be important.  This is the task of the next 
section. 
 
2.  The interpretation in interpretationism 
 
In this thesis, and in the work of philosophers I count as interpretationists, ‘interpret’ 
and its cognates are used extensively.  There is talk of the process of interpretation, 
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the method and assumptions of interpretation; of interpretation theory; of homely, 
radical, real and idealised interpreters; of people and languages being interpreted; of 
individual thoughts, actions or sentences being interpreted; and of ‘interpretability’, 
and what that could mean. 
 As Simon Blackburn has pointed out, the use of ‘interpret’ seems more at 
home in some of these contexts than in others.  Blackburn also gives an example of a 
request for interpretation sounding odd: ‘suppose I show you a familiar domestic 
object which is obviously, say, a spoon, and ask you ‘James thought this was a spoon.  
How do you interpret that?’  Then you would be at a loss.  What are you supposed 
to say (absent some strange context)?’15  In response to these comments, I will outline 
four possible meanings of ‘interpretation’ and explain how I take these to relate to 
the project of interpretationism.  
 First of all, ‘interpretation’ may be used as more or less synonymous with 
‘identification’.  When the interpretationist talks about interpreting a thought or 
sentence, he is often referring to identifying that thought or sentence in the sense of 
establishing its existence and determining its content.  The question of whether a 
thought or sentence is interpretable is then the question of whether it can be 
identified in this way using the method which the interpretationist considers to be 
important. 
 On the other hand, ‘interpretation’ may be used to refer to gaining a 
particular sort of understanding: the sort of understanding given by explanations in 
terms of reasons.  For example, I might wonder how, in this sense, to interpret a ball 
being thrown in my direction: as a mistake, an attack, or an invitation to play. 
 ‘Interpretation’ may also be used to refer to simplifying and/or clarifying 
something.  For example, one might ask for an interpretation of a paragraph of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, even in its English translation.  One could thereby ask 
                                                     
15 Personal correspondence. 
24 
 
for a simpler restatement of the paragraph, or a summary of its important points, 
rather than an account of the reasons why Kant wrote it. 
 Finally, ‘interpretation’ might refer to a process of attributing significance to 
an event or object, without explaining this by calling on the reasons of a person.  So, 
for example, a doctor might be taken to interpret the symptoms of their patient, or a 
scientist might interpret the results of their experiment.  This may also be the sort of 
interpretation applied, less successfully, to tea leaves, entrails, or configurations of 
stars in attempts at divination. 
 These four kinds of interpretation are related to each other.  The second and 
the fourth both involve giving a kind of explanation of an object or event, but I think 
they are worth distinguishing because only the first has to involve attributing 
reasons to a particular being.  The third may seem separate from the second as far as 
the questioner is concerned, but the person who wishes to give the third kind of 
interpretation of a paragraph of Kant probably needs to engage in the first two kinds 
of interpretation in order to do this well. 
 Interpretationism is concerned primarily with the first two kinds of 
interpretation.  It is interested in a process of trying to identify thoughts through a 
process of understanding and explaining persons and their actions.  The fact that the 
word ‘interpret’ rather than ‘identify’ is applied to thoughts reflects the fact that it is 
this particular method of identification that the interpretationist is interested in. 
 Given these considerations, we can partly explain why the word ‘interpret’ 
sometimes seems odd when applied to thoughts.  Take Blackburn’s example above: 
here we can say that the request to interpret is indeed misplaced, because the first 
sort of interpretation has already occurred, the second and third are unnecessary 
(the thought is stated as simply and clearly as one could wish, and there are no 
special explanations required for you to understand why a person might think that a 
spoon is a spoon), and the fourth sort of interpretation is not something we are used 
to applying to everyday thoughts about spoons.  That there are different kinds of 
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interpretation, together with conversational implicature, creates much of the 
strangeness here. 
 This may not completely dissipate the oddness, however.  One might object 
that ‘interpretation’ is far more naturally applied to the understanding of a language, 
and that there is an important disanalogy between language and the mind: in 
interpreting parts of a language, an interpreter can focus on what he is interpreting, 
a series of noises perhaps, or some marks on a page, in a way that we do not 
ordinarily think possible in the supposed interpretation of thought.  Unless we are to 
identify thoughts with behaviour, as the behaviourist did, we cannot see or hear 
other people’s thoughts.  Thus one might object that they are not available to be 
interpreted until the identification has taken place.  It may therefore continue to feel 
slightly inappropriate to talk about interpreting thoughts in the sense that the 
interpretationist intends.  
This is perhaps one of the reasons why Child (1994) insists that a person, 
rather than their thoughts, is always the primary object of interpretation.  Another 
reason for saying this relates to the impossibility of ‘interpreting’ thoughts one at a 
time, and the need to consider all of a person’s interactions with their environment.  
This will be discussed in more detail shortly.  I agree with Child in this matter.  
However, since I am interested particularly in thoughts which are difficult for an 
interpreter to identify and attribute, I will sometimes talk about what it means for 
particular thoughts to be ‘interpretable’ as a useful shorthand. 
 Having determined something further about what sort of interpretation 
interpretationism is interested in, we can add to our characterisation of the theory: 
we can say that interpretationism takes thoughts to be things which are identifiable 
by a process of understanding and explaining thinkers and their actions in terms of 
reasons, that thoughts are essentially involved in a creature acting for reasons, and 
that thinkers are beings susceptible to understanding in terms of reasons, and 
therefore creatures with purposes and reasons for doing things.   
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The Availability Claim, understood using this notion of interpretation, ceases 
to be something that the analytic behaviourist needs to commit to: the analytic 
behaviourist does not need to say that thinkers and their actions are always 
susceptible to explanation in terms of reasons in order to count as an analytic 
behaviourist, just as he does not need to make any commitments concerning the 
rationality of thinkers.  The two are obviously connected, and this offers the 
beginnings of an account of why the interpretationist’s Availability and Rationality 
Claims come together: it seems that a thinker needs to be rational to at least some 
degree in order for the kind of interpretation of them which is supposed to be 
possible to take place.   
 
How exactly does the process of identifying thoughts through understanding and 
explaining thinkers and their actions in terms of reasons work?  And what 
relationship does this sort of interpretation bear to our own real life methods of 
understanding each other?  These are questions to which different interpretationists 
may give different answers.  For example, different answers are given by the two 
most famous interpretationists, Dennett and Davidson. 16  Rather than engage in 
exegesis, I will briefly outline two common features of the two accounts to produce a 
sketch of how interpretation may proceed, and illustrate them using two examples.  I 
will then comment on some of the differences between Dennett and Davidson’s 
accounts. 
 According to both Davidson and Dennett, interpretation must begin by 
assuming that the subject is, at least to some degree, rational.  It then proceeds by the 
interpreter working out, using this assumption together with a lot of information 
                                                     
16 A clear account of the procedure Dennett envisages is given in his paper ‘True Believers’ (contained 
in his (1987)).  Davidson describes the process of interpretation that concerns him in a variety of ways 
over several decades, and one may question to what extent Davidson’s writings present us with a 
single, gradually elaborated picture of interpretation, and to what extent he changes his account over 
the course of his career.  A good review is given in chapters 12 and 14 of Lepore and Ludwig (2005). 
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about the subject’s history, environment and behaviour, what the subject must think 
at different times and, if they have language, also what they mean by their 
utterances.  The interpreter must attribute many thoughts to their subject, and these 
must make sense not only in light of aspects of the subject’s situation and behaviour, 
but also in light of each other: the thoughts attributed need to fit together. 
 First, take the example above of a person throwing a ball in my direction.  In 
order to interpret their thoughts at the time, we proceed on the supposition that they 
had a reason for throwing the ball, and we try to work out what the reason might be.  
There are several candidates: they want me to participate in a game, they want to 
annoy me, they want to get my attention, and so on.  To work out which is the real 
reason, we need more information. 
 We look, then, at other aspects of the situation.  Suppose that this person and I 
are both standing near a basketball court.  That makes the first option look sensible.  
We might refine our attribution, and say that he wants me to play basketball.  
However, to confirm this hypothesis, we must be sure of certain other things.  For 
example, does this person have any experience of basketball courts and what 
happens on them?  If he has never seen or heard of one before, then how could he 
desire to play basketball?  But suppose we have seen this person on basketball courts 
quite often before, and he has often behaved, in conjunction with other people 
behaving similarly, in accordance with the rules of basketball.  We might then 
attribute to him knowledge of the rules of basketball, and suppose that he frequently 
has the desire to play it.   
However, given just this behaviour, there is still a lot we don’t know about his 
frequent desire to play, and this may affect whether it makes sense to think he wants 
to play with me on this occasion.  Does this person just love playing basketball?  Or 
does he see it as a means to something else he desires?  Basketball could be a means 
to many things: fitness, companionship, social status, his father’s approval.  We need 
to look at more of this person’s situation and behaviour to find out the nature of his 
frequent desire to play. 
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Suppose, first, we look at his relationship with his father.  This will, 
presumably, involve looking at quite a lot of linguistic behaviour on the part of both 
father and son, and so to make use of this source of information we need to be able 
to understand the language (or languages, or idiolects) in which father and son 
speak to each other.  Suppose that we have enough information, and have it 
organised perspicuously enough, to be confident that we can understand what 
father and son say to each other, and suppose that we hear the father frequently 
complaining that the son spends too much time playing sports when he ought to 
spend more time studying.  Perhaps the father suggests that he gives up basketball.  
That counts against the hypothesis that the son wants to play basketball to please his 
father.  Suppose, moreover, that the son refuses, and gives as a reason that people 
like him because he’s on the basketball team.  That counts in favour of the 
hypothesis that at least part of the reason he wants to play basketball is because of 
the social status it gives him.  We may then look at a lot of other verbal and non-
verbal behaviour of this person, and consider potential reasons behind it, in order to 
further support the hypothesis that social status is very important to him. 
 Suppose the hypothesis about a desire for social status explains much of this 
person’s behaviour very well.  This may then have an effect on what reason we 
should attribute to him in throwing the ball at me.  Suppose that I have very little 
social status.  In conjunction with other behaviour from our peers, this may make it 
reasonable to suppose that playing basketball with me would damage this person’s 
social status.  And the person who threw the ball may have done many things in the 
past which indicate that he knows my social status, and knows how, according to the 
prevailing social norms, he therefore ought to treat me.  Suppose also that there are 
other people around at the time that the ball is thrown, whose situated behaviour 
suggests that they are very keen enforcers of the social norms just mentioned, and 
suppose that the person who threw the ball at me has just uttered the word ‘Hello,’ 
while facing these people.  We can then attribute to him the belief that they are there, 
and may be watching his behaviour. 
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Given all of this information, the hypothesis that the person wants to play 
with me seems very unlikely.  It seems more likely that he wants to annoy me.  
Perhaps more information is required to confirm this.  Still, it is already clear that in 
order to work out the reason behind quite a simple piece of behaviour, we have had 
to look at a great deal more behaviour than just the throwing of the ball, and have 
had to attribute many more beliefs, desires and intentions to the person who threw it.  
We could also imagine this process of interpretation being used in the 
example from the beginning of chapter 1, the case of the humans who meet the 
Analogoids.  Suppose that when the humans land on Analog, a group of Analogoids 
approach them as they exit their spaceship, one alien makes a series of noises, and 
then all of the aliens spread their arms outwards and up a little above their heads 
and display their teeth.  The humans begin by supposing that the Analogoids 
wanted to do these things, that they had reasons for doing them.  But based on such 
a small snapshot of Analogoid behaviour they do not know what the noises or the 
gestures signify about the Analogoids’ thoughts.  Of particular concern to the 
humans is the fact that they do not know what the Analogoids think about their 
arrival.  Again, there are several options: the Analogoids might want to welcome 
them to their planet, they might want to warn the humans off, they might want to 
deliver a non-committal sort of greeting and to make their minds up about whether 
humans are good to have around later, or they might be in the middle of performing 
a religious ceremony which they had long planned to perform at this time and place, 
and which they feel compelled to continue with despite the unfortunate arrival of 
some odd-looking creatures in the relevant location.  Suppose that the leader of the 
humans decides the best thing to do is to imitate the Analogoids: she makes a speech, 
then spreads out her arms and smiles, and her crew follow her lead.  To everyone’s 
relief, the Analogoids do not pounce on them, and the humans decide that the noises 
made by the lead Analogoid did not mean, ‘Get back into that spaceship this instant 
or we shall rip you to pieces with our hands and teeth.’  The humans and 
Analogoids then begin to observe and interact with each other. 
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The interpretation of the Analogoids will be more difficult than the 
interpretation of the ball-thrower, because the humans cannot call on shared 
knowledge of social norms etc.  Additionally, interpreting the Analogoid’s language 
is a very important part of the process and (unlike in the normal situations we 
encounter) it must start from scratch.    These features make the interpretation of the 
Analogoids a case of what Davidson calls radical interpretation.  This is the sort of 
case that he focuses on, and it makes particularly clear how much information about 
behaviour must be gathered and systematised, and why assuming that a subject has 
reasons for the things they do is necessary if you want to work out what they think.  
These features also, however, make it harder to describe a particular case concisely.  
The interpretation of language, for example, surely involves information about its 
use in all sorts of different situations, together with assumptions that the speakers 
are saying true and pertinent things with it on many occasions.  This emphasises the 
fact that information about a great deal of behaviour is required, while also entailing 
that it would be very tedious to describe in detail how the humans work out what 
the first noises an Analogoid directed towards them meant. 
 
The two examples above provide rough illustrations of the sort of process that both 
Dennett and Davidson have in mind when they talk about interpretation.  However, 
as mentioned above, there are important differences between the two accounts.  Two 
major differences include the centrality of prediction (Dennett emphasises prediction 
far more than does Davidson) and the importance of language (Davidson describes a 
process which centrally involves the interpretation of a subject’s utterances, and 
argues that non-linguistic creatures cannot think.  Dennett applies his method of 
interpretation to non-linguistic creatures, including very simple beings such as 
thermostats and clams).  For the moment, I remain neutral on these issues.  However, 
both will be discussed in Part III. 
Dennett and Davidson also disagree on how the process they describe relates 
to what we actually do when we understand one another.  Dennett thinks that the 
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process he describes is our process (1987: 11) and moreover that it is something we 
can’t avoid doing with respect to ourselves and our fellows (1987: 27).  On the other 
hand Davidson, at least in later work,17 suggests that we cannot use his ‘official’ 
method of discovering other people’s thoughts (radical interpretation), but that it 
reveals to us what the possibility of our interpretation of persons depends on.  This 
is an important difference, because it affects the sorts of objections we might present.  
If we are told that the process of interpretation that is important is just our process, 
then we face two problems.  First, we may worry that focusing too closely on our 
own interpretational abilities and methods, will, because of contingent human 
limitations, prevent us from being able to attribute thought to some possible thinkers.  
Second, what method we use to understand each other seems to be an empirical 
question.  We may then worry that scientific discoveries about how our process of 
interpretation works may show that we don’t use anything like the method that 
Dennett, for example, suggests.  However, if we are told that interpretationism does 
not focus on our method of understanding each other, then it is much less clear how 
we can justify our approach by pointing to the way real humans acquire and use 
psychological concepts, and what they think they know about minds.18   
There are, then, two potentially problematic ways to understand the 
relationship between the process of interpretation described by interpretationism 
and our actual methods of finding out about each others’ minds.  Perhaps the ideal 
solution would be to adopt some sort of middle position, which would allow us to 
avoid both sets of problems.  However, in this thesis I will not attempt to give a full 
account of how this could be done.  Rather, I keep the potential problems above in 
view, and aim to develop interpretationism in such a way that this issue will be 
tractable. 
                                                     
17 See for example his (2004: 128). 
18 For this as a criticism of Davidson’s approach, see Rescorla (forthcoming), which asks of Davidson’s 
strategy ‘Why this make believe?’ 
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This means that the process of interpretation invoked must be at least closely 
related to our methods.  It might be a description of our methods at a high level of 
abstraction, or it might be a rational reconstruction of our methods.  It may in some 
ways be an idealisation of our method, but it is important that it not ignore 
important features of our situation that interpretationism is supposed to help us to 
understand.  In particular, it must not ignore human limitations in such a way as to 
make it obscure how finite creatures such as ourselves can have thoughts and can 
interpret the thoughts of others.  Whichever of the above best describes the 
relationship, it must be plausible to say that considering the method of interpretation 
picked out by interpretationism tells us what the possibility and reliability of our 
method relies on.  I will comment on how this issue may be pursued further in Part 
IV. 
  
At this point, I hope that the reader feels that they have some grip on what I mean by 
interpretationism.  We do, after all, know something about what sort of 
interpretation it takes to be important, we know some of the claims that 
interpretationism makes about thinkers and thoughts, and we know some of the 
things that make interpretationism different from analytic behaviourism. 
Still, there are some very important things we do not know.  Take the claims 
that interpretationism makes about thoughts and thinkers: it says that thoughts are 
things which are identifiable by a process of coming to understand and explaining 
thinkers and their actions in terms of reasons and that they are essentially involved 
in a subject acting for reasons, and it says that thinkers are beings susceptible to 
understanding in terms of their reasons, and therefore creatures with purposes and 
reasons for doing things.  But what is the status of these claims?  What are they 
trying to do – to give us definitions of ‘thought’ and ‘thinker’, to provide an analysis 
of our concepts?  Or are they supposed to do something else?  Without knowing the 
answers to such questions, we cannot know what sort of a theory of mind we are 
dealing with, nor assess it appropriately.  I have not answered these questions up 
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front because the sort of interpretationism I am interested in encompasses sub-types 
which give different answers to these questions. 
 In the next section, I introduce a four-way distinction between types of 
interpretationism, and explain the kind of account each attempts to give of thought, 
how each treats the central claims that any interpretationist makes about thought 
and thinkers, how they see the relationship between the Availability and Rationality 
Claims, and what particular problems each might face.  As mentioned in the 
introduction above, one type of interpretationism also exhibits a further difference 
from analytic behaviourism. 
 
3.  Varieties of interpretationism 
 
3.1 Derivative interpretationism 
The aim of derivative interpretationism is to give an analysis of thought in 
independent terms.  These independent terms do not include ‘interpretation’.  
Nevertheless, according to derivative interpretationism it is a consequence of the 
correct analysis that every thought is interpretable.  This seems to be the position 
that Child (1994) has in mind when he uses the label ‘non-constitutive 
interpretationism’. 
 On this view, thought consists in a sort of pattern19 in the life of one subject 
which can be specified without invoking the idea of interpretation.  Two of the 
claims above: that thoughts are things which are identifiable by a process of coming 
to understand and explaining thinkers and their actions in terms of reasons, and that 
thinkers are beings susceptible to this kind of understanding, are then just the results 
of the analysis of thought and thinkers.  They do not provide a definition or an 
analysis.   
                                                     
19 Cf. Dennett’s paper ‘Real Patterns’ in his (1998).  I use the term very broadly, to cover both the 
actions of the creature over time, and its changing dispositional profile. 
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 We must then ask what analysis the derivative interpretationist will give.  
How will they describe the patterns necessary for thought and thinkers?  Well, these 
patterns will be ones which make the thinkers rational.  I will take it that the 
derivative interpretationist will explain these patterns in terms of some notion of 
rationality, and that they will therefore take the Rationality Claim from section 1 as 
prior to the Availability Claim.  It should be noted straight away, however, that the 
notion of rationality in play here may not be the notion that immediately comes to 
mind when we hear the word ‘rationality’. 
 In some ways, derivative interpretationism is an ambitious theory: it aims, 
after all, to give a proper analysis of the concept of thought, and it may even 
ultimately try to analyse psychological concepts in terms of non-psychological ones 
(if rationality is not taken as a psychological concept, or can be further analysed in 
terms of non-psychological concepts), and intentional concepts in terms of non-
intentional ones (if rationality can ultimately be analysed in non-intentional terms).  
However, as a form of interpretationism, Child (1994) is right that it is not very 
ambitious.  Derivative interpretationism does not suggest a particularly distinctive 
or important role for the idea of interpretation to play in the understanding of 
thought.   
 The greatest problem for this form of interpretationism is to give the 
promised analysis: to say something sensible about rationality without talking about 
thought and interpretation, which then allows us to derive the consequence that all 
thought is indeed interpretable. 
 
3.2 Analytic interpretationism 
The aim of analytic20 interpretationism is to also to give an analysis of thought in 
independent terms, but it says that one of the most important of these terms is 
                                                     
20 This is an unfortunate name for this position, invoking as it does the analytic-synthetic distinction 
and all its attendant problems, while also recalling both analytic behaviourism and analytic 
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‘interpretability’.  According to such an account, having a thought is constituted by 
being interpretable as having that thought: and one has a thought in virtue of being 
interpretable as having that thought.  The claims above, that thoughts are things 
which are identifiable by a process of understanding and explaining thinkers and 
their actions in terms of reasons, and that thinkers are beings susceptible to this kind 
of understanding, do then give us an analysis of the concepts of thought and 
thinkers.   This is the position that Child (1994) seems to have most prominently in 
mind when he uses the label ‘constitutive interpretationism’. 
 The question of where rationality fits into this account is a little harder than 
with the previous account.  It seems that there are two possibilities: either the 
rationality of thinkers might be taken as a consequence of their interpretability, or 
the notion of rationality might play some role in our account of interpretation.  Thus, 
it is unclear whether, on this view, the Availability Claim is strictly prior to the 
Rationality Claim or not.21  As a form of interpretationism, it is clear that analytic 
interpretationism is highly ambitious: it claims that the notion of interpretation is 
essential in understanding the nature of thought. 
 The greatest problem for this form of interpretationism is, as Child points out, 
that it appears to be circular.  In fact, Child suggests three circularity objections to 
this theory: first, that interpretability cannot be explained without reference to the 
properties people are interpretable as having, i.e. thoughts, which are what we were 
supposed to be analysing; second, that interpreting someone involves having a 
propositional attitude about them, and we can ask what it is for an interpreter to 
have this attitude, thus leading to a vicious regress; and third, that interpretationism 
tries to explain what it is to be a rational agent in terms of interpretability, but to 
understand interpretability, we have to use the idea of it being possible to treat the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
functionalism, even though the theory in question is not necessarily analytic in exactly the sense that 
either of those two theories are analytic. Nevertheless, I cannot think of another more suitable name. 
21 More on notions of priority shortly. 
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creature as if it were a rational agent, and so the idea of a rational agent must explain, 
rather than being dependent on, the idea of interpretability. 
 One way to react to these threats would be to retreat to derivative 
interpretationism.  However, analytic interpretationism might have the resources to 
address them.  For example, if the notion of rationality is taken as prior to the notion 
of rational agency, and rationality is part of our account of interpretation, it appears 
there is more potential for avoiding circularity than if the rationality of thought is 
merely taken as a consequence of interpretability.  Child also suggests that the 
interpretationist might make use of a distinction between different kinds of priority.  
He suggests that Peacocke’s (1981) distinction between definitional and cognitive 
priority might be helpful: 
 
One might, for example, say that the concept of being interpretable as 
believing that p is definitionally prior to the concept of believing that p (i.e. the 
concept of believing that p can be illuminatingly defined in terms of the 
concept of being interpretable as believing that p), but that the concept of 
believing that p is cognitively prior to the concept of being interpretable as 
believing that p (i.e. no one could possess the second concept without 
possessing the first). (54)  
 
The hope would be that once we recognise the different senses of priority in play, we 
will see that there is no circle involved in the theory after all.  I agree that the notion 
of priority as it has been used in this discussion so far is sorely in need of 
clarification, and that there may well be more than one notion in play.  It is far less 
clear to me, however, that these different notions will allow us to break out of all 
potential circles.   
 Child also suggests another way, his preferred way, to avoid circularity.  He 
suggests that the interpretationist adopt a ‘no-priority’ view, and decline to say that 
either thought or interpretation is prior to the other in any important sense.  I will 
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say that this response amounts to rejecting analytic interpretationism, and moving to 
either dependence or cartographic interpretationism, depending on whether the 
project is still conceived as one of analysis. 
 
3.3 Dependence interpretationism 
Dependence interpretationism tries to adopt Child’s solution to the circularity 
problem without giving up on the idea that interpretationism provides an analysis of 
thought.  It claims that we can give an analysis of thought in independent terms, but 
that such an analysis must be an analysis of both thought and interpretation, because 
the two cannot be analysed separately. 
The argument that Child suggests for constitutive interpretationism could be 
used to support this view.  This is based on Davidson’s suggestions in, for example, 
‘Thought and Talk’,22 and it says that belief only arises in the context of two (or more) 
creatures interacting with each other in a certain way: a way which involves each 
interpreting the other.  The claim of the dependence interpretationist could then be 
that for a pattern to involve thought it must involve more than one subject, and the 
two or more subjects must interact in a particular way.  Rationality then enters into 
the picture when we come to describe the pattern in independent terms, as the 
dependence interpretationist insists that we can.  He may, for example, say that the 
lives of the creatures must instantiate rational patterns.  Again, it should be noted 
that ‘rationality’ may be being used in a way that is to some extent non-standard. 
 Dependence interpretationism is ambitious in terms of what it is trying to 
achieve (a proper analysis of thought) and as a form of interpretationism (since it 
gives the understanding of interpretation an important and distinctive role in the 
understanding of thought).  In addition, the dependence theorist won’t want to say 
that one has a thought in virtue of being interpretable as having that thought.  Thus, 
the role of the notion of interpretation in dependence interpretationism is not the 
                                                     
22  Which can be found in his (1984).  I do not mean to claim that Davidson is a dependence 
interpretationist, however. 
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same as the role of the notion of interpretation in analytic interpretationism.  This 
picture, then, fits in well with the things Child says about his preferred version of 
constitutive interpretationism.23   
While I think that, given Child’s definitions and discussion, we probably 
ought to class this as a form of constitutive interpretationism if we are going to apply 
the distinction, it is also important to note that in an important respect, dependence 
interpretationism has more in common with derivative interpretationism than it 
does with analytic interpretationism.  Like derivative interpretationism, it does not 
count the important interpretationist claims about thought and thinkers being 
interpretable as giving an analysis of those concepts.  
 The circularity objections that threatened analytic interpretationism have little 
bite against this view.   It can respond that one cannot give priority to either the 
notion of thought or that of interpretability; however together they can be specified 
without adverting to either notion by talking about the independently specifiable 
pattern involving two or more creatures that constitutes thought and interpretation.  
You cannot then explain thought without talking about a process of interpretation, 
but you can explain both thought and interpretation without invoking either. 
 The important problems for dependence interpretationism are rather 
presenting a persuasive argument for why thought and interpretation must come as 
a package, in order to avoid returning to derivative interpretationism,24 and then 
producing the analysis of the package, including saying something suitable about 
rationality which does not invoke the notions of thought or interpretation. 
 
3.4 Cartographic interpretationism 
Alternatively, in taking a ‘no-priority’ view of the relationship between thought and 
interpretation, one might thereby reject the aim of giving an analysis in independent 
terms.  Instead, one might attempt to map out the relationships between the two 
                                                     
23 See note 85 on p48 and note 96 on p54 for Child’s discussion of the expression ‘in virtue of’. 
24 Child, at least, is not convinced by the Davidsonian argument mentioned above. 
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concepts, thereby illuminating both of them, without performing any sort of 
conceptual reduction or placing them in a hierarchy.  In such an account, rationality 
then appears as another importantly related concept, on a level with thought and 
interpretation.  I will call this project cartographic interpretationism. 
 In one sense, this project is less ambitious than the other three, just because it 
does not aim to give an analysis.25   On the other hand, as a form of interpretationism 
the theory is very ambitious: it says that we cannot understand thought without 
understanding interpretation, and so gives interpretation a central, distinctive and 
ineliminable role in the understanding of thought.   
 I suspect that, if we are to employ Child’s terminology, this should count as a 
form of constitutive interpretationism, because of the central role it gives to 
interpretation.  However, it seems inappropriate to say either that one has a thought 
in virtue of being interpretable as having that thought, or that having a thought is 
simply constituted by being interpretable as having that thought: both suggest the 
aim of analysing thought which is explicitly rejected by this theory.  In rejecting 
hierarchy among the concepts of thought, interpretation and rationality, the theory 
will also refuse to assign priority of a definitional or analytical sort among the 
Availability and Rationality Claims. 
 Cartographic interpretationism also suggests a respect in which analytic 
behaviourism, and the other three types of interpretationism, go beyond the 
requirements for being in the ‘No’ camp: it suggests that to be in the ‘No’ camp, one 
does not have to offer an analysis of thought and of thinkers, one just needs to say 
that when explaining what other concepts the concept of thought relates to, ideas 
about particular kinds of internal organisation of thinkers do not come into the 
                                                     
25 It might, however, be combined with a claim that such an analysis is not possible and/or that there 
is no perspective external to the practice of interpretation from which thought can be accurately and 
completely described.  A theory which sought to demonstrate this would have a different, but strong 
ambition. 
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picture.  This is enough to disagree with the central claim of those in the ‘Yes’ camp, 
and so to show that you are a member of the ‘No’ camp.26 
Cartographic interpretationism will either reject charges of circularity entirely, 
or claim that it presents us with a virtuous, because genuinely illuminating, circle of 
concepts.  Its central challenge will be to deliver an account which is, indeed, 
illuminating.27 
 
3.5 Conclusion to section 3 
The four-way distinction I have proposed between varieties of interpretationism is 
necessarily schematic at this stage, but it does make clear how theories which share a 
commitment to the claims of section 1 may nevertheless differ in structure and aim.  
I will appeal to these different varieties of interpretationism in the course of my 
thesis, showing some of the effects that a choice between the different types will 
have.  I do not, however, argue decisively for any one of them.  The aim of my thesis 
is to show that interpretationism, as a broader category of position in the philosophy 
of mind, is plausible in that:   
1. it has the potential to fulfil certain promises of a theory of mind which 
focuses on the behaviour, rather than on the internal make-up of candidate 
thinkers. 
2. it can fend off certain apparent counterexamples. 
As we will see in the next section, there are plenty of challenges to the idea that any 
theory which accepts the Availability and Rationality Claim can achieve this, and I 
focus on these. 
 
                                                     
26  Likewise, someone could be in the ‘Yes’ camp without needing to give a full analysis.  As 
mentioned in chapter 1, section 2, Block may hold such a position. 
27 Naturally, we will now want to ask what it means for such an account to be illuminating.  I contend 
that there are some generally agreed signs of such illumination and suggest that cartographic 
interpretationism displays these in Appendix 3. 
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4.  Problems for interpretationism 
 
A first problem for interpretationism is proving that it can indeed allow that mental 
states cause the behaviour that we commonly suppose them to.  Exactly how an 
interpretationist can ensure this is a difficult issue, and one that has received 
substantial attention in the literature.  Donald Davidson tackles the question in his 
‘Mental Events’,28  which has formed the starting point for many discussions of 
mental causation, and Child (1994) discusses the issue at length.  I, however, do not 
intend to engage with this literature, but assume that some workable account can be 
found. 
 
Instead, I focus on what we might call difficult cases for interpretationism, many of 
which have been presented as counterexamples to the position.  These come in two 
categories. 
 First, there are cases which challenge the Availability Claim.  Some of these 
suggest that interpretability cannot be necessary for thought.  There are extreme 
cases here, such as the case of the person with a rich mental life who suffers from 
Total Locked-in Syndrome.29  However, there are also much more mundane cases 
where it seems very difficult, if not impossible, for an interpreter to discover another 
person’s thoughts.  For example, is there any sense in which all the thoughts 
occurring within dreams are interpretable, given that they happen during sleep and 
are then usually forgotten?  And could an interpreter always see through a subject’s 
attempts to deceive them?  These problems reflect a feature of interpretationism 
which may seem highly counter-intuitive, namely that it does not seem to make 
room for our ideas about the privacy of the mental.  Other challenges to the 
                                                     
28 To be found in his (1980). 
29 This is a condition where a person is awake and aware, but all of the voluntary muscles in their 
body are paralysed.  In such cases doctors may believe that their patients are aware only because of 
evidence from brain-scanning techniques.  See for example ‘Detecting consciousness in a total locked-
in syndrome: an active event-related paradigm’ in Neurocase 2009 Aug: 15 (4): 271-7. 
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Availability Claim threaten the idea that interpretability is sufficient for thought.  
For example, could even the most complex, interpretable behaviour establish that we 
were dealing with a thinker, if that behaviour was produced in highly non-standard 
ways, for example by a mechanically simple, though enormous, look-up table? 
 The second category of apparent counter-examples is supposed to show that 
the Rationality Claim is implausible.  There are various phenomena which suggest 
that ordinary human thought is not always, or perhaps ever, very rational.  Once 
again, dreams provide an example here: they are well known for often making little 
sense.  Philosophical attention has been also been directed at the results of the 
Heuristics and Biases Program in cognitive psychology: some have taken these 
results to show that even in relatively simple, everyday reasoning, most people use 
unreliable heuristics rather than what one would expect to be familiar logical rules.  
Other cases include the traditional problems of irrationality, and the thoughts often 
attributed to people with certain mental health problems, such as those who suffer 
from delusions.  In response to such cases, interpretationism may seem to face an 
unpalatable choice between saying that these are really instances of rationality, or 
saying that many ‘people’ and perhaps even all humans, due to a lack of rationality, 
fail to be thinkers.  
 
How serious these difficult cases are for the prospects of interpretationism clearly 
depends on exactly how we are supposed to understand the Availability and 
Rationality Claims.  My plan in the rest of this thesis is to focus on certain of these 
hard cases, and to use them to develop the crucial notions of interpretability and 
rationality.  I will argue that we can develop these notions so that the Availability 
and Rationality Claims look plausible, and interpretationism still has the potential to 
satisfy the three reasons for occupying the ‘No’ camp that were suggested in chapter 
1. 
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PART II: INTERPRETABILITY 
 
Interpretationism claims that a being has a thought iff it is interpretable as having 
that thought.  The purpose of Part II is to consider threats to this claim, and through 
doing so to offer the most plausible account of ‘interpretability’. 
Chapter 3 presents the first challenge to the Availability Claim: the problem of 
seemingly hidden thoughts which occur during dreams.  I use the case of dreams to 
develop a notion of interpretability according to which a thought is interpretable if 
either a) there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual 
situation and actions, or b) there would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable 
counterfactual situation.   
In chapter 4, I argue that although it might be plausible to say that each 
individual thought could be interpretable in this sense, two features of our mental 
lives (the way our thoughts are influenced by interactions with the world, and our 
propensity to forget many of our thoughts) indicate that no real interpreter could 
interpret all the actual thoughts of a subject.  I then argue that this need not conflict 
with another commitment of interpretationism, to the holistic nature of 
interpretation. 
Finally, chapters 5 and 6 address further challenges to the Availability Claim.  
Chapter 5 uses two difficult cases to make suggestions about what we should count 
as suitable counterfactual situations, while chapter 6 argues that the interpretationist 
should accept some rather strange thinkers, and can counteract the intuitions which 
seem to tell against doing so. 
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Chapter 3 – The Interpretation of 
Dreams 
1.  The problem 
 
We have some thoughts which are at least extremely difficult for an interpreter to 
discover.   Let us call these ‘hidden thoughts.’  A striking example is provided by 
those thoughts which occur during dreams. 
When the normal person enters REM sleep (the state in which most dreaming 
occurs), their muscle tone decreases to the extent that, if the same level of muscle 
atonia is experienced when conscious, it feels like paralysis.  One suggestion for why 
this occurs is that it ensures that we don’t act out our dreams.  Another important 
feature of dreams is that although a dreamer’s real environment can affect the 
content of their dream to some extent (for example, the noise of an alarm may be 
incorporated into a dream, so that the dreamer experiences the noise as coming from 
a different source), a dreamer’s thoughts are far less influenced by their current 
environment than is the case for waking thoughts.  Consequently, two important 
factors in the interpretation of thought are diminished in the case of dreams: the 
connection between thought and action, and the connection between thought and 
environment.  As a result, it is probably impossible to interpret most dreams as they 
are happening.  In accordance with our normal sleep cycle, most dreams are then 
forgotten before or almost as soon as we wake up.  Thus, for the majority of dreams, 
the dreamer cannot even tell an interpreter what the dream involved when they 
wake up. 
Dreams, then, seem to provide a straightforward counterexample to 
interpretationism’s Availability Claim. Every human dreams, and so it seems that 
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every human has a vast number of thoughts which are not available to any 
interpreter.   
 
This chapter argues that interpretationism can account for dream thoughts if it 
adopts the right account of interpretability.  This involves considering how the 
interpretationist should use counterfactuals in his theory.  Throughout the chapter, I 
concentrate on the interpretation of the content of dream thoughts.   
Section 2 begins the task by considering three bad solutions to the problem 
posed by dreams, and thus reviewing some of the desiderata for a good solution.  
Section 3 considers how the interpretationist might employ counterfactuals in his 
theory, argues for one particular way of using counterfactuals, and in so doing offers 
what I take to be the best available understanding of interpretability.  Finally, section 
4 compares my interpretationist account of dreams with the account given by 
Norman Malcolm in order to answer questions about when we should say dreams 
occur, and what relationship we must posit between dreams and dream reports. 
 
2.  Some bad solutions 
 
There are a few apparently simple solutions to the problem posed by dreams.  First, 
an interpretationist could claim that dreams are not/do not involve thoughts.  They 
would not then be something that interpretationism needed to account for.  This 
would involve rejecting what Dennett calls the “received view” of dreams: 
 
Dreams consist of sensations, thoughts, impressions, and so forth, usually 
composed into coherent narratives, occurring somehow in awareness or 
consciousness, though in some other sense the dreamer is unconscious during 
the episode. (1976: 151) 
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Although rejecting this marks a move away from common sense, current scientific 
thinking, and philosophical tradition,30 it is not unprecedented.  However, many of 
the arguments against the received view concentrate on questioning whether dreams 
are, in any sense, conscious,31 and when, during the period that the subject is out of 
communication with an interpreter, they occur.32  The interpretationist who wishes 
to get out of needing to account for dreams must also question whether dreams are, 
or involve, thoughts.  He therefore requires a particularly strong rejection of the 
received view, and one which initially seems to leave us with a difficult task in 
explaining all the waking beliefs and other thoughts people have about their dreams.  
If the problem posed by dreams is not limited to dreams, he may also have to deny 
that a large number of other apparent episodes that we usually count as thoughts are 
contentful. 
Still, such a position is possible.33  My argument against it is that there is no 
need for interpretationism to deliver such counterintuitive consequences, and so 
consists in the positive suggestions of this chapter for how the interpretationist 
should account for dreams. 
 
A second possibility is a variant on the first.  It admits that dreams may involve 
thoughts, but restricts the scope of interpretationism so that it does not purport to 
                                                     
30 Malcolm (1959) notes that Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Russell, Moore and Freud have all explicitly 
endorsed the received view. 
31 See Dennett (1976) for a discussion of whether we are conscious during dreams.  The view Dennett 
suggests in opposition to the view that dreams are conscious experiences does not prevent dreams 
from possessing content. 
32 The main challenge here arises from the existence of arousal dreams, where it appears that a 
disturbance simultaneously produces what seems to have been a long dream and awakens the sleeper.  
Some suggestions for explaining these phenomena can be found in Mullane (1983) and Gregory 
(1916). For the argument of this chapter, the significance of arousal dreams lies in their ability to raise 
questions about when dreams really occur, whether we can know when they occur, and what this 
tells us about the nature of dreams.  This is discussed in section 4 below. 
33 I initially believed that it was held by Norman Malcolm in his Dreaming (1959).  Malcolm’s position 
is more sophisticated than the sketch above implies, however, and I discuss how his proposals relate 
to my own in section 4. 
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cover them.  However, this severely limits the scope of the theory.  For example, it 
would prevent the interpretationist from being able to claim that his theory tells us 
general and philosophically important things about mental content as such.  Another 
problem for this solution would be giving a reasonable justification for which 
thoughts were and were not covered by interpretationism.  If the only difference is 
that dreams are not available to interpretation, we may start to wonder whether 
interpretationism tells us anything philosophically useful about thought: the claim 
that interpretable thoughts are interpretable is not very interesting. 
 
A third easy solution to the problem of hidden dreams abandons interpretationism 
as I have characterised it in favour of a theory such as that outlined by Lewis in his 
‘Radical Interpretation’. 34   This involves saying that the interpreter to whom 
thoughts must be available is not an ordinary human, but a fictitious mighty knower 
who knows the subject’s movements, the forces acting on them and produced by 
them, all the light, sound and chemicals absorbed or emitted by the subject, all the 
material parts of the subject and their movements and so on, the masses and charges 
of the particles that compose the subject, the magnitudes and directions of any fields 
or whatever permeates him, the complete history of the subject, the complete history 
of others like the subject, and the nomological and counterfactual dependences 
between all of these facts.  For someone who possessed all this information, the 
absence of communication with a dreamer during sleep would present far less of a 
barrier to interpretation. 
 However, Lewis’s theory involves rejecting interpretationism as I have 
characterised it.  It does not count as a member of the ‘No’ camp, because it allows 
that internal brain states might be relevant to a creature’s mental state even without 
having the potential to affect outer behaviour.  It also fails to satisfy one of the 
motivations for being in the ‘No’ camp: it raises sceptical problems about our 
                                                     
34 Which can be found in his (1983). 
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knowledge of minds and their nature, because it leaves open the possibility that the 
mighty knower might have a hugely different view of our mental states from us 
(about both our own and other people’s minds).  Therefore, although Lewis’s theory 
admits the importance of the notion of interpretation, adopting his theory amounts 
to abandoning the purpose of this thesis, as described in Part I.  
 
Let us therefore look for another solution: one which does not deliver hugely 
counter-intuitive consequences, which retains the potential to say something 
philosophically interesting about thought, and which fits the brief of Part I. 
 
3.  Ways of employing counterfactuals 
 
A fourth suggestion: although most dreams are actually forgotten, it seems that they 
could be recalled if the dreamer were to be woken during the dream and 
immediately questioned.  Perhaps, therefore, the content of a dream is determined 
by what an interpreter would learn in such counterfactual situations. 
This raises an important question about the use of counterfactuals in 
interpretationism.  Here are three options: 
 
1) The interpretationist could disallow any use of counterfactuals in his theory.  
Every genuine thought would then need to be not only interpretable, but 
actually interpreted. 
2) The interpretationist could allow counterfactuals concerning the interpreter of 
his theory, but not concerning the subject, i.e. determining content would 
involve imagining what an interpreter would have concluded if present, but 
could not draw upon what the subject would have done in different 
circumstances. 
3) The interpretationist could allow counterfactuals about both subject and 
interpreter, so that the contents of a subject’s thoughts are determined by 
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what an interpreter would conclude if they knew about what he actually does 
and/or what he would do in other circumstances. 
 
Although there is evidence35 that Davidson thought that subjects must actually be 
interpreted in order to have contentful mental states, this does not mean he was 
committed to option 1.  Davidson’s requirement of actual interpretation is connected 
to his theory about how we acquire the notion of objective truth, and how the 
meanings of terms in basic occasion sentences are connected to their causes.  Even 
Davidson, therefore, requires only that each person be interpreted at some point, not 
at every point.36  It is simply hopelessly implausible to insist that every thought be 
actually interpreted by a real interpreter. 
 Option 2 is more plausible than option 1.  According to this option, a thought 
counts as interpretable if there actually is sufficient evidence for the existence and 
content of that thought. This would be a very reasonable way to understand the 
word ‘interpretable’, if told nothing more about it.  If interpretationism employs this 
notion in their Availability Claim, then it must say that the existence of any 
interpretable thought guarantees the existence of some behaviour which could 
provide evidence for the interpretation of that thought, although there need not be 
any interpreter around to observe it.  However, option 2 and its attendant notion of 
interpretability provide no help with the problem of hidden dreams.  Even when we 
counterfactually suppose that there is an interpreter sitting at your bedside, he 
cannot tell what you are dreaming unless we counterfactually suppose that you 
wake up. 
 Option 3 is the one required if we are to adopt the solution to hidden dreams 
suggested above.  It is also the view some commentators attribute to Davidson.  For 
example, Jonathan Ellis says that, for Davidson, ‘believes’ is a predicate constructed 
                                                     
35 See for example ‘The Second Person’ in his (2001). 
36 However, see Byrne (1998) footnote 17 for a suggestion that Davidson is in fact making the stronger 
claim.  
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to capture ‘aspects of the complicated structure of one’s behaviour and dispositions 
to behaviour.’  (2011: 193).  Note that adopting option 3 involves departing from the 
understanding of interpretability outlined in the paragraph above.  Instead of 
requiring actual and sufficient evidence for whatever is being called interpretable, 
option 3 moves us to a weaker notion of interpretability, which requires only that it 
must be possible for there to be sufficient evidence for whatever is being called 
interpretable. 
 
Ellis (2011) seems to think that Davidson endorses option 3: he suggests that a 
subject’s behaviour in counterfactual situations is relevant to his actual mental states 
when he says that, on Davidson’s view, ‘An interpreter who had complete 
knowledge of all of a subject’s potential behaviour and the circumstances under which it 
occurred would be in the position to know everything a speaker believes.’ (2011: 194, 
italics added)   
But Ellis’s statement goes beyond the idea that the truth of counterfactuals is 
relevant to the thoughts possessed by a subject; he is also saying that knowledge of 
these counterfactuals is relevant to and sufficient for knowledge of a subject’s beliefs.  
One may then wonder whether Ellis also thinks that knowledge of counterfactuals is 
also necessary for reliable interpretation.  If that is the case, then to know that Seb is 
thinking that an ice cream would be nice, an interpreter would need to know what 
Seb is and has actually been doing and seeing, and what he would do if there were 
an ice cream van within his sight which only sold ice cream, and what he would do if 
there was an ice cream van within his sight which sold both ice creams and cold 
drinks, etc.   
 Call this view, which asserts an interpreter’s need for knowledge of 
counterfactuals, option 3*.  As we will see shortly, this adds something to option 3 as 
stated above, and is not the only route that the interpretationist can take. 
Regardless of what Ellis intended to assert, Byrne (1998) certainly thinks that 
the interpretationist needs to endorse option 3* in order to explain how actually 
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hidden thoughts can count as interpretable, and he thinks that interpretationism can 
be criticised on this basis.  He objects that giving our interpreter knowledge of all 
relevant counterfactuals gives her knowledge that a real interpreter cannot have: 
 
We have to give the Interpreter knowledge of counterfactuals that cannot be 
known on the basis of how the subject actually behaves.  But the ordinary 
person adopting the intentional stance, or the anthropologist approaching a 
totally alien tribe, are simply not in possession of enormous quantities of 
counterfactual knowledge that cannot be gleaned from actual observation of 
the subject. (1998: 219) 
 
According to Byrne, this dramatically distances the interpreter of interpretationism 
from real human interpreters (as well as the radical interpreter of Davidson’s 
thought experiments). His point is that a real interpreter cannot work out 
information about lots of different counterfactual situations when such knowledge is 
not determined by actual observation of the subject, and so option 3* requires an 
interpreter who possesses information that no real interpreter could have.  The 
interpreter who possesses large amounts of counterfactual knowledge isn’t as 
different from us as Lewis’s mighty knower.  However, their position is still so far 
from being attainable that we face a problem with accounting for our everyday 
knowledge of minds.  Moreover, it is unclear how any interpreter could get such vast 
amounts of counterfactual information.  On this option, therefore, the interpreter 
posited by interpretationism is not even a reasonable idealisation of real interpreters.  
At most, it is a degenerate idealisation, abstracting away from important features of 
our practices of interpretation. 37  It may then also fail to satisfy the third reason 
suggested for occupying the ‘No’ camp in chapter 1, section 3.38 
                                                     
37 Cf. Hooker (1994), which gives an account of useful vs. degenerate idealisations. 
38 I.e. the need to give an account of our concept of thought which fits in with the origins and uses of 
our psychological concepts.  
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 We might wonder whether the situation here is really as bad as Byrne 
supposes.  After all, we do sometimes know counterfactual information about other 
people.  For example, if we know Seb well, we may be certain that, whenever it is 
hot, he will be disposed to buy an ice cream if an opportunity presents itself.  In that 
case, on any particular hot day it seems that we can know what Seb would do if he 
saw an ice cream van, even if there is no such van in sight.  Such knowledge is not 
derived from actual observation of a subject at the moment the thought is to be 
attributed to them, but it is derived from actual observation of the subject over a 
long period of time.  Perhaps, then, if a real interpreter were to watch a subject for 
long enough they would have all the information, including counterfactual 
information, needed to fully interpret the subject? 
 Unfortunately, this is not the case.  For this to provide a reasonable solution to 
our problem, people and their thoughts would have to be (as a matter of necessity) 
far more uniform and therefore predictable than they actually are.  Some thoughts, 
such as Seb’s desire for ice cream, may be highly predictable.  Moreover, particular 
interpretations of Seb may both commit one to and depend upon certain beliefs 
about counterfactuals concerning Seb.  For example, if I interpret Seb as wanting an 
ice cream, I may also commit to the belief that if he was offered an ice cream he 
would accept it (all things being equal), and the fact that Seb has so often wanted ice 
creams in the past may encourage the belief that he would accept an ice cream now 
if offered one, which may be part of what (in combination with other evidence) 
informs my judgement that he does want an ice cream now.  Nevertheless, we think 
that many other thoughts are not predictable from previous behaviour, and that 
some of them are never actually displayed in subsequent action.   
The ordinary interpreter may know what alternative situations would reveal 
such thoughts, and the fact that these thoughts could be so revealed seems to be 
enough to persuade us that such thoughts do exist.  Still, the ordinary interpreter 
does not know, on the basis of actual observation, that these counterfactual facts 
obtain.  I conclude that what evidence would be available in certain situations, as 
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well as what evidence is actually available, must be relevant to the determination of 
some of people’s thoughts, including many of their dreams.  We cannot defend the 
position that Byrne (1998) attacks. 
 We therefore reach the problem that Byrne poses for the interpretationist: the 
interpretability of a thought cannot depend solely on actual evidence, yet if we allow 
an interpreter access to ‘non-actual evidence,’ we distance the position from which 
thoughts count as interpretable too far from our own position, thus creating a 
problem for our knowledge of minds.   
 
We can solve this problem by noting the difference between saying that 
interpretability depends on counterfactuals about what an interpreter could know, and 
saying that interpretation requires knowledge of counterfactuals.  The first, expressed in 
my statement of option 3 above, does not imply the second, which Byrne at least 
thinks the interpretationist will call on in explaining interpretability.  The 
interpretationist, then, should adopt option 3 without adding any claims about an 
interpreter needing to know counterfactuals which he cannot know on the basis of 
his actual evidence. 
According to this option, a subject is interpretable as having a thought iff 
either a) there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual 
situation and actions, or b) there would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable 
counterfactual situation.39  Since I support and develop the notion of interpretability 
corresponding to this, I will give it a name: potential behaviour interpretability (PB-
interpretability for short). 
If we are to take this option, we need to say something about which 
counterfactual situation is the important one, and whether there is just one 
                                                     
39 Neither the actual nor counterfactual situations mentioned here should be taken as limited to the 
place, environment and actions of the subject at the time a thought occurs.  As explained in chapter 2 
part 2, the sort of interpretation the interpretationist is interested in will use a great deal of 
information about the subject’s environment and behaviour over a period of time.  ‘Situation’ here 
must be understood broadly enough to allow for this. 
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counterfactual situation that will do, or whether there might be several possible 
situations in which an interpreter would have the information they needed to 
identify a thought.  We could claim that there is one situation which constitutes the 
‘ideal conditions’ for interpreting a thought, or that there are often several possible 
situations which would count as sufficiently good for interpretation.  The second 
suggestion is more plausible, and fits well with Davidson’s and Child’s assertions 
that the interpretationist need only say that an interpreter can discover the thoughts 
of a subject in favourable conditions.  Either way, we need to say something about 
what count as ‘sufficiently good’ or ‘ideal’ conditions for interpretation, and in doing 
so we face a threat of circularity.  I return to this issue in chapter 5. 
Suppose for now that we settle on the idea that a thought is PB-interpretable 
if either there is sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual 
situation and actions, or there would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable 
counterfactual situation.  The interpreter who succeeds in interpreting the thought in 
question on this view appears to be far less removed from a real interpreter.  We 
might say that this interpreter provides a virtuous idealisation of a real interpreter – 
one which can throw light on and help to explain our interpretive practices, rather 
than obscuring them.  Option 3 therefore seems to provide the best opportunity for 
resolving the problem interpretationism faces with dreams. 
 
It should be noted that this account of the interpretability of dream thoughts is at 
least very similar to a suggestion offered in Child (2007), which discusses 
Wittgenstein’s view of dreams.40  Child suggests that such a view amounts to a form 
of anti-realism about dream thoughts.  In the next section, I develop my 
interpretationist account of dreams further by comparing it to the account given in 
Malcolm (1959), which is also inspired by Wittgenstein’s discussion of dreams.  This 
allows me to argue that the account of this chapter does provide a genuine 
                                                     
40 See (2007: 255).  Child does not attribute the view to Wittgenstein, but offers it as an account which 
he did not consider. 
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alternative to simply denying that dreams involve contentful mental states (the first 
bad solution in section 2 above), to elucidate the relationship that interpretationism 
should posit between dreams and dream reports, and to comment on the issue of 
when dreams occur.  It will also indicate possible reasons for not taking my account 
of dream thoughts to be an anti-realist one.  However, I will not argue directly for 
the idea that my view does not involve at least a moderate form of anti-realism 
about dream thoughts. 
 
4. Malcolm on dreams 
 
Considerations about dreams and how we know about them appear in 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and have been discussed by some of his 
followers.  These discussions have often proceeded from an attempt to understand 
how we apply the concept of dreaming to conclusions about how we should 
describe the phenomena, an approach that should be amenable to many 
interpretationists given the third reason for being interested in interpretationism as 
suggested in chapter 1. 
In his (1959) book Dreaming, Malcolm argues for a strong connection between 
dreams and dream reports; he says that the latter are the sole criterion of the 
occurrence of the former.  He then uses this, among other commitments, to argue for 
his view of dreams.  This is summed up by Schroeder (1997) in 3 controversial theses: 
 
(1) The temporal location of dreams as taking place in one’s sleep is not an 
empirical fact, but determined by grammar. (D, p.50) 
(2) This grammatical determination does not allow dreams a precise date in 
physical time (beyond saying that they occur during one’s sleep). (D, p.70) 
(3) Dreams do not consist of mental occurrences such as thoughts, sensations, 
emotions, images, hallucinations &c. (D, p.51f.) (Schroeder, 1997: 15) 
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So, Malcolm’s idea about the connection between dreams and dream reports bears 
some resemblance to the claims of this chapter, and moreover his arguments stem 
from a methodology which at least resembles that of my interpretationist.  We must 
therefore ask: is my interpretationist committed to any of these theses?  And if not, 
what should he say about Malcolm’s arguments for these claims? 
 
My interpretationist does not want to say that dreams are not mental occurrences: 
such a claim would amount to the first easy but unsatisfactory solution to the 
problem of dreams discussed in section 2.  However, although some have taken this 
as Malcolm’s claim, he does not state his own position quite so baldly.  For example: 
 
I was inclined at one time to think of this result41 as amounting to a proof that 
dreaming is not a mental activity or a mental phenomenon or a conscious 
experience.  But now I reject that inclination.  For one thing, the phrases 
‘mental activity’, ‘mental phenomenon’, ‘conscious experience’ are so vague 
that I should not have known what I was asserting. (52) 
 
Another problem with the bald claim is that it could be made false by simple 
stipulation of the definition of a mental occurrence.  Instead, Malcolm therefore 
claims: 
 
if anyone holds that dreams are identical with, or composed of, thoughts, 
impressions, feelings, images, and so on (here one may supply whatever 
mental nouns one likes, except ‘dreams’), occurring in sleep, then his view is 
false. (52) 
 
                                                     
41 This refers to the result of the arguments Malcolm gives in chapters 9, 10 and 11 of Dreaming.  What 
I take to be the most important part of Malcolm’s argument is reproduced below. 
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Given this, it seems that Malcolm may want to draw a distinction between dreams 
and waking thought without denying that dreams have content, which has been the 
central issue of this chapter.  I think it is unclear exactly how Malcolm’s third claim 
is to be cashed out, but he does certainly draw a distinction between dreams and 
waking thoughts which has not been drawn by my interpretationist.   
Malcolm supports this distinction between dreams and waking thoughts 
using an argument which is also supposed to establish claims (1) and (2).  Since 
dream reports are the only criterion for the occurrence of dreams, there is supposed 
to be a logical link between dreams and reports which, according to Malcolm, 
prevents us from being able to characterise dreams independently from the reports 
at all.42  But this then means that we can’t think of the dream as unknowably 
occurring at one time rather than another.  Since we cannot tell on the basis of dream 
reports the difference between the situation where dreams occur during sleep and 
then are then remembered on awakening, and the situation where dreams only 
occur during awakening,43 dreams are not supposed admit of this difference.  It is a 
feature of the way we talk about dreams that we say they occur during sleep – and 
as such it is part of our grammar.  But since we cannot say when they occur, they do 
not actually have a precise date in ‘physical’ time, and nor is the claim that they 
occur during sleep an empirical claim.  Thus we arrive at the first two claims above. 
 This argument moves from our epistemological situation to what appear to be 
metaphysical claims about the nature of dreams.  This sort of a move is sometimes 
legitimate according to interpretationism as characterised in chapter 2.  However, we 
must question both if Malcolm gets the epistemological situation right, and if this 
particular transition is acceptable. 
One response to this argument would be to claim that it does not put dreams 
on a different epistemic footing from many waking thoughts.  Schroeder (1997) 
                                                     
42 Some have taken this to mean that Malcolm denies the existence of dreams, or actually identifies 
them with dream reports.  Again, Malcolm would not accept such a bald statement of his position. 
43 The latter is Gregory (1916)’s explanation of the possibility of arousal dreams, which were 
mentioned in footnote 32. 
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offers this reply, and uses as examples thoughts that occurred to a subject in the past 
when he was unobserved, but which we nevertheless accept that he is able to report 
to us. 
 The difference that Malcolm would point to in reply is that although in the 
case of waking thoughts, a report might be the only criterion of the existence of a 
thought’s existence, still that report at least can occur at the same time as the thought.  
In the case of dreams not only do we have a single criterion, but it also can’t occur 
simultaneously with the dream.  This is supposed to be significant because of the 
following principle endorsed by Malcolm: 
 
I am assuming it to be an a priori truth that whenever a thought occurs to a 
person or he experiences a feeling he could, at that time, give expression to 
the thought or feeling. I mean that this is always logically possible (1957: 207) 
 
This then gives us the distinction that claim (3) suggests we should recognise 
between waking thoughts and dreams. 
 
We could reply to this as Schroeder does, by saying that ‘it is not clear what 
importance verifiability in principle may have in a given case where, as it happens, 
there is no possibility of carrying out any checks.’ (1997: 29)  This, however, would 
be a very dangerous reply for my interpretationist to make.  The notion of 
interpretability developed in this chapter depends on the idea that it matters if an 
actually hidden thought can be interpreted in principle, where this means in some 
suitable counterfactual situation.  The notion of possibility that is important to my 
interpretationist cannot be the one that Schroeder applies, which allows that simply 
leaving a person alone, or gagging him, removes the relevant sort of possibility of 
the subject giving a report on his mental state.44  In making Schroeder’s reply my 
                                                     
44 The sort of possibility the interpretationist requires is discussed further in chapter 5. 
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interpretationist would run the risk of allowing the problem with dreaming to infect 
the interpretation of many other thoughts.  This would not be to present a 
‘companions in guilt’ style response to dreams, but to admit that interpretationism 
just doesn’t give a good account of a great number of thoughts.   
 My interpretationist should accept that, if waking thoughts can in principle be 
expressed at the time they happen while dreams cannot, then this is a genuine 
difference between the two.  However, I see no reason why they need to accept 
Malcolm’s principle above, and so accept that this difference makes the difference 
Malcolm claims it does.  Malcolm’s principle requires argument, otherwise we can 
accuse him of simply begging the question against the similarity of dream thoughts 
and waking thoughts.  Malcolm does not appear to give any such argument, and 
there are good reasons to doubt the principle.  For example, anyone who for any 
reason thinks that not all thoughts can be linguistically expressed by their subjects 
has reason to doubt the principle.45 
 Perhaps Malcolm would reply that the principle holds precisely because, 
without it, it might be impossible to know exactly when many thoughts occur.  
Whether this is true, and whether it matters, will be discussed shortly.   First, I 
challenge the idea that dream reports are the only criteria for the occurrence of 
dreams. 
 
 Why should we think that we have only one criterion for the application of the 
concept of dreaming, when people sometimes do all sorts of things in their sleep?  
They may adopt happy, sad or fearful facial expressions; they may start slightly as if 
surprised; they may laugh or moan.  People sometimes also talk in their sleep, and 
may even perform ‘actions’ such as walking.  We take such incidents as evidence 
that a subject is dreaming, so shouldn’t they count amongst the criteria for the 
                                                     
45 For example, because they believe non-linguistic creatures can have thoughts.  This, of course, 
raises the question of what the interpretationist should say about inexpressible thoughts within 
dreams, or the dreams of non-linguistic creatures.  I shelve this issue until Part III, chapter 11. 
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occurrence of dreaming?  Malcolm’s reply to such considerations is to deny that in 
these cases the subject is properly asleep, and so to deny that whatever thoughts 
such phenomena are evidence for count as dreams. 
 To make this reply, Malcolm employs very strict criteria for what counts as 
really being asleep.  He takes the criteria we teach children when we teach them how 
to apply the word ‘asleep’ – closed eyes, lack of movement, obliviousness to mild 
external stimuli, etc. – and demands that all of them be satisfied without 
qualification for a person to count as asleep rather than merely in a state resembling 
sleep.  This, however, is not how we commonly use the term ‘asleep’.  Rather, we 
seem to require only that a sufficient number of the criteria be satisfied, so that if for 
example a person has their eyes closed and doesn’t respond when spoken to, we 
count them as asleep even if they are smiling and mumbling.46 
  At this point, Malcolm might say that even if we admit that sleepers do not 
have to fulfil all of our criteria, expression of emotion, genuine speech and other 
actions have to involve an element of intention or self-awareness which must be 
lacking in the case of any apparent expressions or actions during sleep.  Sleep talking, 
then, could happen, but it would not be speech; only noise that sounded like speech.  
To reply to this we could once again raise doubts about whether this got our use of 
the word ‘sleep’ right (or our use of the words ‘expression’ and perhaps even 
‘action’).  However, even if we were to agree with Malcolm on this point, we could 
still say that these merely apparent actions and expressions could be counted as 
informative about whether dreaming was occurring, and what it involved. 
 It seems reasonable to say that there are quite often events, other than dream 
reports, which count as criteria for the occurrence of dreams.  In this respect, dreams 
are not in fact different in kind from waking thoughts: it is just a matter of the 
frequency and degree of supporting evidence for such reports. 
                                                     
46 This seems to fit far better with Wittgenstein’s reflections on family resemblances than does 
Malcolm’s approach. 
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 ‘But,’ Malcolm might say, ‘there’s no way to tell the difference between the 
case where you really speak in your sleep, and the case where you happen to make 
an apparently sensible series of noises which do not correspond to any thoughts.  But 
then there can’t be a difference, and such phenomena can’t provide evidence for the 
claim that there are genuine thoughts during sleep.’ 
In response to this, we could point to the fact that people’s behaviour during 
sleep may agree or disagree with dream reports they give after waking or being 
woken, and that this provides something of a check on the reliability of both.  
Suppose a person was tossing and turning in their sleep, and then screamed aloud, 
whereupon you shook them and woke them.  If the person said they dreamt they 
were being chased and then attacked by a giant spider, this would confirm the idea 
that they had been having certain thoughts while sleeping.  If they complained that 
you had woken them, saying (with perfect sincerity) that they had been having a 
lovely dream about sunbathing, then you might conclude that either their behaviour 
during sleep, or their subsequent report, did not reflect their thoughts during sleep.  
 In the case where behaviour and report don’t agree, of course, it is at least 
difficult to tell which we should take as indicating the thoughts of the dreamer.  And 
if we cannot determine which we should pay more attention to, Malcolm will say 
there can’t be a difference between the case where the report is inaccurate and the 
case where the behaviour is misleading.  The interpretationist has at least two 
options at this point.  They could agree with Malcolm, just for the rare cases where in 
the actual world or in some suitable counterfactual situation a subject exhibits sleep 
behaviour and gives dream reports that contradict each other, and there is no way to 
choose which better reflects their thoughts using principles of interpretation that call 
on considerations such as rationality.  They would then presumably say that the 
dream thoughts in such cases were massively indeterminate in attitude, content, or 
both.  Alternatively, they could say that in such cases, we give or should give one of 
the criteria priority.  I will not decide between these options here. 
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Finally, we come to the issue of when dreams occur.  One thing we can now say is  
that we do have good evidence that dreams sometimes occur during what we would 
usually call sleep and at specific times: namely those incidents in which behaviour 
during sleep and dream reports on awakening confirm each other.  But what should 
we say about the times when there is no behaviour during sleep, i.e. those occasions 
when the person just lies there?  Perhaps there is a sense in which it is possible that 
the subject could exhibit behaviour which would confirm their potential dream 
reports, even though they don’t, just as it’s possible that a person could have given a 
dream report if awoken, even though they didn’t. 
 We do not have to rely on this answer, however, in order to say that these 
dreams do have a precise date in time.  This is because, whereas Malcolm seemed to 
posit a logical link between dreams and actual dream reports, my interpretationist 
suggests a link between dreams and the disposition to give a dream report if woken.  
As explained in chapter 3, the interpretationist does not need to identify dreams 
with these dispositions.  Nevertheless, the link posited means that they can call on 
dispositions to show that a dream could occur at a precise moment in time, just as 
long as we think that dispositions come to exist at a particular time.  The point at 
which interpretation becomes a possibility then determines the temporal location of 
the dream.  Of course, this does not mean that in any particular case an interpreter 
can determine when a dream occurred: whenever they wake the subject and ask 
about their dreams, they don’t have a way of knowing the age of the disposition they 
activate.  Thus, everyday interpretation may not be able to tell us when each dream 
occurs.   
 
The interpretationist account of dreams that I offer thus differs in several ways from 
the account given by Malcolm.  My interpretationist rejects all three of Malcolm’s 
controversial claims, and also suggests a slightly different relationship between 
dreams and dream reports, as detailed above.  Given these differences, the 
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interpretationist account is not open to all the problems Malcolm’s account faces, 
and certainly should not be taken as simply denying that dream thoughts exist. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The apparent ‘hiddenness’ of dreams prompts us to consider what the 
interpretationist can plausibly mean when he claims that thought is interpretable.  
This chapter has argued that the most appropriate notion is that of PB-
interpretability: it must be possible for there to be sufficient evidence for the 
existence and content of whatever is being called interpretable.  
 In the next chapter, I argue that adopting this notion of interpretability has the 
consequence that no real interpreter could possess the information needed to 
interpret all the actual thoughts of a subject, either over an extended period of time 
or perhaps even within a particular moment.  I then argue that this does not present 
a problem for the interpretationist. 
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Chapter 4 – The Holistic Nature of 
Interpretation 
 
In chapter 3 I considered a number of ways of understanding the ‘interpretability’ of 
thought, and settled on an account which I called PB-interpretability.  Saying that all 
thoughts are PB-interpretable amounts to saying that for each thought, either there is 
sufficient evidence concerning the thought in the subject’s actual situation, or there 
would be sufficient evidence in at least one suitable counterfactual situation.   
In section 1 below, I argue that while it might be plausible that each thought is 
PB-interpretable, it is not plausible that all could be interpreted in the same possible 
world by a real interpreter or a suitable idealisation thereof.  Section 2 then draws 
out the significance of this claim by showing how it connects with a famous claim 
from Dennett: ‘all there is to really and truly believing that p (for any proposition p) 
is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best (most 
predictive) interpretation.’ (1987: 29)  I argue that we should not endorse Dennett’s 
claim as it stands, and thus illustrate one potential difference between Dennett’s 
position and the one developed in this thesis.  The conclusion of section 2 is that 
there is, prima facie, a tension between accepting the Availability Claim (understood 
as asserting the necessity and sufficiency of PB-interpretability for thought) and a 
holistic view of interpretation.  In section 3 I first explain why a genuine conflict here 
would be a problem for the interpretationist, and then argue that the apparent 
tension can be dissipated. 
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1.  The directability of thought 
 
The Availability Claim, if it uses the notion of PB-interpretability, entails that each 
thought that a subject has must be PB-interpretable.  So, for any thought that a 
subject has, a real or suitably idealised interpreter could identify that thought if she 
used the right method and was lucky enough to do so in favourable or suitable 
conditions.  But this doesn’t guarantee that a real or suitably idealised interpreter 
could have experienced favourable circumstances and thereby interpreted all the 
actual thoughts of a particular subject.  And as it happens, this final claim is 
implausible, because of a feature of thought which we might call ‘directability’: its 
course, and our memories about its course, can be easily influenced by interaction 
with an interpreter. 
 This is particularly clear in the case of dreams.  Favourable circumstances for 
interpreting dreams appear to involve the interpreter knowing the language of the 
subject, and waking the subject and asking them what they have just dreamed at 
regular intervals.  But this means that the subject will have at least slightly different 
dreams than he would have done had he been allowed to sleep uninterrupted.  It is 
also likely to change the waking thoughts of the subject: the subject will have more 
waking thoughts at different times, due to being woken, and some of them will 
probably be caused by the waking. Moreover, consistently waking a subject when 
they start to dream has deleterious effects on mental and physical well-being, 
suggesting that such questioning would drastically alter the majority of the subject’s 
waking thoughts.  Although this phenomenon is dramatically illustrated by the case 
of interpreting dreams, it is in fact widespread.  For example, I cannot remember 
every thought I have had during a long bike ride once I reach home, and so if an 
interpreter asks me what I was thinking about, I cannot tell them everything.  If the 
interpreter rode along beside me, I could have answered questions about what I was 
thinking as we went along.  That, however, would have significantly altered the 
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course that my thoughts took.  In general, interactions with an interpreter, and other 
changes in the circumstances of the subject, affect the thoughts that the subject has.   
 So far, the issue I have raised amounts to the claim that although each thought 
may be interpretable at or just after the time it occurs, many thoughts arise only 
because the prior thoughts of a subject were not interpreted.  The actual thoughts of 
a subject, taken together, are not jointly interpretable.  I have allowed that an 
interpreter might have been able to interpret everything a subject thought given the 
right conditions, but pointed out that this would have involved interpreting 
different thoughts.  We therefore have a problem with saying that all the thoughts in 
a set that extends across time are available to an interpreter.  However, we can also 
produce problems of synchronic availability.  These suggest that it may be false even 
that a real interpreter could, if they were extremely lucky and always observed their 
subject in favourable conditions, succeed in interpreting some complete set of 
thoughts of that subject. 
Suppose that subject x is dreaming that he is in Vancouver Aquarium when 
interpreter y wakes him up to ask what he is dreaming.  Like many dreams, x’s 
dream is highly detailed and complex.  At the moment he awoke, it included the 
following details: that he was standing in front of a large window with fish on the 
other side; that there was a particularly large, grey, and ugly fish swimming to the 
left of him, which he considered to be rather threatening, and five small colourful 
fish to the right, which he thought very pretty; that he was with his niece, but she 
was behind him, looking through another window; that some young boys were 
shouting in the background; and finally that he was worrying whether it was ethical 
to visit this aquarium, given the way it acquired its beluga whales.  When y wakes x 
up and asks him what he was dreaming, x replies that he dreamt he was in an 
aquarium.  Y then presses x for more details: was it any particular aquarium?  Was 
he with anyone?  What could he see?  What was he feeling and thinking?  
Depending on the order in which y asks these questions, x may remember different 
features of his dream, since during the time it takes to relate some of these details, it 
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seems likely that others will be forgotten.  For example, x might be able to recall the 
colours of the different fish if he is asked about these first.  However, he may forget 
them in the time it takes to explain why he was worried about being at the aquarium.  
On the other hand, if x spends the first few minutes after waking listing the colours 
of the fish, he may forget that there were boys shouting in the background. 
This problem of synchronic availability is once again easy to illustrate using 
the case of dreams, because of the memory loss associated with dreaming.  However, 
it again seems likely that it is more widespread.  If we allow that people can have 
several thoughts at one time, and that they can forget these thoughts, or might not be 
aware of some of them, then it seems as if with respect to waking thoughts, an 
interpreter might be able to discover any particular thought, but not all the thoughts 
that a person has at one time.  
 
Let us return to the original question of chapter 4: how can the interpretationist 
account for contentful, hidden dream thoughts?  The suggestion was that dream 
content is determined by what an interpreter would learn in counterfactual 
situations.  There was a constraint on this solution: we wanted to avoid demanding 
that our interpreter have information that a real interpreter couldn’t possibly possess.  
I therefore suggested that there must be enough evidence in at least one 
counterfactual situation for an interpreter to identify the thought.  Now, I have 
suggested that because thought is directable, no real interpreter could possess the 
information needed to interpret all the actual thoughts of a subject, either over an 
extended period of time or perhaps even within a particular moment. 
 We might question this result, for example by suggesting that it relies too 
heavily on the contingent fact that we often forget our past thoughts.  We might 
suggest that a real interpreter could possess the necessary information, and could 
interpret all the actual thoughts of a subject, if that subject had a better memory.  We 
might then suggest that the possession of such a memory on the part of the subject is 
a component of there being ‘favourable conditions’ for interpretation.  According to 
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this proposal, what we need to do is to add an additional counterfactual supposition 
about the subject of interpretation.  However, in chapter 5, where I discuss what we 
should count as suitable counterfactual situations, I argue that we must not include 
massive changes to the mental capabilities of the subject of interpretation.  I claim 
that at least some failures in memory are an important aspect of our finitude, and as 
such must be taken into consideration by the interpretationist. 
Rather than questioning the results of this section, I will argue that they do 
not present a serious problem for interpretationism.  First, however, we must 
consider why they are significant at all.   
 
2.  Dennett’s famous claim 
 
In The Intentional Stance, Dennett makes what he calls a ‘perverse’ claim, namely that 
‘all there is to really and truly believing that p (for any proposition p) is being an 
intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive) 
interpretation.’ (1987: 29)  It is because of the words in italics that he thinks this claim 
is ‘apparently shallow and instrumentalistic’ (ibid.), although of course he thinks 
that it turns out on closer inspection to provide a robust theory. 
To this part of the claim, my interpretationist may agree: they too might think 
that all there is to having various thoughts (from a philosophical point of view) is 
being interpretable as having them.  However, Dennett’s claim might also be taken 
to imply that there is some one interpretation which details absolutely everything 
that a subject thinks.  And since for Dennett the intentional stance is one that we 
normal humans adopt in interacting with each other, and which is justified by its 
usefulness in generating predictions that we can use, this suggests that Dennett may 
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disagree with the claim that not all thoughts can be jointly available to a real 
interpreter.47 
 My interpretationist may admit the existence of a single ‘interpretation’ which 
gives an account of all the thoughts that a subject has (call this the complete theory), 
but should insist that this won’t be available to any real interpreter.  Rather, it will be 
made up of the combination of the many interpretations which were individually 
available to a real interpreter.   
 
However, if the complete theory is not available to real interpreters, then those 
interpreters will not be able to call on considerations about how their interpretations 
fit into the complete theory in deciding which are best. 
To illustrate this consequence, let us return to the difference between options 
3 and 3* for using counterfactuals in explaining interpretability, as presented in the 
previous chapter.  According to option 3, to interpret a subject an interpreter 
requires information from just one situation, and it is possible that he could have 
been in this situation, although he might actually be in a situation less favourable to 
interpretation.  This was the option I argued for in the previous chapter.  In contrast, 
according to option 3*, interpretation of a subject requires a large amount of 
counterfactual information, including several counterfactuals about the subject’s 
actions at a given moment.  If we had chosen option 3*, we would not be having the 
current disagreement with Dennett.  If the relevant interpreter of a subject was one 
who had access to all counterfactual information about that subject, then we would 
have none of the reasons presented in the previous section for supposing that 
thoughts may fail to be jointly interpretable: since the notion of interpretability in 
play would not be linked to what a real interpreter could find out, considerations 
about how many and which thoughts a real interpreter could find out about together 
                                                     
47 The quote does not provide decisive grounds for this interpretation of Dennett.  However, I am not 
primarily concerned with interpreting Dennett, and regardless of Dennett’s actual position it is useful 
to contrast this potential interpretation with my own view.  
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would not be relevant.  This would then mean that the relevant interpreter could 
work out which individual thoughts to attribute by seeing how they fitted into the 
best complete theory of the subject’s mental life.  
So, if we adopt the notion of interpretability I have suggested, we have reason 
to believe that not all actual thoughts of a subject are available for interpretation 
together, and that the complete theory of a subject’s thoughts cannot guide an 
interpreter in deciding which individual thoughts should be attributed to a subject.  
This sounds like a rejection of some kind of holism.  In section 3, I address this issue.  
I first distinguish between some different types of holism, then explain why a retreat 
to atomism would be disastrous for interpretationism, and finally argue that a 
commitment to the Availability Claim and to using the notion of PB-interpretability 
is compatible with the moderate form of holism about interpretation that 
interpretationism requires. 
 
3.  Holism 
 
There are various different things that philosophers might refer to using the term 
‘holism’.  One common distinction is drawn between holism concerning the mind, 
and holism about language.  The former of these is our main concern here.  It too can 
be split into further types, three of which are given below. 
Holism concerning the mind might refer to: 
A.  The view that the concepts we apply to mental states cannot be described 
or understood separately.  According to this view, there is at least one area of 
discourse in which meaning is holistic.  However, without further argument it 
does not necessarily follow that there is anything holistic about the nature of 
mental states themselves.   
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B.  The view that thoughts cannot be determined one at a time, nor actions 
given intentional descriptions in isolation, but rather they have to be worked 
out together. 
C.  The view that the content and/or attitude of any mental state depends 
upon the set of which it is a part. 
Most detailed discussions of holism seem to focus on type C above,48 and this is also 
a brand of holism which Davidson seems to endorse.  However, it is primarily type 
B which should concern us here.  I do not discuss type C holism further in this 
chapter. 
 Type B holism is important because it is the form of holism challenged by the 
ideas presented so far in this chapter.  Yet it may also seem to be assumed by the 
process of interpretation which, in chapter 2, I said that interpretationism was 
interested in.  The method placed centre stage by interpretationism is one of working 
out what an individual thinks by working out how their environment, actions and 
thoughts must fit together and influence each other.  The topic of how 
interpretationism should claim thoughts fit together is set aside until the discussion 
of rationality in Part III.  However the mere fact that interpretation proceeds on the 
basis of an assumption about how they fit together is enough to show that 
interpretation cannot be atomistic. 
 The emphasis on the importance of a holistic process of interpretation also 
marked one of the important differences between interpretationism and analytic 
behaviourism.  If interpretation did not proceed holistically, then surely there would 
be something to say about the behaviour associated with particular thoughts, as 
analytical behaviourism supposed.  Yet it seems there is nothing useful to say here, 
as shown by many critics of behaviourism.  We do not want interpretationism to face 
these criticisms as well. 
                                                     
48 See Heal (1994) and Jackman (1999) for useful discussions of the different strengths of type C holism 
available, and thoughts about which seems most plausible. 
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The apparent conflict is easy to resolve without either turning to a new method of 
interpretation or collapsing back into something like analytic behaviourism.  Our 
interpretationist should claim both that individual thoughts are available to 
interpretation without all the surrounding thoughts being available to interpretation, 
and that we have to determine thoughts in combination rather than separately.  But 
although these two commitments might initially appear to point in different 
directions, they are not incompatible as long we do not say that all thoughts must be 
determined together.   My interpretationist, then, should allow that one does not 
need to interpret absolutely all the thoughts of a subject in order to interpret one of 
them, while maintaining that one will often (perhaps always) need to interpret 
several at a time. 
 This is the important claim the interpretationist must make in order to avoid a 
clash between the Availability Claim and their view of the nature of interpretation: 
you don’t need to interpret every single thought of a subject to be able to interpret 
one of them, but you do need to interpret more than one at a time.  This claim seems 
very plausible, and I presume that many philosophers with different background 
theories would accept it.  My interpretationist, then, is committed here to a 
reasonably uncontroversial claim.  However, his position becomes both more 
complicated and rather more idiosyncratic when we work out the details of which 
thoughts do and do not need to be interpreted together according to his view.  This 
provides us with the more interesting puzzle raised by considerations about the 
directability of thought. 
 Our consideration of which thoughts need to be interpreted together might 
follow the pattern of discussions about holism and molecularism or localism with 
regard to language.49  In that case, one obvious suggestion would be that we need to 
interpret all the thoughts concerning a certain domain together.  So for example, we 
                                                     
49 See for example Peacocke (1997). 
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might suggest that all thoughts about maths have to be interpreted together, and all 
thoughts about the mental have to be interpreted together, but that to interpret all 
thoughts about maths you do not need to interpret all thoughts about the mental.  
There would be some obvious problems with such a proposal, for example the 
difficulty in delineating domains.  Perhaps these problems could be solved, perhaps 
not; but in any case, this is not what my interpretationist ought to say.   My 
interpretationist needs to rule out the possibility of thoughts which are not co-
interpretable needing to be interpreted together, and given the reasons for thinking 
some thoughts might not be co-interpretable (as presented in section 1) these might 
well sometimes be thoughts on the same topics.  Ruling out this possibility is a 
project which I do not think other philosophers have addressed, since it is a problem 
quite specific to my brand of interpretationism. 
 So, might thoughts which are not co-interpretable need to be interpreted 
together?  Or in other words, might certain mental states fail to be jointly accessible 
with those mental states whose interpretation they affect?  The form of such a 
counterexample would have to be as follows:  It would be a case where, to determine 
thought a, y needs to know that it occurs in the given situation along with thought b.  
However, it must also be impossible for y to determine the contents of both thought 
a and thought b, because if he discovers the content of b, he prevents himself from 
being able to find out about a and vice versa.  Y therefore won’t be able to determine 
the content of thought a.  If this situation is possible, then not every thought must be 
PB-interpretable. 
 Hopefully this gives an idea of what would constitute a counterexample to 
the interpretationist’s view.  It is worth also bringing out some of the complexities 
which would make it difficult to present the interpretationist with such a 
counterexample.  First, it should be noted that, given the considerations from section 
1, the interpretationist does not need to say that any two thoughts are necessarily 
jointly uninterpretable.  Take the example of the dream about the aquarium: any two 
of the details from the dream may be recallable together, even if all are not recallable 
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together.  Second, cases probably usually involve groups of inaccessible thoughts 
affecting the correct interpretation of other groups, rather than single thoughts 
making a great difference to each other.  Scenarios are also particularly difficult to 
construct because we are not supposed to look at actual situations where an 
interpreter is in fact unable to identify a thought because another remains hidden.  
Rather, we need a situation with a certain counterfactual structure such that the 
above has to obtain. A counterexample must show that there are some thoughts 
which can’t be interpreted even in the most favourable conditions possible.50     
 I have not managed to think of any situation of this structure which would 
arise because of the directability of thought and/or the frailty of memory commented 
on in section 1.  I therefore cannot present such a counterexample as evidence 
against my interpretationist’s claim that every thought is PB-interpretable because 
each thought is co-interpretable with enough other thoughts to establish its existence 
and content. 
 What is the status of this claim?  For example, should we see it as some sort of 
hopeful statement of faith on the part of the interpretationist?  Or perhaps as simply 
part of his definition of thought?  The former description might seem more accurate 
to the extent that the interpretationist is depending on the fact that he cannot think 
of a counterexample, and hopes that no one else will be able to either.  The latter 
would seem more appropriate if the interpretationist would be inclined to mistrust 
the importance of any intuitions behind supposed counterexamples, and claims that 
he has deduced that every thought is co-interpretable with enough other thoughts to 
establish its existence and content as a consequence of the nature of thought. 
 The best position for an interpretationist, however, would be to be able to 
produce an argument in favour of the claim.  I think that such an argument might be 
available, and that it might depend on the vast number of thoughts that each person 
has and is capable of having, and the correspondingly small difference that any one 
                                                     
50 The complicated nature of the counterexamples required makes it uncertain whether such a 
counterexample could have much intuitive force against my interpretationist.   
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thought must surely make to the interpretation of another in all favourable 
circumstances.  This argument could not be pursued, however, without a discussion 
of how thoughts need to be related to each other, such as that offered in Part III.  It 
will not be developed further in this thesis. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The Availability Claim (understood using the notion of PB-interpretability) and the 
holistic nature of interpretation may appear incompatible at a superficial glance.  
However, the tension disappears if we allow the quite uncontentious claim that you 
do not need to interpret every single thought of a subject to be able to interpret one 
of them, but you do need to interpret more than one at a time.  In combination with 
the interpretationist’s theory, this leads to a more unusual claim, namely that that 
every thought is PB-interpretable because each thought is co-interpretable with 
enough other thoughts to establish its existence and content.  Although far fewer 
people are likely to endorse this claim, I have not found a counterexample to refute it.  
I therefore provisionally conclude that my interpretationist can endorse the 
Availability Claim and a moderate holism about the nature of interpretation.  
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Chapter 5 – Possibility, Deception and 
Paralysis 
 
In chapter 2 I characterised interpretationism as being committed to an Availability 
Claim: the claim that interpretability is both necessary and sufficient for thought.  In 
chapter 3, I argued for a particular understanding of interpretability: PB-
interpretability.  When we plug PB-interpretability into the Availability Claim, we 
get the claim that for every thought, either it can be interpreted given the 
information available to a real interpreter in the actual world, or it could be 
interpreted given the information that would be available to a real interpreter in at 
least one suitable counterfactual situation.  In this chapter, I consider these ‘suitable 
counterfactual situations’, and the plausibility of an Availability Claim which refers 
to them, in more detail.  In particular, I consider the related issues of how the 
interpretationist can pick out the suitable situations he needs for his theory, and 
what these situations will be like. 
 
Section 1 explains the nature of this task, and offers some conditions on an account 
of suitable situations.  Section 2 then considers a general problem that the 
interpretationist might be thought to have in referring to these suitable 
counterfactual situations as part of his theory, and shows how it can be overcome.  
The third section considers a particular kind of case – deception – where it may be 
thought difficult to explain what goes wrong with attempted interpretation in the 
actual world.  Finally, the fourth section considers a case, involving a paralysed 
thinker, where it might be thought that there are no suitable counterfactual 
situations for the interpretationist to call on.  Both apparent counterexamples are 
used to characterise suitable situations further. 
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It will emerge through the discussion of these problems that different kinds of 
interpretationism have different requirements for this part of their theory.  I will 
argue that, given the considerations of this chapter, cartographic interpretationism is 
left in the strongest position.  I will not give necessary and sufficient conditions on 
suitable counterfactual situations (in section 1 I suggest this is not needed for the 
theory to succeed).  More significantly, I will not prove conclusively that the 
proposed counterexamples to interpretationism can be disarmed.  However, I will 
aim to make it plausible that, in the case of thoughts hidden in this world, there is 
always a suitable counterfactual situation where they are not hidden. 
 
1.  The task 
 
For those comfortable with possible worlds, a suitable counterfactual situation may 
be thought of as a possible world (or, alternatively, a part of a possible world, since 
not everything that happens in the world will be relevant to interpretation of a given 
thought).  I will utilize the language of possible worlds here for ease of expression. 
The interpretationist asserts that when a thought is hidden in this world, there 
is a possible world in which the thought is not hidden.  Moreover, he refers to this 
possible world as part of his account of that thought.  For example, he might say 
‘thought m counts as interpretable because there is a possible world, w, in which 
there is enough evidence to allow an interpreter to identify it.’  This possible world 
must then be such as to make it clear why the thought should count as interpretable 
in the actual world.  Only such possible worlds will provide suitable counterfactual 
situations. 
 In this section I consider, first, conditions on how the interpretationist should 
refer to these counterfactual situations as part of his theory, and why the analytic 
interpretationist faces a particularly difficult task here; and second, what we need to 
say about what the suitable counterfactual situations must be like.  This will set up 
the task of addressing these issues more fully through the rest of the chapter. 
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First, consider the interpretationist’s reference to suitable counterfactual situations as 
part of his theory.  Since the interpretationist refers to these worlds as part of his 
account, he needs to be able to do so in a way that doesn’t undermine the account, 
either by making it circular or by making it trivial.  This means that he cannot simply 
say that the suitable counterfactual situations are the ones where the thought is 
available to interpretation, i.e. where there is enough evidence to interpret the 
thought.  If he did this, he would be proposing that thoughts are interpretable if they 
can be interpreted in a suitable situation, and that a suitable situation is one where 
they can be interpreted.  For the analytic interpretationist, who hopes to give an 
analysis of thought in terms of interpretability, this leads to vicious circularity.  
However, even if we do not  want to analyse thought in terms of interpretability, but 
rather want to pursue one of the other forms of interpretationism, this suggestion is 
unacceptable:  it gives us a very small and unilluminating circle which tells us 
nothing about what the suitable situations are like, what interpretation depends on, 
how close the notion of interpretability in question is to an everyday conception of 
what counts as interpretable, or how to evaluate the truth of claims that something is 
or is not interpretable.  Anyone who wants to say that the Availability Claim is 
interesting needs to give a more substantive account of what counts as a suitable 
counterfactual situation. 
All interpretationists, then, face some work in picking out suitable situations 
in an illuminating way.  However, the different sorts of interpretationist may still 
adopt different strategies.  For the analytic interpretationist, suitable situations are 
part of the analysis of interpretability, which is part of the analysis of thought.  
Therefore, the analytic interpretationist cannot refer to thought or particular 
thoughts in picking out suitable situations without circularity. 
On the other hand, referring to a mental state in explaining interpretability is 
far less obviously problematic for the interpretationist who wants to say that a 
subject has a thought iff they are interpretable as having that thought, but who then 
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refrains from giving an analysis according to which being interpretable as having a 
thought is precisely what having that thought consists in. 
According to derivative and dependence interpretationists, there is another 
analysis to give of thought, and this will allow us to explain what it is to have a 
thought, and will have the consequence that every thought is interpretable.  Since 
the notion of interpretability is not required for the analysis, perhaps we can explain 
what interpretability amounts to using certain mental states.  Indeed, the 
dependence interpretationist, who thinks that the notions of thought and 
interpretability have to be understood together, would expect nothing less. 
According to cartographic interpretationists, there is no analysis of thought to 
be given using independent terms, but we can illuminate the nature of thought by 
showing how it relates to other concepts, in particular that of interpretation.  These 
theorists may accept that there is a circularity involved in the account, but they must 
argue that it is not thereby problematic (see Appendix 3).  They can refer to thoughts 
when describing suitable situations in general or when describing the situation 
where an individual thought could be attributed, but must ensure that they do not 
thereby make their account vacuous. 
In sections 2 and 3 I present two apparent problems for the interpretationist in 
picking out the suitable situations which he wants to use in his theory.  As one 
would expect, the different kinds of interpretationism will need to respond in 
different ways, and the task for analytic interpretationism is more difficult. 
 
Next, consider more directly what should count as suitable counterfactual situations.  
One might hope that an account of these suitable counterfactual situations would 
involve giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a possible world to provide us 
with a suitable counterfactual situation.  However, a result from the previous 
chapter suggests a complication for this project.   
In chapter 4, section 1, I argued that there were reasons to doubt that all the 
thoughts of a subject across time, and even within a time, could be interpreted 
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together.  This means that a situation which is suitable for the identification of some 
thoughts may be unsuitable for the identification of others.  Situations will not be 
suitable or unsuitable simpliciter, and likewise conditions may not be favourable or 
unfavourable for interpretation simpliciter.  Rather, there are conditions or situations 
that are good for interpreting some thoughts of a subject and bad for interpreting 
others.  To return to the example of dreams, the situation in which you wake the 
subject and ask one series of questions about their dream reveals different thoughts 
from the situation in which you wake them and ask a different series of questions. 
 This means that we cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
situation to be suitable for the interpretation of any thought that a subject happens to 
have.  We might still be able to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
situation to be in the group of suitable situations which will include at least one 
situation where each thought of the subject can be interpreted along with many 
others, but not all the other thoughts of the subject.  However, we should note that 
the viability of interpretationism only requires that for any thought, there be some 
possible world where it can be identified, and that this world can be referred to by 
the interpretationist as part of his theory.  Therefore, although we shouldn’t rule out 
the possibility of a precise theory of the characteristics of suitable situations, we need 
not rely upon it.  Instead of pursuing necessary and sufficient conditions which may 
not exist, I will primarily consider apparent problem cases, and show how the 
interpretationist might address them (see sections 3 and 4 below). 
 Even if we cannot give complete necessary and sufficient conditions on 
suitable counterfactual situations, however, we can place two quite general 
conditions on them from the start.  This will help us to characterize them, but will 
also present us with a challenge. 
The two quite obvious conditions are that suitable situations must not involve 
unacceptable changes to the interpreter or their subject, and they must not take us 
too far from what we intuitively mean by ‘interpretable’ and ‘interpretability’. 
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To see the importance of these conditions, consider the follow cases.  First, 
suppose that at time t x lies asleep dreaming, and that interpreter y sits at her 
bedside with no idea what thoughts her dreams involve.  Suppose also that there is a 
possible world, w, in which at time t+1 y suddenly acquires the powers of Lewis’s 
fictitious mighty knower, and is then able to call on a huge amount more evidence 
and attribute all of x’s dream thoughts (and indeed, all her other thoughts, past 
present and future) to her.  This possible world doesn’t provide us with a suitable 
counterfactual situation.  The reason I have argued that the interpretationist should 
use the notion of PB-interpretability, rather than some of the other notions canvassed, 
is that he needs to avoid distancing the perspective from which thoughts count as 
interpretable too far from our own perspective.  If we allow reference to worlds 
where interpreters gain the abilities of Lewis’s mighty knower, we undermine this 
aim entirely. 
Consider another example: suppose again that at time t x lies asleep, 
dreaming.  Suppose also that there is a possible world, w, in which at time t+1 x 
suddenly changes so that she both can and does remember all her own thoughts in 
perfect detail.  Three weeks later, x in w is asked what she was thinking at 3:27am 
three weeks previously, and as a result tells interpreter y what she thought as part of 
the very same dream that the x of our world had.  Even if we accept that this is a 
genuinely possible scenario, we won’t want to say that this shows that x’s dream 
thoughts count as interpretable in this world.  The problem here is that the changes 
suggested in x are too big.  Showing that if you improved our memory so drastically 
you would make it possible to interpret our dreams does not show that we ordinary 
humans are interpretable. 
 The challenge that arises from these conditions is then to make it plausible 
that there will always be a possible world in which thoughts that are hidden in this 
world can be interpreted, without such unreasonable changes to the situation.  This 
is addressed primarily in section 4, where I suggest that the important issue is to 
consider how a subject is changed, rather than using some undifferentiated notion of 
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size of change.  I also argue that the interpretationist’s notion of interpretability is 
perhaps not exactly what many people would imagine on first hearing the word, but 
that it resembles an intuitive notion of interpretability in the respects that are 
important. 
 
In the next section, I turn to a general worry51 that someone might have about the 
interpretationist’s ability to refer to suitable counterfactual situations.  As we will see, 
it is only a significant problem for the analytic interpretationist, but even he may be 
able to overcome it. 
 
2.  A general problem 
 
Suppose that Rob thinks ‘I’d really like a Mars bar’ during a logic seminar, but 
doesn’t express this thought to anyone (it being an unsuitable contribution to a 
philosophical discussion).  Suppose he then forgets this thought, as we often do 
forget such passing thoughts.  In the actual world, there isn’t enough evidence for 
anyone to identify Rob’s thought.  However, the interpretationist may say that it 
counts as interpretable because there is another possible world in which Tim writes a 
note to Rob saying ‘What are you thinking right now?’ and Rob writes back ‘that I 
want a Mars bar.’   
But, the opponent of interpretationism may say, there are lots of possible 
worlds in which Rob and Tim write notes to each other in this logic seminar.  In one 
of them, Rob will think ‘I’d really like a Mars bar’ and write a note about this to Tim.  
However, in another he will think ‘I’d really like some coke’ and so write this 
instead, and in another he will think ‘I’d really like pizza’ and write this.  How is the 
interpretationist to select the first possible world as the one which provides the 
suitable counterfactual situation which reveals Rob’s thought in the actual world?  
                                                     
51 I am indebted to Adrian Boutel for suggesting this issue to me. 
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Obviously, the suitable counterfactual situation is the one where Rob reveals the 
same thought that he has in the actual world.  However, the opponent will say, this is 
not something that the interpretationist can stipulate, without referring to the 
thought he is supposed to be giving an account of, and so introducing circularity 
into the account. 
 The opponent of interpretationism may then suggest that from within the ‘Yes’ 
camp it is much easier to pinpoint which possible worlds give a suitable 
counterfactual situation where a thought from this world is interpreted.  A Yes-
camper can say, for example, that a counterfactual situation may show a thought 
which is hidden in this world to be interpretable because the same internal state 
which constitutes the thought in this world also exists in the counterfactual situation, 
in addition to evidence which allows an interpreter in that world to identify the 
presence of the internal state under the appropriate mental description.  The 
interpretationist, on the other hand, cannot say this, because it would stop him from 
being able to say that the Availability Claim reveals something philosophically 
significant about thought.  If we adopt the Yes-camper’s solution to the problem, 
that work will be going on elsewhere – in the account of what internal states etc. are 
needed for particular thoughts and to be a thinker generally. 
 
I think that there are three replies the interpretationist might give to this objection.  
First, the interpretationist might say that the problem in fact only applies to the 
analytic interpretationist.  The other kinds of interpretationist should indeed avoid 
talking about the particular internal state which constitutes a thought when picking 
out suitable counterfactual situations.  However, they can simply stipulate that 
suitable counterfactual situations for showing the interpretability of a thought in this 
world involve the same thought occurring in the counterfactual situation.  As long as 
this is not all they say, they will still be able to tell us what suitable situations will be 
like, what interpretation depends on, and how the ‘interpretability’ they speak of 
relates to what we might intuitively understand by the word.  In other words, as 
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long as specifying that the same thought must occur in the actual and suitable 
counterfactual situation does not exhaust their account, there seems no reason to 
suppose that the account will be unilluminating, even if it is not suitable as an 
analysis.  This, then, tells us something about how derivative, dependence and 
cartographic interpretationists might pick out the possible worlds they are interested 
in, and something about how those worlds will be related to the actual world.  
However, if we want to be analytic interpretationists we must seek another solution. 
 A second option would be to say that in accordance with a standard account 
of possible worlds, we should evaluate claims about what thoughts a subject is 
interpretable as having by looking at the closest possible worlds where the 
antecedent of the relevant counterfactual statement holds.  So, for example, take the 
statement, ‘If Tim were to write a note asking Rob what he was thinking, then Rob 
would write back that he was thinking that he wanted a Mars bar.’  This will count 
as true because in the nearest possible world where Tim writes the note to Rob, Rob 
reveals his desire for a Mars bar.  The counterfactual statements according to which 
Rob reveals a desire for something else will count as false, because they do not tell us 
what happens at the nearest worlds where their antecedent is true.  Thus, Rob’s 
actual thought that he would like a Mars bar will count as interpretable, and he will 
not count as having and being interpretable as having the many other thoughts that 
he might have had, but did not have, at the relevant time. 
 This proposed solution does not make such explicit reference to the thought 
that is being said to be interpretable.  Nevertheless, there are two concerns that we 
might have about it.  First, it relies on the idea that the nearest possible world where 
the antecedent of the statement above is true will be a world where Rob has the same 
thought.  We may worry that we could develop the case so that this would not 
obviously be true.  The resulting discussion would surely encounter difficulty with 
the haziness of the notion of closeness of possible worlds, and this problem would 
make the second concern more pressing.  This second worry is that the analytic 
interpretationist is not entitled to the idea that the world where Rob has the same 
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thought and reveals it is closer than the world where he has a different thought and 
reveals it. 
 If one finds these concerns pressing, one might move to the third option, 
which is to specify the way in which the suitable possible worlds must be similar to 
the actual world, without mentioning thought.  According to this option, the suitable 
worlds are ones in which Rob has just the same categorical properties (e.g. of his 
brain states) up to the point where the interpreter’s probe elicits a response that 
reveals his mental state. 
There is a problem that we might raise for this suggestion: since we are calling 
on the inner, hidden properties of Rob to determine which the suitable situations for 
interpretation are, we may worry that we are abandoning the spirit of 
interpretationism.  There are two worries buried within this problem: first, the worry 
that in calling on such states of Rob, we must thereby cause problems for our 
account of our knowledge of minds; and second, that in calling on such properties 
we must be admitting that it is really internal states etc. that are important to the 
nature of thoughts and the mind, rather than actual and potential behaviour and its 
interpretation. 
I think that both of these worries are unjustified.  First, consider the 
knowledge issue.  An ordinary interpreter cannot know the categorical properties of 
their subject’s brain, but even if we adopt this account they never need to.  It is a 
tautology that this condition is one that obtains in the actual world (of course the 
subject has the same categorical properties in the actual world as they have in the 
actual world).  With respect to counterfactual worlds, the interpretationist uses the 
condition to stipulate which counterfactuals are important.  No real interpreter is 
ever in the position of needing to know if the condition obtains and failing to do so.  
The issue about knowledge just doesn’t arise. 
 Second, consider the worry that calling on internal states and properties of a 
subject prevents us from insisting on proper interpretationist criteria for the 
existence of thoughts.  This is unfounded, because we do not need to give, nor need 
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there be, any reduction of the mental to any physical, internal states of subjects, in 
order for the solution to work.  All we need to say is that the categorical properties of 
the subject as a whole should not change, before the occurrence of the thought(s) in 
question.  The interpretationist has already allowed that there may be physical 
grounds for the dispositions which provide the criteria for whether a person has a 
thought or not.  They may even have said that this is part of our concept of thought 
(perhaps as part of their account of mental causation).  To call on these grounds in 
such a general way to establish which counterfactual situations are suitable, while 
continuing to insist that it is the interpretation of the behaviour in these suitable 
situations which is important with respect to the existence and content of the 
thoughts the subject has, does not move us into the ‘Yes’ camp. 
 
We have then, a suggestion for how even the analytic interpretationist may pick out 
the possible worlds he is interested in, and another suggestion about the nature of 
counterfactual situations themselves, in the form of a suggestion about their 
relationship to our world.  The ‘general problem’ seems not to be a problem for 
anyone. However, this cannot be all there is to say about suitable situations and the 
ways they can be picked out.  To find out more, I turn to another potential 
counterexample for interpretationism: deception. 
 
3.  Deception 
 
Cases of deception are a major challenge for behaviourism: deception is used in the 
perfect actor counterexamples, which are employed to challenge both the necessity 
and the sufficiency of the behaviourist account of thought.  Whereas other problems 
faced by behaviourism seemed less applicable to interpretationism, the problem of 
deception may seem to carry over.   The majority of discussions of deception and 
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behaviourism consider rather outlandish examples.52  I will begin with an everyday 
sort of case, but will also need to consider the case of infinite preferences for 
deception towards the end of this section. 
 
Imagine a person, Alex, saying ‘I bought the last round.  It’s your turn.’  She 
represents herself as believing this, and makes a convincing show of it.  However, 
suppose also that she does not, in fact, believe it.  She actually believes that you 
bought the last round, but she wants you to buy this one too. 
Suppose that you try to identify Alex’s thought.  To start with, you look at 
Alex’s present situation and behaviour.  You know that you actually bought the last 
round, but Alex appears perfectly sincere.  In fact, she seems so convinced that she 
bought the last round that you start to doubt your own memory.   
Since they endorse at least a moderate form of type B holism, no 
interpretationist would claim that such a small time slice ought to provide sufficient 
evidence for the attribution of such a thought.  You should also consider Alex’s past 
behaviour.  If she is often dishonest about when it’s her turn to buy a drink, this may 
give you reason to doubt her sincerity in the present case.  However, suppose that 
Alex has not been dishonest about such things before, and it is well-established that 
she has a poor memory, particularly after a couple of drinks.   
Still, the interpretationist allows you more evidence: you need not finalise 
your attribution before the evidence of Alex’s future behaviour is in.  If Alex 
confesses that she lied after you have bought the drinks, or she writes about the 
incident in her diary, or she boasts to someone else about her ability to deceive you, 
then there will be evidence that a real interpreter can use to attribute her actual 
thought.  Yet, suppose that Alex does none of these things – suppose that she does 
her best to maintain that she didn’t lie, due to concern about what others might think 
of her, she doesn’t keep a diary, and she quickly forgets about the incident.  Suppose 
                                                     
52 See, for example, Putnam (1965), Bennett (1976) and Ellis (2011). 
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that any interpreter of Alex in the actual world would attribute to her the thought 
that she bought the last round, but that this is not the right thought. 
 My interpretationist has not said that an interpreter is always able to identify 
a subject’s thoughts given information about their actual behaviour, only that the 
subject must be PB-interpretable.  And there are plenty of possible situations where 
Alex’s behaviour would have given the thought in question away: even if she did 
not, she might have confessed, she might have started to keep a diary that evening, 
and she might have met a friend in the pub’s toilet and told them how she pulled the 
wool over your eyes.  However, what makes this case different from, and perhaps 
more difficult than, the case of dreams is that we have a potential and apparently 
convincing interpretation of Alex in the actual world, and we need to say why it 
doesn’t tell us what the thought is in the actual world, even if it has been formed 
using what looks like the correct method for attributing thoughts.  Why do the 
possible worlds where Alex acts otherwise show what her thought really is, rather 
than the actual world?  What interpretationist-friendly reason is there for insisting 
that, in the actual world, Alex doesn’t believe that she bought the last round? 
 
I think that there are two options for the interpretationist here.  The first, suitable for 
all stripes of interpretationist, is to say that in the actual world our methods of 
interpretation have not been fully applied to Alex, and this is why they do not count 
as revealing her real thought.  She may have been tested to some degree.  However, 
we may insist that there must be some conditions under which we could definitely 
elicit a confession (for example through torture, or some other method of persuading 
Alex that her health and happiness depend upon complete honesty).  If you think 
that such methods could work, you can say that we could gain a confession as long 
as Alex doesn’t assign a relatively infinite weight to hiding the belief in question.  
You can then say that the actual situation does not reveal Alex’s actual thought 
because it does not involve the best tests, and you can say that the suitable situations 
for interpretation are those which provide evidence which leads us to the same 
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verdict about the thoughts in question as the evidence provided through the most 
reliable tests would suggest.  If the most reliable tests would deliver different 
answers from those we would give in the actual situation, then the actual situation 
isn’t one in which the thought in question is interpretable using only actual 
behaviour. 
 The problem with this reply is the possibility that a person might have a 
preference with infinite weight for hiding certain beliefs.  Provided she keeps this 
preference, the best tests of her in her current state will surely not reveal her true 
belief, nor indeed her preference for keeping it hidden. 
One possibility here is to question the intelligibility of such infinitely 
weighted preferences.  This could be done on the grounds that they would be too 
irrational for the subject in question to meet the interpretationist’s condition of 
rationality.  In response to such a move, some might object that the call on rationality 
is inappropriate, since the rationality of all subjects has not been established at this 
stage.  This is the response that Ellis (2011) makes in his discussion of whether 
Davidson can respond to his case of a person whose overriding goal is to deceive 
anyone who tries to identify his thoughts.  It is true that the move could create a 
problem for the analytic interpretationist, since they may want to argue for the 
Rationality Claim using the Availability Claim.   There is a possibility of vicious 
circularity if the Rationality Claim also has to be used to defend the truth of the 
Availability Claim.  However, there are other forms of interpretationism and other 
arguments for the Rationality Claim (see chapter 7). 
The success of an appeal to the Rationality Claim also depends, however, on 
the content of this claim, and on whether infinitely weighted preferences really 
would entail that a creature wouldn’t be rational in the required sense.  This seems 
very much open to question.  The idea that suitable situations may at least 
sometimes be those in which the best tests are performed seems to be a good one, 
but if the Rationality Claim cannot allow us to rule out infinitely weighted 
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preferences for deception, it seems that it cannot completely solve the issue with 
deception. 
The second way to respond to our issue with deception is to say that the 
problem with the actual situation, and the reason why even this good application of 
our method of interpreting does not reveal the real thought, is that Alex is not being 
sincere.  Nevertheless, her thought remains interpretable because there are possible 
worlds in which Alex is, at least at some point, sincere (for example with you after 
you buy the round, or with her friend in the toilet, or with her newly started diary). 
This explanation of the suitable situations for interpreting Alex refers to at 
least one mental state (the state of sincerity), and it may refer to more, even to the 
thought being said to be interpretable.  It is not, therefore, an acceptable suggestion 
for the analytic interpretationist.  Suitable situations are mentioned in our account of 
interpretability, and since the analytic interpretationist wants to analyse what it is to 
have particular thoughts and thought in general in terms of this, they cannot refer to 
mental states here without circularity. 
The other three kinds of interpretationism, with their ability to accept 
reference to mental states in describing the suitable conditions for interpretation, can 
call upon this condition in their description of suitable situations.  They may then be 
able to accept the possibility of infinitely weighted preferences for concealment:  
they can say that when someone has a preference with infinite weight for concealing 
their thoughts, the suitable conditions for interpreting them are ones in which they 
later change their mind about what is important to them, and decide that it is 
actually in their best interests to tell or show an interpreter what they were thinking. 
 In the case of the cartographic interpretationist, I think that this provides a 
reasonable answer to the issue with deception.  However, it should be noted that the 
case is not so clear with the derivative and dependence interpretationists.  They may 
be able to refer to sincerity in explaining what we may count as the suitable 
situations for interpretation.  However, they also say that there is an analysis, which 
does not refer to thought, of what having particular thoughts amounts to.  They are 
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supposed to be able to say, for any thought of a being, what makes it the case that 
the being in question has that thought, using their preferred analysis.  The question 
remains, will they be able to give such an account for deceptive thinkers?  It is not 
possible to answer this question without also considering what the analysis will be.  
However, we may note that these kinds of interpretationist will face a problem that 
is quite similar to the traditional problem that behaviourism faces with deception, 
and the available strategies for saving the theory will be similar.  For some 
suggestions, see Block (1981) and Bennett (1976). 
Three kinds of interpretationism, then, could call on sincerity as part of their 
account of suitable situations.  I will now consider one potential problem for, and 
one limitation of this suggestion.  The problem is that this suggestion appears to 
threaten our ability to give a good account of our knowledge of the minds of others.  
After all, an interpreter cannot know how their subject would behave if they were 
being sincere, without knowing whether they are being sincere in the current 
instance.  In response to this, I think that an interpretationist ought to admit to some 
limitation on our knowledge of other minds.  Still, they should say that even if what 
determines the success of interpretation in the actual situation is inaccessible to the 
ordinary interpreter, there are situations in which the subject is interpretable by such 
interpreters, so the Availability Claim remains true.  The possibility of successful 
interpretation remains.  Moreover, the claim that we cannot know with certainty 
what people are thinking (at least sometimes) because they might be lying is a very 
commonsense idea.53   
The limitation of this suggestion is that it certainly cannot provide a complete 
account of suitable situations.  First, it is not clear that it can help us to give an 
account of the important conditions for interpreting someone who is self-deceived.  It 
seems that in such a case, a person might sincerely tell an interpreter what they think 
they are thinking, and yet fail to reveal all the thoughts involved in their self-
                                                     
53 See chapter 12, section 2 for some further discussion.   
92 
 
deception.  It also seems possible that the rest of their actual behaviour might fail to 
establish the self-deception and associated thoughts.  The same may be true of 
certain counterfactual situations involving the self-deceived subject.  There are ways 
that we could try to dispel this challenge.  We could argue that the self-deceived 
person cannot be completely sincere with an interpreter while their self-deception 
lasts, or we could add in the condition that suitable situations should involve the 
subject also being sincere with his or herself.  But we could also respond by 
admitting that situations involving sincerity aren’t always suitable situations (indeed, 
we’ll see that this is true in any case in section 4).  A second issue is that sincerity 
doesn’t seem to be a necessary condition on a situation being an excellent one for 
interpretation.  We sometimes seem able to firmly establish a person’s mental state 
using their behaviour even when they are being deceitful towards themselves or 
others.  It seems, then, that although sincerity could be an important feature of a 
suitable situation for interpretation in many instances of interpreting thoughts, it is 
unlikely to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition on suitable situations. 
 
In conclusion of this section, the issue of deception appears to tell most strongly 
against analytic interpretationism.  The other kinds of interpretationism can all 
answer the problem to some extent using the suggestions of this section.  However, 
only cartographic interpretationism can rest content with these suggestions, without 
fearing that deception may cause problems in another part of his theory.  We have 
also obtained two more suggestions about what interpretation depends upon, and 
what suitable situations will involve: good tests and sincerity. 
 We now move on to the next potential counter-example: the person with 
locked-in syndrome.  As I said above, this may appear to present us with a case 
where there are no genuinely suitable counterfactual situations.  In addressing it, we 
will learn more about what the interpretationist’s suitable counterfactual situations 
must be like, and how his notion of ‘interpretability’ relates to what we might 
intuitively understand by the word. 
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4.  The locked-in cosmologist 
 
The locked-in cosmologist suffers from total locked-in syndrome: every voluntary 
muscle in her body is paralysed.  However, she has a rich mental life.  In particular, 
she has a strong interest in cosmology and spends a lot of time trying to work out if 
the universe will continue to expand, or will end in a big crunch.  In the actual world, 
however, nobody realises that the locked-in cosmologist is having thoughts at all, 
because she has been mistakenly diagnosed as being in a coma.  Thus, in the actual 
world, the ordinary interpreter cannot work out what, or even that, the cosmologist 
is thinking by employing our usual methods. 
Cases like this have been used as counterexamples to positions in the ‘No’ 
camp, and they initially appear to provide very strong support for the ‘Yes’ camp.  
After all, the reason we do not want to deny that the locked-in cosmologist is 
possible, the reason we in fact want to say that there really are people with this 
condition, is that when we perform certain sorts of tests we find that their brains are 
active in just the ways that our brains are active.  We may also understand what 
prevents them from being able to move, and feel certain that this small difference 
between them and a healthy person cannot prevent them from thinking when there 
are so many important similarities.  We might initially think that this proves that it is 
the inner stuff, which we can sometimes access using advanced technologies, but 
which we certainly cannot access using our everyday methods of interpretation, 
which is really important in determining whether a creature has a mind and/or 
particular thoughts, regardless of the potential for interpretation. 
 
The interpretationist does not have to accept this account of the significance of 
locked-in syndrome.  They can instead say that brain activity shows that we are 
probably dealing with a thinker because it shows that there is in fact the potential for 
the right sort of behaviour, and therefore behaviour and interpretation in suitable 
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counterfactual situations.  The interpretationist should then go on to say something 
about what these counterfactual situations are like. 
 One situation in which an interpreter could discover what the locked-in 
cosmologist is thinking is the situation where the cosmologist is given the 
appropriate brain scans, where this leads to the right diagnosis, and where the 
cosmologist is then chosen as a subject for one of the current programs developing 
neural-interface technology.  This technology involves, for example, implanting a 
device into a subject’s brain to pick up certain electrical impulses so that these 
impulses can be used to control a cursor on a computer screen.54  Results from such 
devices provide incontrovertible evidence that there are people with total-locked-in 
syndrome. 
 There are potential issues with calling on such cases as indicating suitable 
counterfactual situations for interpretation.  First of all, the situation is brought 
about by people with knowledge of the brain which far outstrips that of the ordinary 
interpreter.  We might therefore say that there is a very good sense in which our 
ordinary methods of interpretation are not up to the task of interpreting the locked-
in cosmologist, because we lack the knowledge and skills required to set up this 
interpretational interchange.   
However, this first problem is not serious.  Once the conditions are in place, 
an ordinary interpreter is capable of interacting with the subject without any special 
knowledge.  The conversation may be a little different from an ordinary 
conversation: it may be slower, and limited on the cosmologist’s side to yes and no 
answers or to text.  However, these are not significant differences, and the average 
person would be able to adapt to them.  It is consistent with interpretationist 
principles that it should not matter whether ordinary interpreters can understand 
how to achieve the situations where communication is possible.  After all, they do 
not know all about the many processes involved in allowing ordinary humans to 
                                                     
54 See for example Orenstein (2011), which reports a case where a woman moves a cursor by 
‘intending’ to move her paralysed hand. 
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communicate, like the ways the vocal chords or nervous system work.  Part of the 
point of interpretationism is that it allows us to know about someone’s mind without 
knowing these sorts of things. 
 There are, however, more serious problems for the proposal.  A second 
problem is that the situation in which we give the cosmologist a neural-interface 
involves a substantial change to her.  Indeed, it is a truly life-changing change, from 
her point of view.  The same is true of another apparently suitable situation for 
interpreting someone with locked-in syndrome: the case where the subject recovers 
the use of her muscles, and then tells us what she was and is thinking in the ordinary 
way.  Both cases involve a change in the cosmologist’s capacities.  We may therefore 
worry that they change her too much, given the considerations in section 1 above.  In 
other words, we may worry that the cases of neural-interface or recovery are not 
relevantly different from the case of augmented memory, and so that they should be 
ruled out on the same grounds. 
 There are differences we could point out between memory augmentation and 
having a neural-interface.  For example, the latter involves restoring an ability to the 
subject, whereas the former involves augmenting an ability.  However, if we depend 
upon this difference, it may seem that we cannot allow a case where a subject has 
always been both aware and paralysed.55   Perhaps we could still persist in this line 
of response, however, by noting that in the second case we give an ability which is 
normal for the kind to which the cosmologist belongs, which constitutes a move in 
the direction of proper functioning, whereas in the memory augmentation case the 
subject gains superhuman abilities.  We might then question whether we can make 
anything of the notions of normal abilities, proper functioning and the idea of a 
subject belonging to one particular kind, so there is further work to do in order to 
pursue this response.  Nevertheless, it seems to have some potential. 
                                                     
55 Such cases are mentioned in Child (1994: 29). 
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 Another option would be to argue that, unlike the memory case, using a 
neural interface or recovering from paralysis are not changes to the mind of a subject 
(though they may be changes to her brain).  Although they change her abilities to 
express her thoughts and produce behaviour, and may thereby change what she 
goes on to think, they do not change her capacity to have particular thoughts.  
Memory augmentation, on the other hand, changes a distinctively mental capacity of 
the subject. 
 This suggestion about suitable situations raises two issues.  First, if we specify 
that suitable counterfactual situations should not involve a change to the mental 
abilities of the subject, then we once again risk circularity in an analysis of thought.  
As with sincerity, this is a problem primarily for the analytic interpretationist, and it 
may simply show that the analytic interpretationist should not take this route.  It 
also raises an issue for the derivative and dependence interpretationists: although 
they can use this sort of condition to describe suitable situations, they cannot use it 
in their analysis of why she counts as having the thoughts she does.   
The second issue is more significant: it is that in admitting that the change of 
situation changes the subject’s ability to express herself (as we surely must, whatever 
our account of suitable situations), we seem to be in danger of undermining the idea 
that she is, in the actual situation, really interpretable.  Indeed, this response serves 
to highlight the fact that there is a very straightforward sense in which the locked-in 
cosmologist, as she was initially described, is not interpretable using our ordinary 
methods.  Whether or not the interpretationist wants to make use of a distinction 
between mental and other abilities, they need to say something about this. 
 This brings us to the difference between two terms that I have used: potential 
and ability.  I have said that when we discover brain activity, we realise that there is 
the potential for behaviour and therefore for interpretation, and I’ve admitted that the 
locked-in cosmologist doesn’t have the ability to produce behaviour.56  As I use the 
                                                     
56 The distinction I draw here is related to Block’s distinction between dispositions and capacities in 
his (1981), and will serve one of the same purposes (namely showing why cases involving paralysis 
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terms, a person has an ability to do something if either she does it, or she could do it 
given only the addition of the starting condition that she decides to.  A person has 
the potential to display behaviour relating to thought x, and therefore to be 
interpreted as thinking x, if they have the ability to display such behaviour, or they 
would have the ability to display such behaviour if they somehow gained a working 
output mechanism.  It should be noted that calling on the idea of a working output 
mechanism does not move us into the ‘Yes’ camp.  In the first place, such a 
mechanism is not required for thought, only used to specify those conditions in 
which thoughts can actually be interpreted.  Second, the notion can be employed by 
the ordinary person or interpreter without specifying how such a mechanism might 
work or what physical states are involved. 
Since the notion of interpretability that is important for the interpretationist 
must be linked to the notion of potential, we must then admit that when the 
interpretationist says that an interpreter could interpret any genuine thought, they 
are using a specific and somewhat attenuated sense of ‘could’, requiring less of a 
subject than one might naturally suppose.  Nevertheless, this notion of 
interpretability seems coherent, and is clearly related to what we might intuitively 
understand by ‘interpretability’.  Moreover, the sense in which someone like the 
locked-in cosmologist counts as interpretable does not remove us further from our 
ordinary practices of interpretation: in the suitable situations, interpretation can 
proceed much as usual. 
 This account once again seems unavailable to the analytic interpretationist, 
since the definitions of ability and potential I have offered refer to mental states.  The 
analytic interpretationist must come up with a different way to explain the sense in 
which we can still count the locked-in cosmologist as interpretable, perhaps simply 
by saying more about what counts as a suitable situation, and showing that the 
cosmologist is interpretable in suitable counterfactual situations.  The dependence 
                                                                                                                                                                     
need not be counterexamples to theories within the ‘No’ camp).  The distinctions do not coincide 
exactly, however.   
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and derivative interpretationists can use the distinction in their account of suitable 
situations and interpretability, but cannot use it in their analysis of thought.  
 
Like the previous section, this section has explored ways that the interpretationist 
might respond to a potential counterexample, and I have argued that the 
interpretationist can indeed respond to the case of the locked-in cosmologist.  I have 
then used this discussion to suggest some more potential conditions on suitable 
situations for interpretation.  This time, I have suggested that it must be certain 
kinds of changes to a subject which are disallowed in suitable situations, rather than 
just ‘big’ changes.  For example, we might disallow situations where the subject 
gains superhuman capacities, but not ones where she has ordinary human capacities 
(such as for communication) restored to her; or we might allow changes to the 
physical capacities of a subject, but not ones to their mental capacities.   
 The suggestions for conditions on suitable situations require further 
elaboration, and it is once again noticeable that fewer options are open to the 
analytic interpretationist.  Nevertheless, possibilities for developing an account of 
suitable situations are available, and we can argue that another apparent 
counterexample to interpretationism no longer looks so worrying once we adopt the 
right account of interpretability. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Given the understanding of interpretability argued for in chapter 3, there are ways 
for the interpretationist to respond to apparent counterexamples involving 
deception and paralysis.  Looking at such cases also helps us to explain what we 
might mean by saying that a person would display appropriate behaviour in one 
suitable counterfactual situation, and to explain why the actual situation doesn’t 
always allow us to interpret a subject.  This in turn helps us to understand what 
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interpretation depends on and how the interpretationist’s notion of interpretability 
relates to what we might intuitively understand by the word. 
I have suggested several principles which may help us to pick out suitable 
counterfactual situations, but I have not developed them fully or tried to weight 
them and combine them into a precise theory of suitable situations for interpretation.  
This might be an achievable task, but it might rather be the case that we cannot give 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and that the best account takes ‘suitable 
situation’ as a cluster concept.   
Another thing which the discussion above suggests is that there are far fewer 
options available to the analytic interpretationist who is trying to give some sort of 
account of suitable situations, than to other interpretationists.  We have not gone into 
the issue in enough detail to show that the analytic interpretationist cannot give the 
account they need.  However, the prospects for analytic interpretationism here do 
not look particularly good.  It is perhaps therefore the least promising of the 
interpretationist projects available. 
The dependence and derivative interpretationists, while probably more able 
to give the account they require of suitable situations, are also seen to have a 
additional challenge in responding to cases of deception and paralysis.  Again, I 
have not shown that this challenge could not be met.  Still, the absence of the need to 
meet such additional challenges may be a significant advantage of cartographic 
interpretationism, as long as we can justify the claim that it is still a respectable and 
interesting philosophical account of the mind. 
 
In the next chapter we turn to two more influential examples which are supposed to 
show why behavioural dispositions and/or interpretability cannot be sufficient for 
thought.  I will argue that the interpretationist should respond by accepting the 
possibility of certain strange thinkers. 
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Chapter 6 – String-Searching Machines 
and Martian Marionettes 
 
In this chapter we consider whether there could be a thing which was interpretable 
as having thoughts, but which nevertheless did not count as a thinker.  Many 
philosophers have insisted that there could be such a thing, and have offered this as 
a decisive refutation of views in the ‘No’ camp.  The most famous examples used 
here are the string-searching machine from Block (1981) and the Martian marionette 
of Peacocke (1983).  These are introduced in section 1, and form the basis of my 
discussion. 
 Child (1994) offers a list of potential replies to such examples.  However, some 
of them involve rejecting the sufficiency of interpretability and adding other criteria 
to our account of thought.  As explained in chapter 2, rejecting sufficiency amounts 
to rejecting interpretationism as I have characterised it.  Therefore, I do not pursue 
these suggestions, but concentrate on the three replies suggested by Child which are 
open to my interpretationist.  Section 2 considers the potential of rejecting the 
thought experiments on grounds of physical impossibility; sections 3 and 4 explore 
denying the status of thinker on interpretationist-friendly grounds, in particular 
because of the history of the supposed thinkers (a suggestion also developed by Ben-
Yami (2005)); and section 5 explores how we might accept the things in question as 
thinkers, and then try to dissipate or discredit the common intuition that they are not 
(a strategy also offered in Dennett (2009)).  I argue that the third of these responses is 
the most promising, but that Child’s form of the response is far more helpful than 
Dennett’s.  I then develop Child’s account further. 
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1.  The thought experiments 
 
1.1 The string-searching machine 
In his (1981) paper, ‘Psychologism and Behaviourism’, Ned Block’s strategy is to 
describe a machine which can respond sensibly to inputs, and which is therefore 
intelligent according to a test like Turing’s, but for which ‘knowledge of the 
machine’s internal processing shows conclusively that it is totally lacking in 
intelligence.’ (19)  ‘Intelligence’ here means the capacity for thought. 
 The machine that Block describes has sensible strings of conversational 
contributions recorded inside it.  When it receives a conversational contribution, A, 
from its interlocutor, it selects all those strings beginning with A.  It then picks one of 
these strings, and delivers the next conversational contribution in that string, B.  The 
interlocutor delivers another contribution, C.  The machine picks out all those strings 
which start with A followed by B followed by C, selects one and then delivers the 
next conversational contribution, D.  And so on.  All the questions, answers, and 
other sorts of contribution are contained within the machine before the conversation 
begins.  The only ‘moving part’ of the machine is the mechanism which identifies the 
interlocutor’s contribution and maps it to the contribution the machine will give. 
 According to Block, the set of strings of reasonable conversational 
contributions is a finite set which could in principle be listed by a large team of 
clever individuals who have been given a large grant to work on the project, who 
probably have some sort of mechanical help, and who can exercise their own 
‘imagination and judgment about what is to count as a sensible string.’ (20)  Indeed, 
presumably we should suppose that the machine was created by just such a team.   
 After describing this machine, Block states that ‘the machine has the 
intelligence of a toaster.  All the intelligence it exhibits is that of its programmers.’ (21) 
 The thought experiment is initially set up so that the machine only has to pass 
the test of having a one hour conversation.  However, Block claims that no particular 
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time restriction is necessary.57  Nor does he think the experiment is limited to cases 
where inputs and outputs are typed: we can have the machine linked up to a robot 
body, which delivers ‘sensory’ information to the machine as input and performs all 
sorts of behaviours in accordance with the machine’s outputs.  In this case, the 
programmers must program a great deal more information into the machine: they 
must code in not only every sensible opener to a conversation, and every turn the 
conversation can then take, but also every piece of sensory information the robot 
body can receive, and a sensible action or set of actions for the body to take for each 
possible combination of sensory inputs, given all previous sensory inputs received 
and actions taken.  What counts as a sensible action will of course depend upon the 
robot body’s physical capacities, and we may choose whether or not to imagine the 
robot to be able to exhibit a large range of our behavioural nuances.  Block’s idea is 
that no matter how closely this being approximates our behaviour, indeed even if it is 
behaviourally indistinguishable from us, it still cannot count as a thinker because of its style 
of internal information processing.  This is supposed to rule out the possibility of us 
admitting that the machine lacks thought, but for a reason amenable to those in the 
‘No’ camp.  For the majority of this chapter, I focus on this final case with the 
conversing robot body.  I do this because interpretationism as I have characterised it 
tells an interpreter to consider the environment and actions of a subject, as well as 
conversational output.   
The paper in which Block presents this string-searching machine also briefly 
mentions another thought experiment which Block thinks delivers the same problem 
for a theory in the ‘No’ camp.  This alternative machine controls a robot which 
simulates a particular person’s behaviour by using a description of her physical 
status, her neurobiology or her psychology to work out how she would behave in 
the situations in which the robot is placed.  This robot will be interpretable as 
thinking if the person it mirrors is, but Block complains that ‘it is hardly obvious that 
                                                     
57 The programmers will, however, have had to program in strings of some finite length. 
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the robot’s process of manipulation of descriptions of [her] cogitation is itself 
cogitation.’ (41)  The issues this case raises are dealt with by considering the Martian 
marionette case below. 
 
All of Block’s thought experiments are supposed to show that the capacity for 
thought depends not only on the behaviour that can and does result from it, but also 
on the style of information processing that produces that behaviour.  Since in the 
cases described we are not supposed to be able to determine the nature of the 
internal information processing by everyday methods of interpretation, we are 
supposed to conclude that interpretability cannot be sufficient for thought. 
 
1.2 The Martian marionette  
In his (1983) book, Sense and Content, Peacocke imagines a human body (called ‘The 
Body’) which is just like that of an ordinary human, save that it does not contain a 
brain.  The nerves which would normally connect to a brain are instead linked by 
radio to a computer on Mars.  Highly intelligent Martians have designed this 
computer, have made sure it has and/or collects information about the history of 
‘The Body’, and have given it conditionals specifying what a typical human would 
do given any history and current stimulation.  The computer can therefore make The 
Body behave in just the way a typical human would in any situation.  Thus, The 
Body is supposed to be interpretable, yet Peacocke claims ‘we have a strong intuition 
that The Body (or The Body plus computer and radio links) does not have 
propositional attitudes at all: it is just a Martian marionette.’ (205)58 
 Peacocke’s case is importantly similar to Block’s final case above.  Although 
Peacocke adds the details that the computer is very far away and was built by 
Martians, he does not think that these features are the ones that determine our 
supposed response to the case.  Rather, he identifies the problem as follows:  ‘There 
                                                     
58 Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the being Peacocke describes as a marionette, even though I 
will ultimately be arguing that it is not a mere marionette, but a genuine thinker. 
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are no states of The Body plus computer related as folk psychology takes belief, 
experience, memory, intention, and so forth to be related.’ (206)59   
 Another difference between Peacocke’s Martian marionette and Block’s final 
machine is that Block has his machine simulate a particular human, whereas 
Peacocke says The Body responds just as ‘the typical human’ does to its history and 
situation.  This difference is, I think, a definite point in favour of Block’s case, since 
we may wonder whether there is any such thing as a ‘typical’ human response to 
many kinds of stimulation.  I will therefore amend Peacocke’s case by imagining that 
the Martians develop a particular character with its own personality and proclivities. 
 
We have, then, two famous thought experiments which are supposed to disprove 
the claim that interpretability is sufficient for thought.  I now turn to the first way we 
might respond to these cases: by complaining that they are physically impossible. 
 
2.  Physical impossibility 
 
The charge of physical impossibility is one principally directed against Block’s 
string-searching machines.  It is an objection that Block himself anticipates and 
discusses.  As Block develops the challenge, the problem is combinatorial explosion: 
given the huge number of possible conversations, let alone overall interactions of a 
body with the world, even the machine which is only supposed to cope with an hour 
long conversation needs to search through more strings than we currently believe 
that there are particles in the universe.  Therefore, no machine could store all the 
information that Block says his string-searching machines contain, and no group of 
humans could possibly have programmed them.  The response then goes on to say 
that, because the case is physically impossible, interpretationism does not need to 
                                                     
59 In diagnosing the problem with the marionette, Peacocke thus seems to gesture towards the very 
issue about mental causation that this thesis has set to one side.  I will therefore not be able to deal 
fully with Peacocke’s complaint.  My focus will be on seeing if Peacocke’s intuition about the 
marionette can be explained in another, interpretationist-friendly way, or else discredited. 
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consider it, and it cannot be used to refute any view of the mind.  Although this 
argument is directed at the string-searching machines, it seems likely that a similar 
argument could be developed for the computer which is supposed to contain 
conditionals telling it how a body with any history would react to any stimulation, 
including stimulation in the form of conversation with other people. 
 Block’s primary60 answer to this problem is that, since something like the 
interpretationist’s Availability Claim is supposed to be a conceptual claim, we need 
only a logically, not a physically possible case in order to refute it.  I think that this 
response chimes with the spirit of interpretationism.  After all, if our concept of 
thought is separate from our ideas about the physical processes etc. that go on inside 
the thinking creature, as interpretationism suggests, why would it not also be 
separate from our ideas about what is physically possible? The insulation of our 
ideas about thought from ideas about how thought might be realised should not be 
selective without some justification, and none has as yet been offered.  I therefore do 
not think that the interpretationist ought to use this response. 
 Nevertheless, the point about physical impossibility might be used in a 
different way: we could say that a strong intuition that there couldn’t be such a 
thinker, because they are physically impossible, somehow interferes with our 
reaction to the case we are being asked to imagine.  To give this response would be 
to move to the strategy of section 5.  Before considering it, I consider two ways of 
trying to disqualify machine and marionette from being thinkers by saying that they 
have the wrong sort of history. 
 
3.  Inappropriate histories: option 1 
 
Ben-Yami (2005) offers a defence of a view called criteria behaviourism.  This says 
that psychological concepts have behavioural criteria.  According to Ben-Yami, ‘no 
                                                     
60 Block also questions whether his machine really is a physical impossibility; see (1981: 32). 
106 
 
matter to what extent two persons differ in their internal processes, if these 
differences would not show in their behaviour, then these persons are 
psychologically the same.’ (180)  This is something the interpretationist agrees with, 
provided that ‘difference in behaviour’ is understood broadly enough.  Although 
Ben-Yami does not call himself an interpretationist, his view shares the feature 
which makes the thought experiments in this chapter problematic, and it is therefore 
worth looking at his response to the problem. 
 
Ben-Yami agrees with Block that the string-searching machine (often called 
Blockhead) lacks intelligence, but says that this is not due to the nature of its internal 
information processing, but because it lacks the requisite capacities.   
 The argument uses a comparison with the case of Cyrano helping Christian to 
give poetic answers to Roxane in Cyrano de Bergerac.  In Act III of this play, Cyrano 
hides beneath Roxane’s balcony and whispers to Christian what he should say.  
Although Christian speaks the poetic answers, and Roxane attributes them to him, 
the fact that he is only repeating them undermines any attribution of poetic ability to 
Christian.  In just the same way, the fact that all Blockhead does is to reproduce the 
answers it has been given shows, according to Ben-Yami, that it has no intelligence 
of its own.   
 The comparison is supposed to show that, like Christian, Blockhead has 
limited capacities: it can give intelligent answers ‘only in exceptional circumstances, 
when it has been programmed in a very specific way.  His machine does not have 
any independent intellectual capacity, but has to be given the right answers in 
advance.’ (185)  The programmers might easily have made mistakes, or decided to 
enter silly answers, and there would have been nothing Blockhead could have done 
to compensate. 
 Ben-Yami then suggests that Block’s problem was that he focused on the point 
of view of an interrogator in a Turing test situation: 
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[T]he interrogator cannot, indeed, distinguish between the machine and an 
intelligent person.  But the interrogator does not have all the information 
required to determine the machine’s capacities.  To determine that, we need 
to know how the machine interacts with its environment in other 
circumstances as well – we need to know what happened to it in the past, and 
not only what it can do at present. (185) 
 
The last sentence above is particularly important for the interpretationist.  If Ben-
Yami had supposed that Blockhead’s lack of capacities was undetectable by the 
ordinary interpreter, then his reply would not have been interpretationist-friendly, 
since the machine would have been interpretable in the sense important to the 
interpretationist and yet would not count as a thinker.  However, Ben-Yami suggests 
that knowing the history of Blockhead would allow us to establish that it does not 
have the right capacities, and this is something an ordinary interpreter could know. 
To evaluate Ben-Yami’s response, I will consider the analogy between 
Christian and Blockhead.  I argue that there are several relevant differences. 
 A first difference, which Ben-Yami recognises, is that Cyrano supplies 
responses to Christian in ‘real time’, whereas Blockhead has been programmed in 
advance with all possible sensible responses.  This is a point which Block thinks is 
important.  Block compares his machine with the case of a two-way radio.  Such a 
radio can also emit sensible responses in a conversation.  However, Block thinks it 
lacks a capacity that Blockhead has.  He thinks we can see this by noting that causal 
signals from the conversation partners do not reach the programmers, whereas the 
person on the end of a two-way radio does hear questions and think up answers.  
The causal efficacy of Blockhead’s programmers is therefore limited in a way that 
allows Blockhead to have a capacity which the radio lacks. 
 Christian seems to be rather more like the radio than like Blockhead in this 
respect, and Ben-Yami should admit that the machine has a capacity which Christian 
and the radio lack: it can produce responses without them being fed into it as the 
108 
 
conversation progresses.  However, Ben-Yami must think that this is not the capacity 
that matters.  He must think that Christian and the machine are still importantly 
similar because, although the programmers don’t stand beside the machine during 
the conversation, it is still similarly dependent on them to produce any answers that 
it gives.  We should then employ Ben-Yami’s point above: just as Christian would 
have given silly answers if Cyrano did the wrong thing, so the machine would give 
silly answers if the programmers programmed it differently.  Thus, according to 
Ben-Yami, the machine’s capacity is limited to ‘exceptional circumstances’; its 
capacity is not ‘general’ enough.  
 The problem here is that, for any thinker, if there is something wrong with 
whatever it is that supports her mental processes, she will experience difficulties in 
producing sensible responses to her situation.  These difficulties will be of varying 
severity depending on what is wrong: sometimes they may result in strange 
thoughts and responses, which nevertheless can still be counted as genuine thoughts 
and actions; sometimes we may end up with involuntary behaviour alongside 
genuine actions, and sometimes a problem stops a biological creature from thinking 
at all.  The problems likely to be experienced by the string-searching machine may 
be different from our problems, both in causes and effects.  But what reason have we 
to think that our capacity for thought is any more general? 
 Perhaps here Ben-Yami would want to call on the immense difficulties in 
creating Block’s machine.  Indeed, we saw above that Blockhead might be impossible, 
whereas we know that lots of humans do successfully think and respond to their 
circumstances.  If the impossibility of producing the machine is the issue, then we 
must refer Ben-Yami to the discussion of section 2.  If mere difficulty is being called 
on, and hence the likelihood of the programmers making mistakes, then Ben-Yami 
seems to be proposing that we rule out candidate thinkers just because the 
circumstances which led to their existence were highly unlikely.  This is a feature 
which many things we want to count as thinkers may share, and there seems to be 
little justification for the interpretationist to call on it. 
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Once created, as per the hypothesis, the machine does have a pretty stable and 
general capacity to respond to things sensibly and in a way that makes it 
interpretable.  I therefore conclude that there is not enough justification for saying 
that the machine does not have the required capacities.  The difference which Ben-
Yami recognises between Christian and Blockhead is a significant one, despite his 
argument to the contrary. 
A second difference between the cases further undermines the analogy that 
Ben-Yami wants to draw: poetic ability and intelligence (in the sense at issue) are 
importantly different.  Although Christian definitely doesn’t have the former, we 
don’t say that he therefore isn’t entertaining the poetic propositions that Cyrano 
gives to him.  Yet it is precisely the mere thinking of thoughts that is at issue in the 
case of Blockhead.  We should, and can happily, deny that Blockhead has certain 
abilities that we may associate with our everyday notion of intelligence.  In 
particular, it lacks a certain strong sort of creativity61.  However, in denying it some 
of the abilities that we suppose humans to have, we need not deny that it thinks.  
The sense in which Christian is shown not to have a capacity is therefore quite 
different from the capacity that Ben-Yami wants to deny in Blockhead, and the 
analogy may therefore fail to support his case. 
 
Suppose we accept the above criticisms of Ben-Yami’s argument.  We might still feel 
that Ben-Yami’s central concern is important.  As well as presenting an argument 
that Blockhead lacks a capacity, he also points out that whatever responses 
Blockhead makes, and whatever capacities he has, these depend upon the 
intelligence of others.  The machine’s responses are derivative: parasitic upon those 
                                                     
61 Blockhead appears to lack what Boden (1994) calls historic creativity, which is the ability to have 
ideas that no one has ever had before.  It need not lack what Boden calls psychological creativity, 
which involves producing ideas which the subject could not have had before, nor need it lack the 
ability to have ideas which it merely happens never to have had before.  That Blockhead can possess 
these latter kinds of creativity will be a consequence of the arguments of section 5.  We may think that 
humans are sometimes creative in the first sense, and perhaps this is important in an account of the 
value of artworks.  However, it is surely the latter two kinds of creativity which should be important 
in the philosophy of mind. 
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of its programmers.  This is the central problem that Ben-Yami sees with Blockhead.  
He uses it to attempt an argument that Blockhead lacks the relevant capacities, 
which I have argued fails.  But maybe this dependence could be problematic in 
another way.  To consider the nature of this dependence, and the way in which it 
should affect our interpretation of Blockhead, I will again compare the case of 
Blockhead with that of Christian. 
In the play, Cyrano tells Christian what to say.  Christian listens to him and 
purposefully repeats exactly what he is told.  I said above that we need not deny that 
Christian entertains the propositions suggested to him, but nor need we insist that 
he does so.  We could imagine that Christian does not even understand the things 
that Cyrano tells him to say.   In this situation, there is an intentional characterisation 
that we can give of Christian according to which he definitely doesn’t generate the 
content of his responses himself, in any sense, and which even tells us that he 
doesn’t understand them. This intentional characterisation of Christian tells us that 
his responses are derivative in a sense which matters to poetic ability.   
 In the thought experiment, however, Blockhead has responses programmed 
into it.  It does not listen to its programmers, nor decide to use their responses.  It 
need not trust its programmers, nor have any view on them at all.  It need have no 
awareness of the responses as given to it.  Unlike in Christian’s case, there does not 
seem to be an intentional characterisation of this very machine which tells us that its 
responses are problematically derivative.  The problem, if there is one, must be in 
giving an intentional characterisation at all, and so we need a justification for saying 
that this is impossible or inappropriate. 
There remains the fact that exactly the responses that the machine produces 
were thought of by others beforehand, and that this plays a direct causal role in 
making the machine respond as it does.  But it is unclear why, on interpretationist 
grounds, this should make such a difference.  Child (1994) suggests that part of the 
problem may be that the machine’s intelligence is parasitic in the sense that it can 
only arise if others have been intelligent before: not all thinkers could think in this 
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way.  But it is surely equally mysterious why this should matter.  To use this 
response to the thought experiment, the interpretationist must claim that it is part of 
our concept of thought that it must not depend in this way upon the thoughts of 
others.  But without a justification for this claim, it is an ad hoc, and therefore 
unconvincing, addition to the theory. A justification cannot be given using Dennett’s 
conception of the purposes of the intentional stance: Blockhead is just as predictable 
from the intentional stance as a human.  In Part III, I question Dennett’s account of 
the purposes of interpretation.  Nevertheless, the alternative I offer gives no more 
support to the claim that the lack of such dependence is important.   
 It could also be noted that certain world views make all human thought and 
action derivative in just the way that Blockhead’s responses are derivative.  Certain 
varieties of religion offer an account of God’s sovereignty according to which God 
has predestined every aspect of his creation, including the thoughts and actions of 
his human subjects.  Such a view may have consequences for our views on moral 
responsibility, but surely it would not imply that none of us are thinkers?  Certainly, 
this is not the consequence that the relevant believers draw from their view, even 
though it makes their thoughts and actions derivative, and even though it means 
that not all thinkers can be like them, since a God is needed to create them. 
 
I conclude that the interpretationist would do better not to claim that the fact that 
Blockhead’s responses were programmed into it, and therefore that its responses 
depend upon those of its programmers, means it cannot be a thinker.   
It is unclear whether Ben-Yami would want his response to Blockhead to be 
carried over to Block’s other machine and the Martian marionette.  Since the 
response does not appear to work well in the case it was designed for, there is no 
reason to try extending it to other cases. 
 
112 
 
4.  Inappropriate histories: option 2 
 
The mere fact that it was programmed does not appear to be a good reason for the 
interpretationist to deny that Blockhead is intelligent.  However, there is another 
way in which the history of Blockhead might make a difference to whether his 
current behaviour reflects genuine thoughts.  This proposal is briefly sketched in 
Child (1994), and has a precedent in Davidson’s discussion of the swampman.62 
 The suggestion calls on the idea that the causal history of a subject, the 
environment they have been in and the objects they have interacted with all play an 
important role in determining the contents of their thoughts.  Child applies this to 
the case of Blockhead as follows: ‘since his dispositions do not result from any 
pattern of causal interactions between him and the things and kinds he seems to be 
thinking about, he cannot correctly be interpreted as thinking about them.’ (1994: 45)  
This can also be applied to Peacocke’s marionette, as I show below.  The argument 
mirrors Davidson’s reasons for denying that a perfect replica of himself which 
behaved exactly like him, formed by chance when lightning strikes a rotten log in a 
swamp, could have thoughts. 
I am going to go through a series of objections to this proposal which I hope 
will show how difficult it would be to endorse.  The final objection then shows that it 
cannot prevent the interpretationist from needing to accept at least some very strange 
thinkers. 
 
First of all, we might question whether Davidson is right about the swampman.  We 
might argue that, given the best account of interpretationism, the swampman should 
be credited with thought just as soon as he appears in the swamp and starts acting 
just like Davidson.63  If this argument worked, surely it would stop us from saying 
that Blockhead and the marionette can’t be thinkers because they haven’t interacted 
                                                     
62 See the beginning of ‘Representation and Interpretation’ in his (2004). 
63 My hunch is that this is correct, but I will not argue for this here. 
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in the appropriate way with the things they talk about.  However, for the rest of this 
section, let us suppose that Davidson is correct that the swampman would not 
immediately be a thinker. 
 We should then ask what we ought to say about the time after the swampman 
has cleaned himself off, walked into town, and lived Davidson’s life for a few years.  
He will then have interacted with things and people in the normal way over a decent 
length of time.  Will this mean he has become a thinker?  I’m not sure that Davidson 
wants to continue to deny that the swampman is a thinker as the swampman grows 
older, but I have not found an explicit ruling on this issue from Davidson.  If the 
swampman can become a thinker, then maybe Blockhead and the marionette can too.  
After all, they too will interact with the people and things around them.  
Nevertheless, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the swampman never 
would become a thinker.  I will show that, even then, we will still fail to rule out all 
Blockheads and marionettes from being thinkers using the argument under 
consideration. 
 Before that, we should consider a feature peculiar to Blockhead, which might 
still prevent us from denying it the status of thinker using the argument under 
consideration.  This is that, in Blockhead’s case, there is a causal connection between 
the things talked about and the responses and thoughts of the being under 
consideration: it comes via the programmers.  All those things which, when first 
switched on, Blockhead is disposed to talk about, the programmers must be 
appropriately causally connected to.  Otherwise, they would not have been able to 
program in the right responses.64  The connection between Blockhead’s thoughts and 
the things about which it seems to think is admittedly non-standard.  Importantly, 
Blockhead itself may not have interacted with the things it seems to think and talk 
                                                     
64 Unless they too are Blockheads, or Martian marionettes, which of course are supposed to be able to 
do everything (non-intentionally described) that a normal human can do, presumably including 
programming.  But a chain of Blockheads will presumably end in real human programmers 
eventually.  Or if the programmers are Martian marionettes, then that is the case we should be 
discussing, as below. 
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about before seeming to think and talk about them.  However, if the constraint of 
causal interaction is to be justified by the use of noting and calling on such 
interactions in the process of interpretation, then the way in which the connection is 
strange does not seem to mark an important difference.  If the interpreter could 
know about the programming of the Blockhead, and about the interactions of its 
programmers with their environment, this might well enable him to give an 
interpretation of Blockhead which is useful in just the ways that interpretations are 
supposed to be useful.  Thus, the constraint of appropriate causal connections does 
not necessarily help with the standard Blockhead case.   
 Maybe we would find a way around this obstacle to denying that Blockhead 
thinks if we looked more closely at the sorts of causal connections and interactions 
with the world that matter to content.  Perhaps a full account of these would give us a 
way to discount the causal connections Blockhead has, via its programmers, to the 
things it talks about, without ruling out the possibility of beliefs formed through 
testimony and innate ideas.  Let us again suppose that this is the case, for the sake of 
argument. 
We may then also take comfort in the fact that the constraint of appropriate 
causal connections can be applied much more easily to the Martian marionette.  The 
computer which controls The Body was programmed by Martians, and if they have 
not visited Earth, they may not have interacted with the things that The Body seems 
to think and talk about.    The Martians’ program works using their knowledge of 
neurophysiology, not knowledge couched in terms of how people react to the 
external situations which they conceptualise in a particular way.  In the standard 
Martian marionette case, then, the causal connections which are supposed to be 
important may well be missing. 
Nevertheless, we can adjust the thought experiments so that there will still be 
problems.  In the case of the Martian marionette we can adjust the thought 
experiment so that The Body definitely does interact with its environment in the 
right way before talking and thinking about the things in that environment.  The 
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Body can start out as an almost-normal body of a human baby.  It can then appear to 
move around in and learn about its environment and thereby learn to talk and think 
in increasingly complex ways.  It can do this while still being controlled by a 
computer which works just as Peacocke describes. 
The same is true with Blockhead.  Since in the case we are interested in it is 
connected to a robot, perhaps its ‘body’ will not grow.  But in other respects it can be 
programmed to react to the world just like a growing child.  All its responses will 
still be programmed in ahead of time, but it will also be true that the dispositions 
Blockhead has at any particular time will result from just the right pattern of 
interactions between it and the world.   
 
I suspect that at least some of the claims accepted for the sake of argument above 
would turn out, on closer inspection, to be false.  The discussion above therefore 
offers us several ways to challenge the argument against Blockhead and marionette 
thought under consideration. To endorse this response to the thought experiments at 
all, a great deal more work would need to be done.  However, even if the claims 
were true, the final objection shows that the response of this section still leaves us 
accepting the possibility of some rather strange thinkers with very different internal 
information processing procedures from the ordinary human.  I suspect that both 
Block and Peacocke would claim that they still have a strong intuition that even the 
Blockhead and marionette which have been babies cannot turn into thinkers.  If so, 
then we are still going to need to use the strategy below, of accepting the existence of 
strange thinkers and then discrediting the intuitions against them, for at least some 
cases. 
 
5.  Allowing strange thinkers 
 
The final strategy to be considered is that of claiming that the beings in the supposed 
counterexamples are thinkers.  They will not then refute the claim that 
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interpretability is sufficient for thought.  The fact that some people find this highly 
implausible must then be addressed, for example by trying to mitigate the intuition 
that such beings can’t be thinkers, or by casting doubt on the value of such intuitions.  
I first of all consider and criticise a recent strategy of Dennett’s for achieving these 
things, before endorsing a strategy suggested by Child (1994). 
 
Daniel Dennett thinks that we should say that Blockheads and marionettes can be 
thinkers.  In the case of the marionette, he thinks that when we imagine the various 
ways the fantasy could be fleshed out, we will realise that there is no 
counterexample here.  In his (2009) he says: 
 
If the off-stage controller controls this body and no other, then we were 
certainly right to attribute the beliefs and desires to the person whose body we 
have surgically explored; this person, like Dennett in ‘Where am I?,’(Dennett 
1978) simply keeps his (silicon) brain in a non-traditional location.  If, on the 
other hand, the Martian program has more than one (pseudo-) agent under 
control, and is coordinating their activities (and not just providing, in one 
place, n different independent agent-brains), then the Martian program itself 
is the best candidate for being the intentional system whose actions we are 
predicting and explaining.  (The Martian program in this case really is a 
puppeteer, and we should recast all the only apparently independent beliefs 
and desires of the various agents as in reality the intended manifestations of 
the master agent[)]. (2009: 346-7) 
 
However, Peacocke explicitly mentions Dennett’s story, ‘Where am I?’.  He says that 
the brain in Dennett’s story, which is connected to a body by radio transmitters, can 
indeed think.  We may presume that he also supposes that the computer copy of the 
brain from the story genuinely thinks, since it is said to be ‘a computer duplicate of 
[Dennett’s] brain, reproducing both the complete information processing structure 
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and the computational speed of my brain in a giant computer program.’ (1983: 319)  
Peacocke is quite explicit that he thinks the problem with his marionette is that it 
doesn’t have states related in the right way to be mental states, because of the way it 
generates behaviour.  This marks a difference between the computers in Peacocke 
and Dennett’s stories, and it is one that Peacocke thinks is significant. 
 Dennett does not add much detail to Peacocke’s story, and ignores the feature 
of the story that Peacocke considers most important.  If Dennett really thinks he has 
given the story all the fleshing out we need in order to see that it is not a 
counterexample, I take it that he just doesn’t share the intuition that the marionette 
wouldn’t be a thinker.  As it happens, I share Dennett’s intuitions here, but in the 
course of this section I try to do more to recognise and account for the fact that 
others do have the same intuition as Peacocke. 
 
Next, consider Dennett’s response to Blockhead.  Dennett suggests the following 
imaginative exercise: 
 
Suppose we discover that Oscar Wilde… lay awake nights thinking of deft 
retorts to likely remarks and committing these pairs to memory so that he 
could deliver them of and when the occasion arose ‘without missing a beat.’  
Would this cast any doubt on our categorization of him as an intelligent 
thinker?  (2009: 348) 
 
He thinks that this case then shows us, by analogy, how we should respond to 
Blockhead: 
 
Just as Peacocke’s puppet does its thinking in a strange place, this one does its 
thinking at a strange time! (2009: 348) 
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However, this response seems very unsatisfactory.  The scenario which is supposed 
to help us seems quite inappropriate:  unlike Oscar Wilde, there is a very good sense 
in which Blockhead does not generate its responses all by itself.  In section 3, I 
suggested that we should admit that Blockhead lacks a kind of creativity (historical 
creativity) which we can still attribute to Wilde.   
 Moreover, it is unclear when Dennett is suggesting that the machine did its 
thinking.  One option is that he is saying that the machine itself doesn’t think, only 
its programmers do, and that we are really interacting with the programmers when 
we interact with the machine.  However, as Block points out, none of our inputs ever 
causally affect the programmers.  In addition, we do not want to attribute to the 
programmers all the thoughts that we would otherwise attribute to Blockhead: they 
did not think, ‘Oh, what a beautiful sunrise,’ or ‘This referee’s a joke,’ or ‘I can’t 
believe I aced my exams’, or whatever.  Unlike Blockhead, they were not in the right 
situations to have such thoughts. 
 Perhaps Dennett is instead suggesting that the programmers and machine are 
a composite thinker, in which thinking done earlier results in thoughts at later and 
appropriate times.  Certainly, thinking can work like this.  The thinking Oscar Wilde 
does late at night may produce particular new thoughts involving indexicals during 
social interactions.    However, since the machine has been designed to act just like a 
normal person, it plus its programmers would make a highly psychologically 
disjointed thinker.  As suggested in section 3, Blockhead doesn’t need to have any 
notion of his origins or how his mind works. Wilde will probably remember that he 
stayed awake thinking up responses, and be pleased that he put in the time when it 
allows him to deliver just the right retort.  Blockhead, on the other hand, may 
perfectly sincerely assure us that he has just come up with a new idea, or worked out 
the answer to a problem, or whatever.  I think there is no more reason to count 
Blockhead and certain time slices of its programmers as a composite thinker than to 
count a time-slice of a hypnotist and the person into whom he implants ideas as a 
composite thinker. 
119 
 
 
Through its implausibility, I think that Dennett’s response to Blockhead points us 
towards one of the reasons why people might mistakenly intuit that Blockhead 
cannot be a thinker.  The reason is another of those canvassed in Child (1994). 
 The suggestion is that the intuition that Blockhead isn’t a thinker comes from 
sleight of hand with the notion of a lookup table.  A normal human might use a 
look-up table to produce behaviour while not having any of the thoughts that that 
behaviour implies.  Perhaps people think of this sort of case, and then retain the idea 
of consciously consulting a lookup table when imagining a being which produces all 
its behaviour like this.  They then carry over the intuition that such behaviour 
wouldn’t be intelligent.  However, this gives the wrong picture of what is happening 
with Blockhead: it doesn’t literally consult the table at all.  No one does, in fact.  As 
Child says, the operation of Blockhead’s look-up table occurs at a sub-personal level. 
Child then suggests that ‘[t]he fact that Blockhead’s sub-personal organisation is 
structurally isomorphic with a look-up table is irrelevant to the question whether, at 
the personal level, Blockhead has propositional attitudes.’ (1994: 44) 
We therefore have a potential diagnosis of where the person who says that 
Blockhead can’t be a thinker may be going wrong: their intuition may be arising 
from thinking of the case in a way which is either incoherent or unjustified.  It will 
be incoherent if they are trying to imagine both that Blockhead is aware of an internal 
process, and that it isn’t a thinker.  More charitably, we might take them to be 
supposing that if Blockhead was a thinker, then he would have to be aware of 
looking things up on a table, but that he then wouldn’t count as a thinker after all.  In 
the second case, the supposition is unjustified because there are many subpersonal 
processes which go on in our brains which we are not aware of, and it is unclear why 
Blockhead shouldn’t have such processes too.65   
                                                     
65 Perhaps at this point, Block will say that even if we allow that the string-searching machine could 
simulate some subpersonal processes, the interpretationist also needs to say that it simulates some 
personal ones.  He might then claim that since the string-searching machine only searches strings; 
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I will now offer some support for the idea that both Block and Peacocke are 
indeed making this mistake.  When considering his final machine (which works 
much as the machine that controls The Body in Peacocke’s story), Block offers the 
following as an ‘intuition massage’ to encourage us to agree that the machine is not 
thinking: ‘substitute for the description-manipulating computer in [the robot’s] head 
a very small intelligent person who speaks only Chinese, and who possesses a manual 
(in Chinese) describing [the relevant] psychological mechanisms.’ (1981: 42)  Block 
points out that the person inside need not know anything about what is happening 
outside, and concludes ‘It seems that the robot simulates… thinking… without itself 
thinking those thoughts.’ (1981: 44) 
 To this intuition massage, we may reply that just because the robot is thinking, 
this gives no reason to suppose that a miniature person who was aware of and 
controlled the manipulations inside the robot should be aware of what is happening 
outside, nor that it has to think the thoughts we attribute to the robot.  Such a little 
person would not be the one we were interpreting.  Rather, he would be like the man 
in Searle’s Chinese room argument, who merely contributed to the mechanics of 
thinking. 66 
Now, if Block’s intuition in the case of his second machine is disrupted by the 
mistaken assumption that this candidate thinker must be aware of manipulating 
information in the way a miniature person in his head would be aware of such 
manipulations, then maybe he is making the similar mistake of supposing that 
Blockhead must be aware of his own information processing mechanisms.  This 
would then explain Block’s intuition, but it would not justify it. 
Peacocke likewise may be accused of this mistake in his discussion of the 
Martian marionette.  Peacocke complains that the states of the computer that he has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
there are no other processes going on inside Blockhead which can be the proper person-level 
processes that Blockhead is supposedly aware of.  My reply to this is given below. 
66 See his (1980).  Searle, of course, does not agree that the man in the Chinese room merely 
contributes to the mechanics of genuine thought, but this well known response to his thought 
experiment is the one the interpretationist should give.  
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described as causes of The Body’s behaviour aren’t related in the right way to be 
mental states like ours.  But if they are sub-personal states which the marionette has 
no awareness of, it is unclear why this is supposed to matter. 
 As implied by the analogy with Wilde above, even Dennett appears to be 
vulnerable to this sort of mistake.  In the same paper, he talks about Blockhead 
having the vast number of potential strings of inputs and outputs stored ‘in 
memory’.  However, this is not the way the interpretationist ought to think of the 
situation.  Just because the information stored in the machine has a particular 
meaning for its programmers, this does not mean that the physical realisation of the 
information has the same meaning for Blockhead.  The information the 
programmers put in is not written in a ‘language of thought.’  It need not even be 
written in a language that Blockhead speaks or understands.  Blockhead does not 
already believe all the things the programmers have programmed him to believe in 
the right situations – he must wait for the right situations to believe them.  Nor does 
he have a fantastic number of conversations stored in his memory – he could not list 
them to us, even if he wanted to.  We should say that from his point of view, the 
responses he makes and the intentions he forms seem to come to him in much the 
same way as our intentions and responses arrive, sometimes as a result of explicit 
trains of thought, and sometimes apparently out of nowhere. 
 There is one problem with this account as a diagnosis of Block’s intuition.  I 
have suggested that Block makes a similar mistake to Searle in his Chinese room 
argument.  Yet, Block himself has argued against Searle, 67  and in his (1981) he 
explicitly says that he is not making the same argument.  Whereas Searle used his 
argument to claim that no process of symbol manipulation could count as thought, 
Block says ‘what justifies us in regarding some symbol-manipulating homunculus 
heads… as unintelligent is that the causal relations among their states do not mirror 
the casual relations among our mental states.’ (12)  However, then the addition of the 
                                                     
67 See his (1980a). 
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miniature person into the machine should be irrelevant.  Certainly, the fact that the 
homunculus isn’t thinking the thoughts we attribute to the robot should not have 
been called on.  Even if Block’s own intuitions do not result from the mistake 
suggested, it seems that he must be attempting to manipulate his readers’ intuitions 
in an unjustified way. 
 The point about the causal relations among mental states takes us, as with 
Peacocke’s ultimate diagnosis of the problem with the Martian marionette, into 
questions about how exactly interpretationism should deal with the causal efficacy 
of the mental.  As explained in chapter 2, this is a huge topic, and I have decided to 
put it to one side in order to explore the more neglected questions of what the 
interpretationist could mean by the two central notions of his theory, interpretability 
and rationality.  The most I can do here is to point out that the packets of 
information that the machine or homunculus manipulates need not be claimed to be 
the beliefs and desires of the candidate thinker.  As Child says, this may all be sub-
personal processing.  The question of whether these sub-personal states can form the 
basis for a higher level consisting of genuine beliefs and desires etc. which are 
related in the right way, and which form the person-level processes that Blockhead 
and the marionette appear to be aware of, remains open.  But we should note that 
Peacocke and Block, in the papers containing the thought experiments we have been 
considering, have not given us reasons to suppose that they cannot. 
  
I think the above provides a plausible diagnosis of many people’s intuitions about 
string-searching machines and Martian marionettes.  Perhaps some such people 
might recognise that they have made the suggested mistake, and might then find 
their intuitions changed or lessened.  However, even if they do not, there are ways 
for the interpretationist to cast doubt on intuitive responses to the cases in question. 
One of these ways has already been mentioned: we may point to the probable 
physical impossibility of the cases, and suggest that people may be confusing an 
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intuition that the thinker described just couldn’t exist, and the intuition that the 
thing in question, if per impossibile it did exist, wouldn’t be a thinker.   
Another thing we might say is that we humans have a strong record of 
producing chauvinist intuitions about mental states, particularly before adequate 
interactions with a candidate thinker.  People have denied the personhood or mental 
capacities of other races, but their concepts of personhood and thought should be 
extended to cover at least all typical adult humans.  Some people also have a very 
hard time accepting that a lump of matter like the brain could produce genuine 
thought and may be attracted to dualism as a result.  However, most modern 
philosophers would suggest that there is something amiss with such intuitions. 
When presented with a really strange sort of thinker, it is unsurprising that 
many of us initially say that it cannot really be a thinker.  But if we were to interact 
with such a being over a long period of time and to mutual benefit; if it made us 
laugh just like our friends did, and seemed to get upset at just the same sorts of 
problems as us, and presented us with good ideas for joint projects; or if it knew just 
what to say to make us furious, or acted spitefully in revenge for a disparaging 
comment we made, etc., then maybe our intuitions would change.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I think that the interpretationist should say that string-searching 
machines and Martian marionettes do not provide counterexamples to the 
Availability Claim, because they are just examples of rather strange thinkers.   
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PART III: RATIONALITY 
 
In chapter 2, I gave the beginnings of an explanation for why the interpretationist’s 
Availability and Rationality Claims came together:  I said that the Availability Claim 
posited that the thoughts of a creature could be identified through an attempt to 
understand and explain the creature and its actions in terms of the reasons of that 
very creature; this, it was suggested, meant that any thinker would need to be 
rational to at least some degree, for how else could this interpretation take place?  In 
this part of the thesis, I consider in more depth why we should suppose that thinkers 
must be rational, and what this rationality could amount to. 
In comparison to ‘interpretability’, the notion of rationality has been 
considered more obviously interesting and problematic by philosophers.  It has 
therefore been discussed at greater length, and the philosophical literature contains 
many more disagreements on the subject, over such issues as whether rationality is 
an achievement or a capacity; whether and to what degree thinking creatures must 
possess it; whether it prescribes only more or less logical relationships between 
thoughts, or also mandates certain appropriate feelings and reasonable ends; and 
whether it should be separated into practical and theoretical subsections.  Those who 
have arrived at conceptions of rationality have then gone on to use these conceptions 
in quite different ways and for different philosophical purposes.  It will not be 
possible to address all of the questions that people have asked about rationality, nor 
to give interpretationist answers to all of them.  The aim of Part III is rather to give a 
schematic view of the notion of rationality which the interpretationist should use. 
Chapter 7 explains the nature of the task the interpretationist takes up in 
trying to characterise rationality, and shows how rationality fits in to the 
interpretationist project in more detail by considering potential arguments for 
holding a Rationality Claim. 
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Chapter 8 considers a simple, rule-based view of rationality, and uses it to 
show why facts about human limitations and our apparent propensity towards 
reasoning errors have been considered problematic for the Rationality Claim.  A 
major problem with this simple view is that it fails to accommodate the idea that our 
limitations, resources and interests can determine which rules of reasoning it is 
sensible for us to follow.  In chapter 9, I suggest a consequentialist account of 
rationality which sanctions the use of quick and dirty reasoning heuristics, but over-
generalises this good idea and so removes all constraints on the content of the 
thoughts interpreted.   
Chapter 10 then argues that Cherniak’s (1986) notion of minimal rationality 
combines the promising aspects of both previous theories, and shows that it can be 
adapted so that it is suitable for interpretationist purposes.  Thus, I argue that the 
interpretationist should say that being rational involves getting at least some things 
right, and exhibiting a pattern in one’s reasoning and acting.  I raise the question of 
whether these conditions are enough to ensure that all who meet them are genuine 
thinkers, with their own perspective to be understood in terms of their reasons, and 
suggest that this minimal account of rationality does correspond to a very basic 
notion of a point of view.  Other features may nevertheless be added to our account 
to develop a more full-blooded conception of a point of view and the ability to 
respond to reasons. 
Finally, in chapter 11, I consider types of thought (dream thoughts and 
imaginings) and a kind of thinking (associative thinking) which initially appear to 
have little to do with rationality.  I argue that these too can be fitted into the 
interpretationist scheme, but that they show an important way in which 
interpretation may be explanatorily incomplete.  I then outline what this suggests 
about the relationship between the science of the mind, the philosophy of mind, and 
interpersonal interpretation. 
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Chapter 7 – The Rationality Claim 
1.  The nature of the task 
  
Despite the many disputes about rationality, there does appear to be something 
which unifies most of the various accounts of rationality: namely, that rationality has 
positive normative import.68  Rationality has to do with what is good in thinking, 
and perhaps also to some extent what is good in acting.  For example, Dennett states 
‘I want to use “rational” as a general purpose term of cognitive approval’ (1987: 97), 
while Heal claims that ‘rational’ expresses a value-laden notion, ‘bound up with our 
view about… what we should aspire to.’ (2007: 403)  It seems to be generally agreed 
that when a philosopher claims that the thoughts of an agent must be in some sense 
rational, they are claiming that the agent cannot be too bad at thinking. 
However, this small puddle of agreement is not enough to show that there are 
not importantly different, but equally reasonable notions of rationality.  For example, 
the idea that rationality has positive normative import does not settle whether all 
good features of thinking are aspects of rationality, or only some subset.  Heal (2007) 
suggests that  
The need for some notions in the area of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are rooted 
in our ability to engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges.  But 
because such exchanges can (as Wittgenstein emphasises) be so various, we 
should expect the notions to come in many versions, shaped by history and 
culture. (403)69 
                                                     
68 Although even this is not universal; see for example Kolodny (2005). 
69 We might develop this point further by suggesting that although the notion of rationality may have 
been developed in situations involving linguistic exchanges, this does not mean that it is now applied 
exclusively within or to such contexts: there are many other activities to which an ability to think may 
contribute in various ways, and too great a focus on linguistic activity, even in all its many forms, 
might produce a somewhat restricted understanding of rationality. 
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She then further suggests that although we (here referring to people in our culture, 
perhaps specifically the culture of Anglophone analytic philosophy) recognise that 
qualities such as imagination, tolerance and balance are important in intellectual life, 
nevertheless our idea of rationality is, for historical reasons, focused most firmly on 
those aspects of thinking exemplified in deductive proofs in areas such as geometry 
and arithmetic.   
 What the interpretationist is interested in is whether there is any concept, 
which we might reasonably term ‘rationality’, which can both do the theoretical 
work the interpretationist requires, and make the Rationality Claim sound at all 
plausible.  The interpretationist, then, does not need to pursue some ‘essence’ or 
‘true nature’ of rationality; he can agree with Heal that there are different notions 
available, associated with different cultures and different purposes.  He only has to 
suppose that one concept, which we might reasonably term ‘rationality’, can be 
employed in a plausible Rationality Claim, and then to say what that concept of 
rationality involves. 
 The obvious starting point for finding the right concept of rationality for the 
interpretationist is then to consider the role that a concept of rationality must play in 
his theory.  Section 2 does this by looking at various arguments for the Rationality 
Claim.  Finally, section 3 considers the different requirements that the different 
forms of interpretationism place on an account of rationality. 
 
2.  The role of rationality 
 
 The term ‘rationality’ is used by the interpretationist to refer to that state of a system 
which is required for the relevant kind of interpretation to be possible.  ‘Rational’, 
then, is a placeholder for the feature, or at least one very important feature, of a 
system that makes interpretation possible, and it is an appropriate term to use just 
because the sort of interpretation in question involves the attribution of reasons.  It 
also, however, plays a technical role in the interpretationist’s theory, and as a result 
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may well diverge from some of our everyday uses of the word.  For example, while 
we often attribute rationality and irrationality to particular thoughts and actions, the 
interpretationist’s primary interest is in a property attributable to a whole mind.   
 In order to get clearer on exactly what role rationality and the Rationality 
Claim play in interpretationism, it is instructive to consider some arguments for the 
claim.  As explained previously, arguing directly for interpretationism and its central 
claims is not one of the aims of this thesis.  However, these arguments for the 
Rationality Claim, including the manner in which one of them fails, illustrate some 
features of how interpretationists do and should employ the notion of rationality, 
and therefore provide some desiderata for a more detailed explanation of the content 
of the Rationality Claim. 
 
2.1 An argument from probability  
First, I consider an argument which Stich (1990) extracts from Quine’s Word and 
Object.  I agree with Stich that this argument fails, and so do not think that it should 
be used by the interpretationist.  Still, it is worth looking at because the way in which 
it fails reveals that the Rationality Claim cannot be an empirical claim.  Since my 
primary concern is how an interpretationist uses their notion of rationality, I won’t 
consider the best way to interpret Quine, a self-proclaimed behaviourist, and I do 
not claim that the argument below should be attributed to him. 
 
Quine considers the possibility of pre-logical mentality, and from this discussion 
extracts a maxim: ‘assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on 
hidden differences in language’ (1960: 59).  He thinks this is supported by the 
common sense view that ‘one interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less 
likely than bad translation – or in the domestic case, linguistic divergence.’ (ibid.)   
To convert these ideas into an interpretationist argument, we should switch 
the focus from the translation of utterances as silly, to the attribution of attitudes 
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which are, in some yet to be determined sense, silly.  We get a group of maxims 
which counsel us against attributing silly attitudes and groups of attitudes, and 
against interpreting a thinker as silly.  Let us suppose that someone offers this as an 
argument for accepting the Rationality Claim. 
 If offered this argument, we should ask why silly attitudes, and hence groups 
of silly attitudes, and hence silly thinkers, are supposed to be unlikely.  The 
probability of such things doesn’t seem like the sort of thing of which we have basic, 
a priori knowledge: if this is to be a good argument, the probabilistic claims require 
some justification.  Stich (1990) suggests that they could be supported by evidence 
about how people actually reason.  However, to gain such evidence we need to 
understand what people are doing and saying, and Quine’s principle was supposed 
to guide this.  Thus, Stich concludes that ‘it looks like any inductive attempt to 
support Quine’s precept will beg the question.’ (1990: 36) 
What this shows is that the Rationality Claim, the claim that thinkers are 
rational in whatever sense is required for interpretation, cannot be an empirical 
claim; and nor can the claim that any particular thinker is rational.  Before we have 
accepted and started to employ the Rationality Claim, empirical evidence about how 
people reason, or whether a particular system counts as a person, is not available.  
Claims that thinkers are rational in some other sense may be established empirically, 
and claims that a particular system is rational may be established empirically, as part 
of the process of establishing the contingent fact about whether or not that system is 
a thinker.  However, the interpretationist’s Rationality Claim is supposed to be a 
priori.  
   
These thoughts do not deny that any particular proposed silliness in thinking is 
unlikely.  The argument is also not intended to show that empirical facts can have no 
relevance to the plausibility of a Rationality Claim: I will argue that they are indeed 
relevant in chapter 9.  Now, however, I turn to an undeniably a priori and direct 
argument for the conclusion that the Rationality Claim is true. 
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2.2 An argument from requirements for interpre tation 
The second argument to be considered proceeds from the Availability Claim to the 
Rationality Claim via the premise that interpretation is only possible if the 
Rationality Claim is true.  It is an argument for the truth of the Rationality Claim 
only if you accept that the Availability Claim is prior in the argumentative structure 
of the theory.  However, it is also an argument for any interpretationist to accept the 
Rationality Claim, in so far as they wish to remain an interpretationist.  This latter 
use for the argument makes it the most important of the arguments for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
This argument seems to underpin Davidson’s application of the Principle of Charity.  
Davidson starts from the problem of how to identify the meanings of speakers’ 
utterances.  In considering this problem, he identifies a circle of meaning and belief:  
‘If all we have to go on is the fact of honest utterance, we cannot infer the belief 
without knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without 
the belief.’ (1984:142)   In order to break this impasse, he claims that we should ‘hold 
belief constant’ while solving for meaning.70  This is to employ the Principle of 
Charity, and Davidson explicitly says this involves investing a person with basic 
rationality71.  If a person’s language is to be interpretable, then, the Principle of 
Charity must apply to them and they must be minimally rational. 
Davidson’s version of the argument, set in the context of the problem of how 
we can interpret language, only has the potential to secure the rationality of 
language-using creatures.  However, the interpretationist who disagrees with 
Davidson on this issue can still use an argument with the same structure.  Consider 
the case of interpreting the thoughts of a non-linguistic creature.  If any 
environmental input could result in any belief, and any set of beliefs and desires 
                                                     
70 And the same sort of strategy is supposed to apply to other thoughts which might affect linguistic 
interpretation. 
71 See for example his (2001: 211). 
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could lead to any action, the interpreter would have no way of determining the 
thoughts of the creature.  In both versions of the argument, and regardless of why 
we think thoughts must be interpretable, the essential point is that interpretation is 
only possible if there are connections between what a subject experiences and does 
and what they think.  In calling the term ‘rationality’ a placeholder, as above, we are 
saying that rationality is just whatever turns out to provide or constitute the needed 
connections. 
Given this role for rationality, we can say a little more about what the 
Rationality Claim must attribute to thinkers.  Rationality is supposed to have a 
central role in allowing the interpreter to determine the content of a subject’s 
thoughts.  Whatever rationality is, therefore, a thinker must have enough of it to 
enable interpretation of them.  Moreover, there must be some restrictions on how 
rationality is to be realised throughout a system of thought.  Since it is involved in 
determining the nature and content of every thought, it cannot be that one simply 
needs a lot of rationality in certain parts of the system, but can then allow complete 
irrationality or non-rationality elsewhere, with no account of how the different 
sections are connected.  For example, it cannot be the case that a person has a set of 
true and rational beliefs about the domain of physics, and then also has one lone and 
completely isolated thought that ‘all English people enjoy shouting at the top of their 
voices about their innermost feelings,’ where this thought is based on no evidence, 
and is not accompanied by any other thoughts about what it is to be English, what a 
person is, what feelings are, etc.   
Endorsing this argument, then, has consequences for answering the question 
‘How far and in what ways can we fall short of what rationality demands while still 
counting as sufficiently rational?’  This question will have great significance as we 
meet some of the problem cases which are supposed to throw doubt on the 
Rationality Claim in subsequent chapters.  The details of the answer depend on how 
exactly rationality determines the nature of each thought.  The argument will be 
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developed further in chapter 9, as we consider whether the interpretationist could 
make use of a consequentialist conception of rationality. 
 
It should be noted that there may be other considerations to take into account in 
producing a good interpretation, and in deciding whether an object warrants such 
interpretation at all.  Some of these could be counted as further conditions on 
rationality (for example, constraints on desires and ends, which Dennett seems to 
take as an aspect of rationality72), while others are better seen as constraints on 
interpretation (for example some form of demand for simplicity or economy in 
interpretation).  In this thesis, however, I restrict my attention to what the 
interpretationist should say about the connections between thoughts, environment 
and action. 
It should also be noted that if, after all such constraints have been added, 
there is still indeterminacy of interpretation, then this must be accepted by the 
interpretationist as a feature that thoughts can have.  Again, I will not discuss this, 
since it does not fit into my project of addressing apparently obvious 
counterexamples to interpretation and developing the central notions of 
interpretability and rationality. 
 
2.3 An argument directly from the nature of thought 
Rather than considering how thought must be if it is to be interpretable, we could 
instead take a more ‘objective’ stance and consider what is required to make a 
thought the thought that it is, regardless of whether anyone is or could be 
interpreting it.  Such an argument thus involves what in chapter 4 I called type C 
holism about the mental: the view that the content and/or attitude of any mental 
state depends upon the set of which it is a part.  If this is taken to be plausible 
independently of the Availability Claim, we gain a different argument for the 
                                                     
72 See his (1987: 20). 
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Rationality Claim.  Such an argument, however, has much the same consequences 
for the nature of the sort of rationality required by the interpretationist as does the 
one above.  It will not, therefore, receive further independent discussion. 
 
3.  Varying requirements 
 
Many of the ideas introduced in the previous sections concerning the nature of the 
Rationality Claim and the concepts it uses should be congenial to all of the varieties 
of interpretationism introduced in chapter 2, section 4.  However, the different 
varieties do not all have the same requirements for a concept of rationality for use in 
their theory. 
   So far in this chapter, I have talked about what rationality might involve by 
talking about thoughts and how they must be related to each other (and to actions 
and environment).  For example, I began by suggesting that the one point of 
agreement among philosophers on this topic is that the rational has something to do 
with what is good in thinking.  This way of talking will be acceptable to the 
cartographic interpretationist, who after all is not attempting to give an analysis of 
thought.  To use psychological concepts while saying how thought and rationality 
relate to each other is a sensible way to proceed as long as neither notion or group of 
notions is to be given priority or explained wholly in terms of the other.  However, 
for the derivative and dependence interpretationists, who attempt to analyse 
thought in terms of rationality or rational patterns, there is a problem.   
 The problem is a pervasive one: theories of rationality are generally presented 
by talking about ‘thought’ and how thoughts are related to each other, to actions and 
to environment.  The derivative and dependence interpretationists, then, may find it 
difficult to engage with the literature on the subject.  Throughout Part III, I ignore 
this problem, and engage with some suggested theories of rationality and discuss 
their suitability for what we might call the general interpretationist project.  I do not 
rule out the idea that my conclusions could be adopted, with some adjustment, by 
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derivative and dependence interpretationists.  However, the cartographic 
interpretationist will find what I say easier to apply. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The interpretationist is not committed to there being an essence or true nature of 
rationality.  However, he is committed to there being a concept which might 
reasonably be called rationality  and which can do the work his theory requires of it; 
most notably, constraining connections between environments, thoughts and actions 
enough to make interpretation possible.  The next chapter begins the task of saying 
what this notion of rationality could be. 
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Chapter 8 – The Standard Picture 
 
I begin the task of finding the best conception of rationality for the interpretationist 
by considering a simple, bold, and (for the relevant purposes) implausible view of 
rationality.  I argue that the interpretationist should not use this conception in their 
Rationality Claim. 
 I take this route for three reasons.  First, the conception of rationality in 
question is not obviously a straw man: at least in his earlier work, Daniel Dennett 
makes comments which seem to presuppose something very like it.73  Second, it is 
certainly a view of rationality which philosophers have attacked while considering 
the Rationality Claim: Stein’s (1996) attack on the idea that we are rational is an 
attack on the idea that we are rational in this sense; and Heal (2003, 2007), Stich (1991) 
and Cherniak (1986) all attribute rationality claims involving this conception of 
rationality to others, and then attack them.  Finally, I think that looking at this simple 
view of rationality will give us the best grip on why certain phenomena are 
sometimes thought to be counterexamples to the Rationality Claim, what the terrain 
of this debate looks like, and what we require in a more sophisticated conception of 
rationality that will be of use to interpretationism. 
 
In section 1, I introduce this simple picture under the name ‘the Standard Picture’ 
(following Stein (1994)’s terminology).  Section 2 then shows how an 
interpretationist might use this picture of rationality.  In section 3 I present the 
supposed counterexamples to the Rationality Claim, and in section 4 I argue that 
although some of these may be less serious than has been supposed, some of them 
are decisive against a Rationality Claim which uses the Standard Picture.  There are 
many other ways one might attack the Standard Picture and a Rationality Claim 
                                                     
73 See, for example, his (1971). 
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which uses it, and some of these are flagged during the discussion.  However, the 
focus of the chapter is on arguing that we humans cannot be considered rational in 
the sense at issue, and this will point the way to subsequent suggestions for the 
developing the Rationality Claim.  I argue that aspects of the Standard Picture may 
be useful to the interpretationist if further developed, but the simple picture of 
rationality presented here is not the one he ought to adopt. 
 
1.  Outlining the Standard Picture 
 
Edward Stein has used the name ‘the Standard Picture’ to refer to the following view 
of rationality: 
 
According to this picture, to be rational is to reason in accordance with 
principles of reasoning that are based on rules of logic, probability theory, 
and so forth.  If the standard picture of reasoning is right, principles of 
reasoning that are based on such rules are normative principles of reasoning, 
namely they are the principles we ought to reason in accordance with. (1996: 4) 
 
This is supposed to be a familiar, intuitively attractive picture of rationality.  Stein 
does not attribute it to any particular philosopher, but thinks that it is what many 
philosophers have had in mind when talking about rationality.  It is supposed to be a 
picture that those who are acquainted with this literature will recognise. 
 It is not difficult to see how one might come to adopt such a view of 
rationality.  After endorsing the widely shared intuition that rationality has 
something to do with what is good in thinking, an obvious next question is to ask 
what good thinking involves.  Our best theories about how we should reason seem a 
good place to look: they just are our best and most sustained attempts to work out 
what good thinking involves.   
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 The theories explicitly mentioned by Stein, logic and probability theory, seem 
to involve attempts to discern rules for theoretical reasoning.  However, as we will 
see in the next section, the interpretationist needs an account of practical reasoning 
as well.  How to characterise these potentially different kinds of reasoning is 
controversial, but I will work with the following simple understanding: theoretical 
reasoning concerns questions of what is true, and/or what we should believe, while 
practical reasoning concerns questions of how we should act.  Theories which 
attempt to systematise the requirements of practical reasoning include rational 
choice theory and game theory. 
 Our actual accounts of what good reasoning involves are incomplete, and 
some obviously important areas display a great lack of consensus – for example, 
there is very little agreement about what (if any) rules govern rational responses to 
new information and therefore belief revision.  Nevertheless, there is some (more or 
less) uncontested ground.  From logic, we might pick out the requirements of 
consistency and completeness.  Applied to belief, we might take these to demand 
that the rational person believe no contradictions and believe all the logical 
consequences of his or her beliefs. From choice theory, we might pick out the rule 
that one not have inconsistent preferences. 
 I take it that Stein thinks that being rational must involve reasoning in 
accordance with the completed/perfected versions of these theories, and that it 
certainly involves obeying those rules we are already certain about.  It is then a very 
intuitive idea that we should try to be rational, and reason in accordance with 
rational principles.74 
 However, saying that the rational being must succeed in obeying all the rules 
all of the time would be hopelessly implausible.  We all know that everyone makes 
mistakes sometimes.  To attack a theory which denied this really would be to attack 
a straw man, and there would be little point in the exercise.  A theory that is worth 
                                                     
74 Why exactly we should obey the rules of rational thinking is a matter of controversy.  I will not 
enter this debate here.   
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considering must not make rationality an all or nothing matter, so that either you 
obey all rules always and everywhere, and count as rational, or break any rule 
anywhere or anywhen and count as non-rational.  We should therefore add to the 
Standard Picture the idea that only perfect or ideal rationality requires always 
keeping all the rules.  Our rationality must instead involve some sort of 
approximation to this ideal.  Being more rational can then involve being a closer 
approximation, and being less rational can involve falling further short.   
 The most obvious way to understand being an ‘approximation’ to the 
perfectly rational beings is as obeying a high proportion of the rules almost all of the 
time.  This, of course, is a very minimal concession.  Stein suggests another option: 
that one can approximate the perfectly rational being by having the capacity to 
follow the same rules as he does, even while perhaps quite frequently failing to 
exercise this capacity.75   This relates to the debate, mentioned in the introduction to 
Part III, about whether rationality is better seen as an achievement or as a capacity.  I 
argue that the concept of rationality required by the interpretationist must involve 
some degree of achievement in chapter 10.  However, for the purposes of this 
chapter we may accept Stein’s suggestion as a possible way of understanding 
‘approximation’ to perfect rationality.  It involves a greater concession than the first 
way, but is still a very strong requirement, as we will see.  There are other, more 
concessive ways to interpret ‘approximation’.  I won’t be considering them in this 
chapter, and will not count a view which employs them as a version of the Standard 
Picture. 
 
Having thus outlined the Standard Picture, there are various ways that we could 
attack it.  One option would be to attack the idea that the notion of a perfectly 
rational being makes sense (a strategy pursued in Heal (2007)).  Alternatively, we 
could challenge the idea that good reasoning can be fully codified in rules (see Child 
                                                     
75 See Stein (1996), especially chapter 2. 
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(1993)).  Let us set these issues to one side for the moment, and concentrate on how 
an interpretationist might employ this picture of rationality, on the assumption that 
it is coherent. 
 
2. Using the Standard Picture 
 
Suppose, then, that we interpret the Rationality Claim as follows: thought must be 
rational in the sense outlined by the Standard Picture of Rationality.  Call this the 
Standard Rationality Claim, or SRC.  We must then consider how this claim could be 
used by the interpretationist. 
The more promising arguments for the Rationality Claim in the previous 
chapter claimed that rational relations between the thoughts of a mind are needed to 
determine the nature and contents of those thoughts.  If we adopt the Standard 
Picture of Rationality along with these arguments, we may arrive at a particular 
picture of how thought content is determined.  Heal (2007) describes the situation as 
follows:  we take our best formal theories of reasoning, and use them to ‘conceive of 
abstract items (propositions) and see that, considered as axioms and theorems, they 
exist in vast timeless patterns of truth-value relations.’ (408)   We then say that 
reasoning in accordance with these formal theories is necessary for our thought, 
because it is only this that allows us to realise the timeless patterns, and it is only by 
realising these patterns that we can be said to be thinking thoughts with the relevant 
propositional content.  On this account, realising these patterns just is what thought 
involves. 
 It seems that the timeless patterns of truth-value relations will be described by 
those theories associated with theoretical reason, and that these patterns will need to 
obtain among the subject’s beliefs.  It is less immediately clear where the desires and 
other thoughts of a creature, or a creature’s actions, fit into this picture.  This is 
where constraints on practical reasoning must enter.  As above, practical reason is 
often described as the form of rationality which tells us what we should do, given 
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the things we believe and desire.  Without some rational constraints on action, it 
would be no guide to what the subject believed, and so an interpreter could not tell 
what part of the timeless pattern of truth-value relationships a subject was 
instantiating.  Or to make a more metaphysical point, in line with the argument from 
chapter 7, section 2.3, without the right connections between what is done and what 
is believed, a subject just wouldn’t count as performing the actions or having the 
beliefs in question.  Therefore, given the account of the determination of thought 
content above, we should take it that practical rationality constraints determine what 
it looks like for a subject to instantiate a pattern described by theoretical reason.  In 
performing this job, practical rationality constraints also allow us to determine a 
creature’s desires and characterise their actions.  Theoretical and practical rationality 
will then both be important, but will have somewhat different roles. 
To make this clearer, let us consider how SCR would be used in interpretation, 
for example of the Analogoids from chapter 1.  For simplicity, let us here suppose 
that the Analogoids are simpler creatures than was suggested in Part I, and do not 
have a language.  Suppose that the Analogoids are octopus-like creatures living in 
an ocean.  Most of the time, they move slowly through the water and ingest tiny 
creatures near the ocean bed, or float near the surface of the water in the sunshine.  
However, this behaviour tends to alter when a predator enters an Analogoid’s 
vicinity.  There are three such predators.  The first, a giant sea spider, is fast, but can 
only move along the ocean bed.  When it approaches an Analogoid, said Analogoid 
usually moves upwards.  The second, a sluggish sort of eel, can go anywhere but 
moves more slowly than the Analogoids.  When it approaches an Analogoid, the 
Analogoid tends to move quickly in the opposite direction.  The third predator, 
which resembles a shark, is fast and able to swim in any direction, but too large to 
get in amongst the branches of a certain plant that grows on the ocean floor.  When it 
approaches an Analogoid, the Analogoid tends to move into the shelter of such 
plants. 
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A human trying to interpret an Analogoid starts with the ability to see how 
that Analogoid moves.  He may then use the assumption that his subject is obeying 
the rules of practical reasoning to determine some candidate belief and desire states 
for the creature.  When the Analogoid moves upwards while being approached by a 
giant spider, for example, the interpreter assumes that this action was the best one to 
perform given the creature’s beliefs and desires, and postulates some beliefs and 
desires which fit the bill: for example, the belief that there is a predator coming 
towards it, the belief that it can escape this predator by swimming upwards, and the 
desire to remain uneaten.  The interpreter does likewise with various other actions, 
and the need to refrain from postulating contradictory beliefs provides some initial 
constraints on candidate beliefs.  Given a set of candidate beliefs, the interpreter then 
assumes that these form part of a pattern of beliefs which instantiate the patterns of 
truth-value relations mentioned above.  He therefore expands his candidate belief 
attributions accordingly.  He can then note other actions which the subject should 
perform given the beliefs and desires attributed to him, and test his attributions by 
observing the creature further or perhaps interacting with the creature to put it in 
situations which, according to his working theory, should elicit particular actions.  
The theory can then be improved through a process of reflective equilibrium.  It 
seems that SRC does provide quite a bit of guidance in interpretation. 
On this picture, it is supposed to make sense that thinkers can make 
occasional mistakes, either in practical or theoretical reasoning: a few broken rules 
do not disrupt the pattern too much, and so we can discover and make sense of 
thoughts which do have particular contents but which are not related to each other 
or to action in quite the right way.  Too much rule-breaking, however, destroys the 
pattern, and that is why thinkers are required to approximate perfect rationality.   
 
Again, there is more than one way to challenge the picture at this point.  One option 
would be to point out the fact that we ordinary interpreters and thinkers do not have 
complete theories of reasoning, and therefore do not have a complete account of the 
142 
 
relevant patterns.  This issue is considered briefly in Heal (2003: 229).  Let us set it 
aside for the moment, and assume that SRC, if true, can fulfil the role that 
interpretationism requires of it. 
Another way to evaluate this picture is to consider the extent to which we 
humans instantiate the patterns, given what we already know about them.  If we 
don’t and/or can’t instantiate the patterns, we have a choice between saying that we 
don’t count as thinkers, and saying that this picture requires the wrong things from 
thought.  This strategy is taken up in the next section. 
 
3. Normal human irrationality 
 
There are many things within the range of normal human thought that might be 
called irrational.  In this section I concentrate on two of them: the two that are most 
relevant to challenging a Rationality Claim which uses the Standard Picture.   
 
3.1 Human limitations 
Various philosophers have commented on,76 and many more must have noticed, the 
limitations of human thought.  We hold inconsistent sets of beliefs, often without 
realising it.  And even if we tried to root out all the inconsistencies in our thought, 
we probably couldn’t succeed.  Moreover, we definitely do not believe all the logical 
consequences of our beliefs, and are certainly incapable of doing so, due to our 
limited powers of deduction.  Yet logical consistency and deductive closure are two 
frequently suggested requirements of rationality.   
This offers a first suggestion that we humans might be incapable of doing 
what rationality demands.  Other phenomena also suggest that we sometimes do 
what rationality forbids. 
 
                                                     
76 See Cherniak (1986), Stein (1996) and Heal (2003). 
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3.2 Data from the heuristics and biases program 
In the latter half of the Twentieth Century, psychologists began to publish findings 
which were intended to suggest that people reason in ways that violate the demands 
of rationality.  A research tradition, often called the ‘heuristics and biases program’, 
developed, and there is now an extensive literature on the subject.  I will outline two 
of these studies as examples, before discussing their imputed significance. 
 
First, we may consider conjunction problems.  These are supposed to test a subject’s 
probabilistic reasoning, and count as tests of theoretical reasoning.  Here is one such 
task presented to subjects by Kahneman and Tversky, and recorded in their (1983): 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in 
philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
 
Linda is a teacher working in an elementary school. 
Linda works in a bookstore and takes yoga classes 
Linda is active in the feminist movement 
Linda is a psychiatric social worker 
Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters 
Linda is a bank teller 
Linda is an insurance salesperson 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement77  
 
                                                     
77 Different presentations of this problem in the literature list different options, and indeed Kahneman 
(2011) says that various versions of the problem were offered in their experiments.  In one version, the 
description was given followed by ‘Which alternative is more probable? Linda is a bank teller.  Linda 
is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.’ (2011: 158)  In most groups, this produced the 
same result as the longer test. 
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The participants in the study were asked to read the description and then rank the 
likelihood of the options.  The result was that the majority of people rated ‘Linda is a 
bank teller and is active in the feminist movement’ as more likely than ‘Linda is a 
bank teller’, despite the fact that Linda cannot be a feminist bank teller unless she is a 
bank teller.  Judging that a compound state of affairs is more likely than one of the 
components of the compound has been labelled the conjunction fallacy.   
 
Next, we may consider so-called preference reversal tests.  These aim to show that 
people’s preferences are sometimes inconsistent with each other.  Since preference 
reversal bears on whether the choices for action that people make are consistent with 
each other, it may be seen as a test of practical rationality.  An account of the 
following test can be found in Kahneman (2011): 
 
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs 
to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific 
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
Version 1: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 
people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people 
will be saved. 
 
Version 2: If program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 
nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people 
will die.78   
                                                     
78 Kahneman (2011: 368). 
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When presented with version 1, the majority of people choose program A.  However, 
when presented with version 2, the majority choose program B’.  Yet, A and A’ have 
the same consequences, as do B and B’.  Thus the way the very same options are 
presented appears to bring about preference reversal.  We can ask which 
consequences respondents prefer, and thus see that they prefer both (or neither). 
 
Numerous other experiments have been carried out.79  However, the examples above 
will be sufficient for discussing the problems posed to the Rationality Claim by 
apparent systematic irrationalities.   
Many people have taken results like the above to support a highly pessimistic 
view of human rationality, or even to prove that humans are not rational.  For 
example, a newspaper article about Kahneman (2011) contains the following claims: 
 
[T]he discovery of loss aversion proved to be an important refutation of 
human rationality. (Lehrer (2012)) 
 
Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that real people don’t deal with 
uncertainty by carefully evaluating all of the relevant information. They stink 
at statistics and rarely maximize utility. Instead, their choices depend on a 
long list of mental short cuts and intemperate emotions, which often lead 
them to pick the wrong options. (Ibid.) 
 
Although we’d always seen ourselves as rational creatures—this was our 
Promethean gift—it turns out that human reason is rather feeble, easily 
overwhelmed by ancient instincts and lazy biases. The mind is a deeply 
flawed machine. (Ibid.) 
                                                     
79 See Kahneman (2011) for further examples. 
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Psychologists and philosophers have sometimes (but by no means always) expressed 
their reactions to the results in more moderate terms.  Nevertheless, many take the 
results of the heuristics and biases program to show that we do not even 
approximate rationality as it is described by the Standard Picture.80  
 
3.3 The resulting argument 
These common forms of human irrationality, if such they be, pose a problem for the 
interpretationist, since they can be used to attack the Rationality Claim using 
something like the following argument: 
 
1. We are not rational; 
2. We have thoughts; 
3. Therefore having thoughts cannot require rationality. 
 
An interpretationist must reject this argument.  To attack the second premise of the 
argument would lead us to eliminativism.  The interpretationist must therefore 
attack premise 1.  One way to do this involves admitting that we are not rational in 
the way required by SRC, but then rejecting the Standard Picture as the right 
conception of rationality to use in the Rationality Claim.  This strategy is explored in 
subsequent chapters.  For the remainder of this chapter, I consider how a supporter 
of SRC might reject premise 1. 
 
4.  Responses 
 
4.1 SCR and the heuristics and biases program 
                                                     
80 See for example Stein (1996), Samuels et al (2002) and Samuels et al (2004).   
147 
 
The results of the heuristics and biases program have been considered particularly 
worrying for optimistic claims about human rationality.  In this section, I first 
consider why they have been considered so important and problematic, and how 
this impacts on the Standard Picture’s ability to perform the task the interpretationist 
requires of it.  I then consider three responses to the experiments: rejecting the 
principles of reasoning that the participants in the experiments violate; attacking the 
experiments (which leads to a discussion of the relevance of empirical results for the 
interpretationist’s Rationality Claim); and utilising the ‘two system’ conception of 
the mind currently popular in cognitive psychology.  I conclude that, although they 
do represent a challenge to the SRC, it is not as significant a challenge as is 
sometimes supposed. 
 
The results from the heuristics and biases program purport to tell us about mistakes 
that most humans make in reasoning.  However, everyone knew that people made 
quite a lot of mistakes before seeing the results.  One of the things that was special 
about these experiments was that they showed that a lot of people seem to make 
systematic errors, involving violating quite simple, familiar rules.  However, this still 
doesn’t fully explain the significance of the results.  Compare this with a case where, 
while investigating the claim that people have mostly true beliefs, we discover that 
people systematically believe their children to be cleverer than they are.  Such a 
result clearly would not do very much to convince us of the falsity of that claim. 
 There are two important differences which explain the concern over the 
results in section 3.2.  First, the experiments above may be taken to show not just that 
we reason incorrectly when presented with these particular (and often artificial) 
puzzles.  Rather, they may be taken to indicate that we are bad at applying certain 
simple rules that are important throughout our epistemic endeavours.  Thus, they 
may show that we probably get a large proportion of our reasoning wrong.  Second, 
although the experiments above cannot by themselves entail very much about 
human reasoning abilities in general, they may be thought to be best explained by, 
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and so lend support to, a theory which takes a very pessimistic view of such abilities.  
I will outline this theory now.  
The view of human reason often associated with the heuristics and biases 
program is that ‘ordinary people lack the underlying rational competence to handle 
a wide array of reasoning tasks, and thus… they must exploit a collection of simple 
heuristics which make them prone to seriously counter-normative patterns of 
reasoning or biases.’ (Samuels et al (2004: 2))  Another way this is often put is to say 
that instead of thinking as rationality demands, people use ‘fast and dirty’ heuristics.  
 ‘Rational competence’ in the above quote makes reference to a distinction 
between performance errors and competence errors, mentioned in section 1.  The 
former involve a subject in some sense knowing or being able to use the correct rules 
for reasoning, but for some reason failing to utilise them (for example because they 
are not paying attention, or are not motivated to do so, or are drunk).  The latter, on 
the other hand, involve in some sense possessing the wrong rules for reasoning, and 
getting things wrong for that reason.  Its use in this context allows us to suggest the 
possibility that the sorts of errors we were already aware of gave us reason to think 
that people made performance errors, but that the systematic way in which people 
fail the reasoning tests above shows that they are also subject to competence errors.  
Thus, the idea that we are even capable of being rational is threatened.  While 
performance errors might threaten only the view that we succeed in being rational 
conceived of as an achievement, competence errors are supposed to threaten also the 
idea that we are rational in the sense of having a capacity.  Understood in this way, 
the results of the heuristics and biases program directly threaten a Rationality Claim 
which uses Stein’s development of the Standard Picture (which says that 
approximating the perfectly rational being may involve possessing the same 
capacities, even if one does not always use them).  
 Philosophers and others, then, have taken the results of the heuristics and 
biases program to support the pessimistic view of human reason.  There are several 
ways to respond, and I consider three of them below. 
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The first approach involves rejecting the principles that participants violate as the 
right principles to follow.  This sort of stance has some merits, as we will see in 
subsequent chapters.  However, in combination with the Standard Picture of 
rationality, it amounts to the claim that given how humans actually reason, we need 
to revise our best formal theories.  
The problem with this response is that, in the brazen form under 
consideration, it conflicts very strongly with our intuitions about what counts as 
good reasoning.  Most of us can be brought to see the usual answers given in the 
experiments as wrong.  When presented with the rules of our formal theories, we 
usually feel quite certain that they are right.  We can also see, or be brought to see, 
how violating the rules sometimes leads people into trouble.  Our attempt to 
develop the Rationality Claim needs to pay some attention to our beliefs about what 
counts as good reasoning. 
 
The second strategy involves attacking the experiments that were used in the 
program, or at least trying to reinterpret their data.  This is often pursued in a 
piecemeal fashion, with different experiments being challenged in different ways. 
In the case of the conjunction test, one popular suggestion is that the wording 
of the task generates unintentional conversational implicatures, and thus that the 
question the participant thinks he or she is being asked actually does have the 
answer they supply.  In the example above, it is suggested that people suppose that 
‘Linda is a bank clerk’ is supposed to imply that Linda is not a feminist.  It is also 
suggested that such implicatures would be very difficult for experimenters to cancel 
out. 
In the case of the preference consistency test, the best strategy would also 
probably be to suggest that people might be misunderstanding the question: for 
example, we might suggest that in version 1 participants suppose the consequences 
of program A to be ‘200 people will definitely be saved, although more might be 
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saved’; while in version 2 they take the consequences of A’ to be ‘400 people will 
definitely die, but more might die.’  If interpreted in this way, the choices presented 
by the two versions would no longer be identical.81 
 The essential point is that each of the experiments can be challenged or 
reinterpreted so that they do not threaten SRC as seriously.  Of course, the 
challenges and reinterpretations can also be challenged, and further argument 
generated, which I have not pursued here.  Here, I will just note that not all of the 
challenges need to work: the supporter of SRC can accept that humans make a few 
mistakes and even lack some few competences.  They just need to argue that these 
are rare enough that we can move towards a more optimistic view of human 
reasoning, and claim that we are rational in the sense needed for SRC to do its work.  
The possibility of challenging the experiments, then, at least makes the pessimistic 
view of human reason look rather less well-supported.  
However, as well as specific debates about the individual experiments, there 
are some general worries about this sort of strategy for protecting SRC.  One such 
worry, offered by Samuels et al (2004) is that if we cannot rely on participants 
understanding their tasks in the same way as the experimenters, then empirical 
evidence which appears to support the idea that humans are rational will be 
undermined as well as the evidence against.  Stein (1996), on the other hand, objects 
to all the replies on the grounds that, since they are different for each experiment, 
they must be ad hoc and therefore suspect: 
 
In general, experimental evidence for the irrationality thesis can always be 
resisted in some such way.  Prima facie, however, these resistance techniques 
offered by friends of the rationality thesis 82  are ad hoc immunization 
strategies.  Without some special theoretical considerations that suggest 
                                                     
81 Admittedly, this does seem a little desperate. 
82 Stein’s rationality thesis is different from what I call the Rationality Claim.  The latter says that any 
thinker must be rational.  Stein’s rationality thesis, in contrast, says that humans are mostly rational.  
His irrationality thesis is then linked to the pessimistic view of human reasoning. 
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otherwise, it seems unlikely that interfering factors are always behind 
divergences from the norms. (110) 
 
The interpretationist will respond to such challenges by claiming that there is a 
general theoretical justification for trying to interpret a person as rational despite 
apparently contrary evidence: namely, his preferred a priori argument for the 
Rationality Claim.  We might have to use different strategies to discredit different 
sets of claims, but this will only be because the different claimants are making 
different mistakes.  We won’t have to gerrymander our theory to meet the different 
challenges, but will reply to each using the same underlying theoretical justification 
that no empirical data could prove that a group of thinkers were not reasonably 
rational.83    Moreover, since there is supposed to be an a priori justification of the 
Rationality Claim, we do not need to worry too much about discrediting evidence 
against the Rationality Claim only at the cost of also losing the evidence for it.   
I think that there is some mileage in this interpretationist reply.  However, it 
would be a mistake for the interpretationist to claim that empirical data about how 
we reason has no relevance at all to the plausibility of the Rationality Claim.  
Interpretationism is supposed to be grounded, at least to some extent, in our 
everyday interpretations of ourselves and others.  One of its attractions, discussed in 
chapter 1, was that it could provide an account on which we come out as knowing at 
least some things about our own and other people’s mental states; on which we do at 
least usually think and talk about the things we think we do; on which we 
sometimes succeed in communicating with each other, etc.  Enough empirical results 
could threaten this motivation for interpretationism.  For example, if it were too 
often the case that the intuitive interpretation of someone’s actions made them 
massively irrational, and the available reinterpretations which could show them to 
                                                     
83 Stein is quite aware of this reply, and addresses arguments for his rationality thesis that are closely 
related to the arguments for the Rationality Claim presented in the previous chapter.  He finds all of 
them wanting.  The interpretationist, of course, must disagree. 
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be rational portrayed them as failing to communicate with anyone around them and 
failing to think about or desire the things they had most contact with, then we would 
have reason to question our version of interpretationism.  When we reinterpret to 
retain the rationality of our subject, this must not make things too complicated, or 
counterintuitive.  If it does, then we will be rightly tempted to decide either that 
some people (maybe including ourselves) turn out not to have thoughts; or that the 
Standard Picture must have been the wrong conception of rationality for the 
interpretationist to adopt, or that there must be something wrong with the 
arguments for the Rationality Claim. 
Thus, there is something in both Stich and Stein’s complaints: 
interpretationism does require empirical support in the form of our experience 
matching what it has to say reasonably well.  Too much evidence which intuitively 
seems to show that we make massive and systematic mistakes could start to 
undermine our theory.  The data from the heuristics and biases program is therefore 
relevant to deciding whether or not we should accept SRC.  The question is whether 
there is enough evidence yet to make this line of reply untenable.  I will not pursue 
this question here, since I think that section 4.2 will provide us with enough reason 
to abandon SRC in any case. 
 
The final response to the results of the heuristics and biases program accepts that the 
experiments show that people do fail to reason in accordance with normatively 
significant rules.  However, it rejects the idea that this shows that humans lack the 
requisite capacity.  Interestingly, this is the view that Kahneman adopts, despite the 
more extreme responses his research has prompted.  To explain this response, I will 
introduce the terminology of System 1 and System 2, originated by the psychologists 
Stanovich and West and now widely used in the field.  The terminology is used 
somewhat differently by different researchers, but I follow Kahneman’s usage. 
 According to Kahneman, ‘System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with 
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control’ (2011: 20).  System 2, on the other 
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hand, ‘allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including 
complex calculations.  The operations of System 2 are often associated with the 
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.’ (21)  Kahneman says that 
we should see these two systems as ‘useful fictions’, and that they are not ‘systems in 
the standard sense of entities with interacting aspects or parts.’ (29)  Rather, this 
terminology allows us to speak more easily of the two modes or styles of thinking that 
humans turn out to use.  Thus, ‘System 2 is responsible for calculation’ is shorthand 
for “Mental arithmetic is a voluntary activity that requires effort, should not be 
performed while making a left turn, and is associated with dilated pupils and an 
accelerated heart rate.” (29)  ‘System 1 is good at association’, on the other hand, 
implies something like “Connections between ideas often occur to a person quickly 
and automatically, and without noticeable effort.”  Kahneman then goes on to use 
this terminology to explain the results of the experiments he and others have 
performed.   
 On Kahneman’s understanding, the results of the heuristics and biases 
program do not show that ordinary people lack the capacity to follow rules of logic, 
etc., but that System 1 lacks this capacity.  He thinks that we often rely on System 1, 
and so get the wrong answers to certain questions, but that we could engage our 
System 2, which does have the capacity to follow the rules of the Standard Picture, 
and thus get the right answers.  Thus, if we agree that the interpretationist can make 
do with a notion of rationality as a capacity, we seem to be able to accept the 
experimental results and endorse SCR. 
 There are, however, a few snags with using Kahneman’s approach to protect 
SRC.  First, according to Kahneman, because the operations of System 1 are 
automatic, it offers and so inclines us towards answers that are sometimes wrong.  
This leads to cognitive illusions which may persist even when we engage our System 
2, and which may be very difficult to overcome.  A second problem is that 
Kahneman suggests that we are bad at knowing which sort of thinking we have 
used to arrive at a given conclusion, making it more difficult for us to assess our own 
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reliability in a given case, and the third and most serious problem is that System 2 is 
much slower than System 1, and it takes far more effort to solve problems using it: it 
could not be used to solve all the problems that we face.  The two system 
interpretation of the results therefore adds to the inventory of human limitations, 
and these limitations are themselves a serious problem. 
 
4.2 SRC and human limitations 
The results of the heuristics and biases program present a challenge to SCR, but not, 
it seems, a conclusive refutation.  The more serious problem, I will argue, arises from 
our human limitations. 
 
Consistency and completeness frequently appear in discussions of what rationality 
involves.  For example, they are mentioned by both Davidson and Dennett in their 
discussions of rationality, and in explaining the Standard Picture Heal asks us to  
 
imagine that we have some package of demands of rationality, including at 
least consistency and completeness in belief together with some other suitable 
elements, which is agreed to spell out (at least a substantial part of) what 
rationality demands. (2003: 230) 
 
Consistency and completeness, then, are definitely among the demands of 
rationality according to the Standard Picture, and so the perfectly rational being has 
no inconsistent beliefs, and believes the logical consequences of all its beliefs.  The 
perfectly rational being may make mistakes or remain ignorant about some aspects 
of the external world, but such ignorance and error is only about the contingent.  We, 
however, do not have perfectly consistent belief sets, and we definitely do not 
believe all the consequences of our beliefs.  Nor are we ever going to fulfil these 
requirements.  This truth is so obvious and commonplace that the interpretationist 
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cannot plausibly dispute it using his preferred argument for the rationality claim to 
reinterpret what is going on.  This is the problem of section 3.1: we humans do not 
seem to do what rationality demands.     
 Section 1 characterised the Standard Picture in such a way that it did not 
demand that we be perfectly rational beings in order to be called rational.  Rather, it 
demanded that we approximate such a being.  The fact that we don’t instantiate 
perfect consistency and completeness is not, in itself, an insurmountable problem.  
SCR could still be true if we ordinary thinkers just believed most of the consequences 
of our beliefs most of the time, and hardly ever believed inconsistencies (this was the 
first suggested understanding of approximation in section 1).  Ordinary thinkers do 
not achieve this much, however: clearly, we fail to believe most of the consequences 
of our beliefs.  SCR could also be true if we could say that we have the capacity to 
eliminate all inconsistencies and to believe all the consequences of our beliefs, but 
don’t use this capacity (this was Stein’s suggested understanding of approximation).  
But this isn’t plausible either.   
Maybe the proponent of SRC could say that the Standard Picture can allow 
that even the perfectly rational being might not fulfil these requirements until it 
reaches the end state mentioned above.  Unlike the perfectly rational being, we may 
never actually reach the end state, but as long as we are making good progress 
towards consistency and completeness, and would achieve it eventually, given 
enough time, then the Standard Picture will be able to count us as rational.  The 
problem is that the ordinary human does not even seem to be on the path towards 
perfect consistency and completeness in belief.  No matter how long a human lives, 
they will not even nearly achieve consistency and completeness in their beliefs.  
They will not deduce even half of the consequences of their beliefs, and a long life 
actually seems likely to increase the number of inconsistent pairs of beliefs.   
Given their prominence in discussions of rationality, one might take 
completeness and consistency to be two of the most important demands of 
rationality.  Yet, we do not have even the capacity to fulfil them if our lives are 
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radically extended.  This shows that we are not rational in the sense given by the 
Standard Picture, and so that we should not accept SRC.   
Moreover, it is not only the case that we are not on a path to consistency and 
completeness: an ordinary human would not even want to be on that path.  Even 
trying to maximise the degree to which we meet these requirements would take up 
all of our time and prevent us from pursuing other things that are valuable to us.  
There is a strong temptation to say that it would be stupid for us to try to go down 
this path: that pursuing perfect consistency and completeness isn’t (overall) rational 
for us.  This threatens another claim that Stein included as part of the Standard 
Picture: that the rules from our best theories of reasoning are all ones that we ought 
to follow. 
As well as admitting that we can be ignorant and mistaken about contingent 
fact, it seems that any reasonably intuitive account of what is rational for us ought to 
take into account our limited cognitive abilities.  The Standard Picture can allow for 
our human limitations to some degree: it can accept that we will not ever achieve 
consistency and completeness.  However, it does not seem able to cope with the idea 
that our limitations should actually affect what rules we ought to try and obey.     
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The Standard Picture offers an initially intuitive way to understand the 
interpretationist’s Rationality Claim, and it appears that it is possible to combine it 
with an account of how thought content is determined.  However, given this 
understanding of rationality, there are at least two groups of apparent 
counterexamples to the Rationality Claim.  The first involves the evidence from the 
heuristics and biases program, and purports to show that ordinary humans make 
frequent and systematic errors in reasoning.  I have argued that this set of 
counterexamples is not as serious as sometimes supposed.  However, the second 
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group, containing the everyday evidence we have for our human limitations, 
presents a more serious challenge.  These show that we are not rational in the way 
suggested by the Standard Picture, and should not even want to be.  Simply pointing 
to the rules in our best formal theories to indicate what perfect rationality involves, 
and saying that thinkers approximate this perfect rationality, does not provide the 
notion of rationality that the interpretationist is after. 
For the limited creature, it seems very plausible that good thinking involves 
the employment of appropriate reasoning strategies given their situation and 
resources.  The simple Standard Picture presented at the beginning of this chapter 
does not have the resources to accommodate this.  But maybe this would be a helpful 
thing for the interpretationist to take into account when developing his Rationality 
Claim and his account of interpretation.  The next two chapters consider theories of 
rationality which would allow the interpretationist to use this idea. 
In the next chapter, I consider a theory which could keep the Standard 
Picture’s commitment to the idea that rational beings approximate perfect rationality, 
while dropping the claim that rules are important.  I argue that this does not provide 
what the interpretationist needs either.   
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Chapter 9 - Consequentialism 
 
The consequentialist about rationality says that being rational is a matter of thinking 
and acting in ways that achieve or have a good chance of achieving certain valuable 
ends.  A Rationality Claim which uses this conception says that all thinkers must 
think and act so as to achieve or have a good chance of achieving the relevant goals 
at least reasonably well given their resources.  I will call this consequentialist 
rationality claim CRC. 
 One of the advantages claimed for the consequentialist conception is that it 
meets what Samuels et al. call the Value Condition: ‘A normative theory of 
reasoning should provide us with a vindication of rationality.  It should explain why 
reasoning in a normatively correct fashion matters – why good reasoning is 
desirable.’ (2004: 40)  They believe that this condition tells against any deontological 
view, because where rules lead to good consequences, the consequences will be what 
justify a subject in following the rules, while whenever following a set of rules fails 
to yield good consequences, it will be unclear why following the rules should be 
valuable.  Thus, consequences always take priority over rules when we decide what 
to do or think.   
 There are things that can be said in response to this argument on behalf of the 
deontologist, and some of them will be said in the course of this chapter.  In 
particular, I argue that if you want a notion of rationality to do a certain theoretical 
job (namely, to determine the nature and content of thought), then rationality cannot 
amount merely to the tendency towards the attainment of consequences. 
 
Section 1 begins by showing that there are several importantly different ways of 
filling out a consequentialist conception of rationality, and section 2 shows how this 
collection of notions could each be used to deal with the results of the heuristics and 
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biases program and facts about human limitations without giving up the Rationality 
Claim.  So far, so good for CRC.  However, section 3 then argues that purely 
consequentialist notions of rationality cannot do the work that interpretationism 
requires of them. 
 
1.  Some varieties of consequentialism 
 
The most obvious point of potential disagreement when we come to fill out a 
consequentialist conception of rationality is what consequences rational thoughts 
and actions are supposed to constitutively lead towards84.  In ethics, there are several 
forms of consequentialism because there are several different accounts of what 
consequences constitute ‘the good’.85  The situation is the same here: people may 
have different ideas about what count as good consequences of thinking and acting. 
 A first sensible suggestion is that rational thought might constitutively lead 
towards some epistemically valuable consequences, such as the acquisition of true 
beliefs.  However, this seems to have the potential to cover only the goals of 
theoretical rationality. 
An alternative suggestion is that rational thought and action constitutively 
lead towards those things which we already value, whatever they may be.  A 
consequentialism which employs this suggestion seems particularly well suited to 
satisfying the Value Condition.  It also reduces the universality of the demands of 
rationality: since people value different things, their being rational will involve 
different things.  This is one of the ways in which, for a consequentialist, rationality 
can be relative to a subject.  One representative of this option in the literature is 
Kacelnik’s (2006) notion of E-rationality (economic rationality), which he defines as 
the maximisation of expected utility.  A similar idea also seems to be suggested by at 
                                                     
84 What this ‘leading towards’ amounts to may also be interpreted differently by different 
consequentialisms.  It is deliberately left vague here, but briefly discussed later in this section. 
85 For some options, see Parfit’s ‘What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best’ in his (1984).  
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least some comments made by Dennett, for example in one of his explanations of the 
relationship between his intentional and design stances.  Dennett says that when 
using the design stance, ‘one ignores the actual (possibly messy) details of the 
physical constitution of an object, and, on the assumption that it has a certain design, 
predicts that it will behave as it is designed to behave under various circumstances’ 
(1987: 16)  He then says both that the intentional stance involves treating an object as 
a rational agent, and that ‘One can view the intentional stance as a limiting case of 
the design stance: one predicts by taking just one assumption about the design of the 
system in question: whatever the design is, it is optimal.’ (73)  If Dennett then 
attributes desires for the consequences (likely to be) achieved to subjects, it seems 
that for Dennett being rational amounts to achieving those things which you are 
optimally designed to achieve, which therefore count as the things you desire.86 
 A third option would be, rather than focusing on what we actually do value, 
to refer to the ‘ends’ of evolutionary processes such as fitness and the survival and 
perpetuation of genes.  Such a notion is also developed by Kacelnik (2006).  He calls 
this B-rationality (biological rationality), and explains how individual creatures can 
be seen as maximising agents for the alleles they carry.  A similar notion of 
rationality also seems to be at work in the optimistic view of human rationality 
presented by some in the evolutionary psychology research program.87   
Finally, we could say that rational actions constitutively lead towards the 
promotion of some sort of ‘objective well-being’ of the subject, where well-being is 
explained in terms of more than the ‘goals’ of evolutionary processes and/or the 
actual desires of the subject. 
 It is important to recognise these different options, because different things 
count as rational for a creature depending on which of them we choose.  For 
                                                     
86 This is only a brief sketch of something Dennett might be taken to think.  More would need to be 
done to develop the above into a plausible picture, or to argue that Dennett is committed to this.  
Although it fits with some of Dennett’s comments, it should also be noted that it goes against others, 
such as his claim that he depends on a ‘systematically pre-theoretical’ (1987:98) notion of rationality. 
87 Some discussion of which can be found in Samuels et al (2004). 
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example, imagine an environment containing two kinds of snakes which are very 
similar in appearance, but only one of which is poisonous.  Then consider two 
people in this environment, one of whom infers that he is in danger whenever he 
sees a snake, and runs away; and the other of whom will not infer that he is in 
danger until he has spotted a distinguishing mark on the underbelly of the snake.  If 
reasoning and action which lead to the avoidance of false beliefs are rational, then 
the second man is the rational one.  If reasoning and action which leads to the 
satisfaction of a subject’s desires are rational, then either (or both, or neither) may be 
rational, depending on what each desires.  If reasoning and action which leads to the 
promotion of the ends of evolutionary processes or the objective well-being of the 
subject are rational, then the first is surely more rational than the second. 
 
Another important question is that of the environment relative to which rationality 
is to be determined.  We could say that the degree of rationality must be always be 
assessed relative to the same environment; our environment perhaps.  Or, we might 
try to assess the rationality of each creature by looking at all situations in which it 
would be logically possible for them to exist.  More intuitively plausible options 
involve making the appropriate environment relative to the subject whose 
rationality is being assessed, thus introducing another way in which the demands of 
rationality may be relative.  For example, we might assess a creature’s rationality 
relative to its actual environment: i.e. determine whether its reasoning and actions 
led towards the chosen positive consequences in whatever situation they were 
actually in.  Something like this option appears to be employed by Bennett (1976).88  
Another option would be to assess rationality relative to the environment in which 
the creature in question grew up or has spent most of its time, and another is to say 
that rationality is determined relative to the environment in which a creature’s 
                                                     
88 Bennett here isn’t trying to provide a theory of rationality, which he thinks involves language as in 
his (1964), but he is providing a theory of teleology which he hopes will serve as a theory of thought.  
I think that he is using something that could quite plausibly be called a notion of rationality, but I 
would not count it as a purely consequentialist one. 
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ancestors evolved. Whichever the consequentialist chooses, they then need some 
way to delineate environments. 
 Once again, different things will count as rational for a creature depending on 
which environment we take to be relevant.  Contrast the previous example of the 
people and their responses to snakes with the following: imagine an environment 
containing two types of non-poisonous snakes.   If we assess rationality relative to 
current environment, a person in this new environment who, upon seeing a snake, 
infers that they are in danger and runs away, may well not do what best promotes 
his evolutionary potential, since he may expend energy unnecessarily and end up 
avoiding places which could be useful to him. 
 
Finally, we may also ask  how we are to interpret the vague term ‘lead towards’ 
when speaking of whether thoughts and actions lead towards certain consequences 
in particular environments.  One issue here is whether the thoughts and actions 
must actually or necessarily result in the consequences, or whether they must raise 
the probability of the consequences by some degree.  If the latter, we can then ask 
whether we are here using an objective notion of probability, or a subjective notion, 
and if a subjective notion, from whose point of view is it to be measured?  This 
introduces a question about the importance of the point of view of the subject on the 
consequentialist view, which I will not attempt to answer here. 
 
Each of these proposals can be criticised in various ways as analyses of our everyday 
notion of rationality, and even within the consequentialist options, there is no need 
to argue for one real or somehow superior notion of rationality.  Rather, we may use 
different notions for different purposes, as Kacelnik (2006) does.  However, once we 
have a purpose in mind, as the interpretationist does, it is important to specify which 
notion we are using just because the various possibilities label different things as 
rational.  As I will also argue in section 3, different versions of consequentialism fail 
the interpretationist in slightly different, though related, ways.  Nevertheless, the 
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various consequentialist proposals do have enough in common to treat their 
responses to human limitations and the results of the heuristics and biases program 
together. 
 
2. CRC, human limitations and the results of the heuristics and biases 
program 
 
CRC says that all thinkers think and act so as to achieve or have a good chance of 
achieving or at least increase their chances of achieving the relevant goals at least 
reasonably well given their resources and an appropriate environment. 
 Unlike SRC, this does not face a problem in accepting and accommodating 
our human weaknesses.  For example, the fact that we do not achieve consistency or 
deductive closure in our beliefs does nothing to disprove CRC, because a 
consequentialist notion of rationality takes what we are capable of doing into 
account when determining what is rational for us.  In other words, a consequentialist 
picture seems to be able to do exactly what I complained that the Standard Picture 
could not do in section 4.2 of the previous chapter. 
 Given CRC, it is also far more difficult to say that the experiments detailed in 
chapter 8 prove that we suffer from counter-normative reasoning competences.  As 
Samuels et al. say, 
 
We are no longer in a position to confidently invoke familiar formal principles 
as benchmarks of good reasoning.  Instead we must address a complex fabric 
of broadly conceptual and empirical issues in order to determine what the 
relevant standards are relative to which the quality of our reasoning should 
be evaluated. (2004: 45) 
 
Whether the reasoning strategies employed by participants in the experiments above 
should count as irrational comes to depend on their individual cognitive capacities, 
164 
 
on whatever is the correct environment in which to determine the likely success rate 
of their strategies, and on what consequences their strategies are supposed to 
achieve.  This makes it possible that the so called ‘fast and dirty’ heuristics identified 
by the heuristics and biases program are in fact the most suitable rules for us to use, 
and so a sign of our rationality, rather than a disproof of it.  A more detailed 
response to the results depends on one’s chosen form of consequentialism. 
 As Samuels et al. say this form of response does not make empirical results 
such as those from the heuristics and biases program completely irrelevant.  Given 
any particular understanding of the goals of rational thinking and our limitations, it 
may look as if we do not do the best that we can do.  At this point, the supporter of 
CRC may need to start employing some of the manoeuvres I suggested for the 
supporter of SRC.   The consequentialist may be able to employ the second two 
responses more successfully: if they choose to challenge the interpretation of the 
results, they can introduce the idea that such results must influence what we take 
our resources and limitations to be, while if they adopt the third option, they will 
have less difficulty in accepting the human limitations it implies. 
   
Thus, if we use a consequentialist notion of rationality we seem to be in a reasonably 
strong position to deal with various empirical facts about humans and their 
reasoning capacities.  The next question is whether the consequentialist conception 
can do the work that interpretationism requires.   
 
3.  Rejecting CRC   
 
To recap, the consequentialist conception of rationality says that being rational 
involves thinking and acting in ways that lead towards certain goals given the 
available resources.  On this account, being more rational involves getting closer to 
doing and thinking whatever would best achieve the specified goals in the relevant 
environment; while being less rational involves not doing the best thing all the time, 
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and perhaps sometimes doing completely the wrong thing.  CRC says all thinkers 
must think and act so as to achieve the relevant goals at least reasonably well given 
their resources. 
 We have seen two reasons why the interpretationist might favour CRC over 
SRC: a consequentialist notion of rationality seems better able to meet the Value 
Condition, and CRC is better able to take into account our human weaknesses.  Here, 
I show that CRC has a very major disadvantage; it does not allow the 
interpretationist to give an account of how the content of thought is determined. 
 
In chapter 7, section 2.2 we considered an argument for the Rationality Claim which 
called on the requirements of interpretation.  This argument is of the utmost 
importance here, since it tells us how the interpretationist wants to use the 
Rationality Claim.  Let us begin by rehearsing it. The argument started from the 
assumption that thinkers had to be interpretable, and then pointed out that 
interpretation requires known connections between a creature’s environment, their 
actions and what they think.  It suggested that the connections were provided by 
rationality, and so concluded that thinkers must be rational.  What the 
interpretationist needs to show is that a consequentialist notion of rationality gives 
us what we need in order to produce interpretations. 
 Consider again the Analogoids from the previous chapter.  They are octopus-
like creatures who behave as follows: most of the time, they move slowly through 
the water and ingest tiny creatures near the ocean bed, or float near the surface of the 
water in the sunshine.  Except, that is, for when one of three predators enters the 
vicinity.  Analogoids move upwards when approached by a giant sea spider, which 
is fast but can only move along the ocean floor.  They swim quickly away from 
approaching sluggish eels, which can swim anywhere, but move slowly.  And they 
swim in amongst the branches of a plant on the ocean floor when approached by the 
fast shark-like predator which can swim in all directions, but which is too large to 
enter the branches of such plants. 
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 Suppose we want to use the intentional stance to interpret an Analogoid.  It 
seems like such an interpretation is very easy to give:  we can say that when it sees a 
giant sea spider and then swims upwards, it does so because it thinks that there is 
sea spider coming towards it, and that it is therefore in danger, it thinks that 
swimming upwards will keep it safe, and it wants to remain uneaten; when it sees a 
sluggish eel and swims quickly in the other direction, this is because it thinks it is in 
danger from an eel, wants to remain uneaten, and thinks that swimming away 
quickly will keep it safe; and so on, with the addition of thoughts about the sharks 
and how to escape them, and various additions about the Analogoid’s other desires, 
how they are ranked, and how it thinks it can best fulfil them.  Such is the obvious 
intentional interpretation of such a creature.  However, CRC does not provide us 
with enough information to produce this interpretation. 
 If we assume only that thinkers must think and act so as to achieve the 
relevant goals at least reasonably well given their resources, we are equally entitled 
to give the following interpretation:  when the Analogoid sees a giant sea spider, it 
believes itself to be safe, desires to remain uneaten, and believes that swimming into 
the plants will put it in danger, it decides on the basis of this that it ought to swim 
forwards very quickly, and as a result of this intention swims slowly upwards; when 
the creature sees a sluggish eel, it forms the belief that there is food nearby, desires to 
remain uneaten, and believes that swimming round very slowly in circles will be 
amusing, it infers from this that it ought to bury itself in the sand, as a result forms 
the intention to swim into the plants, and as a result of this intention, it swims very 
quickly away from the sluggish eel; and so on. 
 Now, there’s clearly something wrong with this interpretation, and we might 
explain what is wrong by saying that obviously, a rational creature won’t form the 
belief that it is safe on meeting an often-encountered predator, obviously it won’t 
decide on the basis of the belief that it’s safe where it is and the desire to remain so, 
that it needs to swim quickly, and obviously, on forming the intention to swim 
forwards quickly, its intentional action cannot consist of swimming slowly upwards.  
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The same goes for the interpretation of the Analogoid after it sees the sluggish eel, 
but perhaps even more so.  But the fact that these interpretations are so obviously 
wrong is not captured by CRC.  In the interpretations, the creature has an experience 
which causes certain mental states, and these mental states then cause it to take the 
appropriate action to realise the purpose we are attributing as a desire to the 
creature.  This is as much as CRC requires, given the version of consequentialism on 
which the relevant consequences are the satisfaction of the rational subject’s desires.  
Those versions of consequentialism in which the relevant consequences are the ends 
of evolutionary processes or the achievement of objective well-being seem to provide 
even less constraints on interpretation, since it seems they may also allow us to make 
up strange desires for the Analogoids.  What happens when we emphasise epistemic 
consequences is dealt with below. 
 The basic problem that we have encountered here is that consequentialism, 
due to its focus on outcomes, seems unable to say anything about how the thoughts 
and actions which lead to an outcome ought to be related to each other.  And this 
means that, using only CRC, the interpreter can’t determine what the thoughts are. 
 At this point, perhaps a supporter of CRC will say that a Rationality Claim 
doesn’t need to provide all that an interpreter needs in order to interpret their 
subjects.  Perhaps CRC is essential to interpretation, but other assumptions, having 
nothing to do with rationality, are also needed, and will be able to resolve the 
indeterminacy encountered above.  However, the problem we are encountering is 
that CRC does not inform us how thoughts have to relate to each other, and this 
seems to be exactly the sort of thing that a Rationality Claim should tell us.  Indeed, it 
is something about which other Rationality Claims have a lot to say.  I therefore 
reject this escape route from the current problem.    
 Alternatively, the consequentialist might object to the argument by saying 
that the problem arises not from using a consequentialist notion of rationality, but 
from the kind of example to which it is applied.  In particular, they might say that 
the problem arises because we are considering creatures which do not have a 
168 
 
language.  We cannot choose between rival interpretations of them, but that is just a 
familiar problem with the interpretation of non-linguistic creatures, and may simply 
show that we should, with Davidson, deny that such creatures really possess 
thoughts at all. 
 However, the indeterminacy here is much more extensive than that identified 
by Davidson.  When considering a dog’s supposed belief that a cat has gone up a 
tree, Davidson says 
 
That oak tree, as it happens, is the oldest tree in sight.  Does the dog think that 
the cat went up the oldest tree in sight?  Or that the cat went up the same tree 
it went up the last time the dog chased it?  It is hard to make sense of such 
questions.  But then it does not seem possible to distinguish between quite 
different things the dog might be said to believe. (2001: 97) 
 
Still, Davidson seems to admit that, to the extent that we can identify what the dog is 
thinking about, we know it is thinking about the tree.  In the case of interpreting an 
Analogoid using CRC, we cannot determine whether it is thinking about a sluggish 
eel, a sea spider, or a shark; or indeed an elephant, a planet or its great grandfather.  
The problem seems not to be that we have a method of interpretation but lack 
enough behaviour to apply it to, but that we lack a way of generating an 
interpretation from behaviour.  The addition of language would not help here. 
 But what about the first version of consequentialism suggested in section 1, 
according to which at least one of the things rational creatures must aim for (and 
perhaps achieve) is true beliefs?  The deviant interpretations above do not involve 
the Analogoids succeeding at this.  Unfortunately, this does not completely resolve 
the problem.  Although some deviant interpretations are ruled out by this version of 
CRC, we can suggest many others, where the Analogoids form true and 
comprehensive beliefs that are, however, at the times that they develop and act on 
them, completely disconnected from their environment and projects.  So, for 
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example, we could offer the following:  when the Analogoid sees a sharkish predator 
at time t1, it forms the (true) belief that it encountered a sluggish eel a week ago, and 
the belief that the best way to escape from giant sea spiders is to swim upwards.  It 
then combines these with the desire to remain uneaten and deduces the second law 
of thermodynamics.   It forms the intention to assassinate the leader of the Women’s 
Institute, and as a result swims into the branches of the nearby plants. 
 What we need is to be able to demand that beliefs, other thoughts, 
environments and actions be connected to each other in appropriate ways.  But then 
we must say what these appropriate ways are, and we risk abandoning 
consequentialism in favour of another account of rationality. 
 The basic objection that I am presenting here is that rationality, in order to do 
what the interpretationist requires, must be a matter of the method of achieving as 
well of the achievement of a consequence.  If rationality is connected to thought in 
the way the interpretationist supposes, then it must be a matter of achieving 
outcomes in a way that involves states which are related to each other in particular 
ways.  Only then can such states be thoughts.  When you ask what the particular 
ways of being related are, the most obvious answer appears to be ‘the rational ways’, 
suggesting that consequentialism does not give us a complete account of the notion 
of rationality needed by the interpretationist. 
 
To avoid the conclusion that consequentialism does not give a sufficient account of 
rationality for our purposes, what is needed is an argument that having certain kinds 
of thoughts with certain connections between them is the best way of achieving any 
outcomes that might be relevant.   
 I suggest that at this point the consequentialist might be tempted to point out 
that he need not eschew the rules of the Standard Picture, or some other set of rules, 
entirely.  If following them is useful, then the creature which satisfies CRC should 
conform to them when resources allow.  The consequentialist may not be able to 
point to an easily identifiable abstract entity the instantiation of which results in 
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thought (as did the supporter of SRC).  However, he may suggest that this does not 
mean that on his theory there is no complex pattern that each thinking creature 
needs to instantiate.  This pattern might be the one a creature instantiates when it 
follows a very complicated set of rules.  There might be some set of rules which 
would say when a creature should and shouldn’t obey the rules picked out by the 
Standard Picture, when it should satisfice in its pursuit of its goals, and so on.   
The consequentialist may then argue that admitting the existence of such a set 
of rules need not make us into deontologists about rationality: we could say that 
although there were rules, they were the rules that mattered to rationality only 
because they led towards the relevant consequences.  It therefore seems as if 
consequences could still have priority on this theory. 
The picture we require, then, is one on which the consequences, attainment of 
which we see as constitutive of rationality, also determine that a creature needs to 
follow certain rules in their thought and action. These rules can then provide us with 
the connections between thoughts which we need to determine the nature and 
content of thoughts.  Moreover, if there is a set of such rules, and we can attribute 
(probably implicit) knowledge of them to interpreters, we will have a way to 
rehabilitate the argument from the requirements of interpretation.  The question is 
whether the consequentialist can provide an argument to say that creatures must 
follow/conform to some set of rules in order to optimally achieve those consequences 
(tendency towards the) attainment of which is constitutive of rationality.   
If the (tendency towards the) achievement of consequences is all that matters 
for rationality, why should creatures follow a set of rules to attain these 
consequences?  Achieving them in a different way each time is still achieving them.  
Perhaps the obvious answer to this is to point to the fact that all the potentially 
rational creatures we have encountered are finite creatures.  And finite creatures, 
with a limited number of resources available to them, and an inability to see the 
future, need to have finite procedures which they can follow, which enable them to 
achieve the important consequences most of the time given their environment.  
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Indeed, this was precisely the point of the consequentialist response to the data from 
the heuristics and biases program (given in Section 2): it may be beneficial for a 
limited creature to adopt certain strategies in thought, even when such strategies are 
not the most reliable ones available.  When we responded to the data from the 
heuristics and biases program, it was important to stress that the strategies need not 
always involve valid inferences.  Here, on the other hand, we may stress that 
sometimes following valid inferences does provide a way for a creature to achieve its 
goals. 
 In reply to this argument, it is sufficient to point out that if it works at all, it 
only tells us that the thoughts of a finite creature must follow some sort of pattern.  It 
cannot tell us what that pattern might be, beyond saying that the pattern must in fact 
promote the relevant consequences.  For example, as long as it fits into some pattern 
of reasoning, it cannot say what is wrong with our Analogoid reasoning like this: 
 
when it sees a sluggish eel, it forms the belief that there is food nearby, desires 
to remain uneaten, and believes that swimming round very slowly in circles 
will be amusing; it infers from this that it ought to bury itself in the sand, as a 
result forms the intention to swim into the plants, and as a result of this 
intention, it swims very quickly away from predator 2. 
Yet this hardly improves our position at all.  We want to say that there are other facts 
about how thoughts need to be related to each other, and I maintain that pure 
consequentialism does not have the resources to do this.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, a purely consequentialist notion of rationality does not provide the 
interpretationist with the resources he needs to explain the nature and content of 
thought.  It should be noted that this is not a wholesale objection to such a notion of 
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rationality: it may be ideally suited to many purposes.  Samuels et al., for example, 
are not interpretationists and it remains possible that their conception of rationality 
does all that they want it to.  There also seems to be something right about 
consequentialism: it seems plausible that rationality should (at least sometimes) have 
something to do with what is good for us.  However, in order to develop a plausible 
form of interpretationism, we need more than this. 
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Chapter 10 – Achievements, Patterns 
and Purposes 
 
The Standard and Consequentialist Pictures of rationality each have attractions.  If 
we take either of them alone, however, they provide us with unsuitable conceptions 
of rationality for the interpretationist’s purposes.  This chapter will attempt to 
suggest a conception of rationality that is more suitable for interpretationism.  As a 
single chapter, it obviously cannot give a complete account of what the 
interpretationist notion of rationality involves and requires, but it will try to provide 
the broad outline of such an account, suggesting how we can combine recognition of 
the importance of rules with recognition of the extent to which they can be broken, 
sometimes for good reasons, and giving pride of place to the role that an assumption 
of rationality is supposed to play in understanding others. 
 I begin in section 1 by returning to an issue briefly raised in chapter 8: 
whether the interpretationist should see the rationality of a thinker as an 
achievement or as a capacity.  I argue that the interpretationist must include some 
achievements in his conception of rationality.  Section 2 then suggests an 
‘achievement’ that any thinker must attain by suggesting that the rational being 
must, at least sometimes, do at least some of the things that the Standard Picture 
says that rationality involves.  Section 3 adds to this that there must also be some 
pattern to or consistency in the way that a creature reasons.  Section 4 then shows 
that, by including these two elements in our conception of rationality, we can give a 
good response to the challenge from chapter 8, concerning human limitations and 
errors in reasoning. 
 In section 5, I consider whether this picture of minimal rationality includes all 
that we need in order to see those who instantiate it as thinkers with perspectives 
and reasons of their own.  I consider further additions that we might make to the 
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picture, but argue that it would be better to refrain from making a decision between 
these related theories, and to endorse a stratified conception of rationality. 
 Section 6 completes the chapter by considering the purpose of interpretation, 
conceived of as an attempt to understand a creature in terms of its reasons through 
assuming it to be rational in the sense argued for. 
 
1.  Rationality as an achievement 
 
The issue of whether rationality should be seen as a capacity or an achievement first 
appeared in chapter 8.  There, we were worried about evidence that we do not 
always reason in a normatively correct fashion.  This was met with the suggestion 
that perhaps it is enough that we could reason better, even though we often don’t.  
The idea that this might allow us to count humans as rational in the sense required 
by the interpretationist might be compared to the way, in Part II of this thesis, the 
potential for us to produce interpretable behaviour was taken to be sufficient for 
thought, even when no actual behaviour occurred.  I come now to the evaluation of 
this suggestion: are the two cases comparable?  And is the potential to be rational all 
that the interpretationist needs a thinker to possess? 
 
We should first note that the intuitive plausibility of the two claims is very different.  
In Part II, the suggestion was that one might have a thought which one did not 
display in any behaviour, but which one could display in behaviour, for example if 
the circumstances were different.  I take it that this will seem quite reasonable to 
more or less everyone.  On the other hand, the suggestion that the interpretationist’s 
kind of rationality might be present only as a capacity with respect to a certain 
thought, such as a belief, amounts to the idea that a subject could have a belief which 
they have not arrived at by rational means and which they then do not use in any of 
the ways sanctioned by the rules in the Standard Picture, despite having 
opportunities, but which they could nevertheless perhaps form and certainly use in 
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an appropriate way.   Thus, the belief won’t have any of the correct upstream 
connections to other thoughts, such as being made probable by other beliefs etc., and 
it won’t have the correct downstream connections to other thoughts, such as the 
subject going on to believe any of the consequences of the belief, or the consequences 
which follow from combining that belief with others of their beliefs, nor their 
rejecting any of the other beliefs they have which are incompatible with this belief, 
nor combining it with their desires to form intentions that are likely to lead to the 
fulfilment of those desires, if the belief is true.  Nevertheless, the belief is supposed 
to be the belief that it is and to have the potential to have (at least some of) the 
appropriate relations to other thoughts and to actions.  While the idea from Part II 
seemed obviously sensible, the counterpart involving rationality seems to me to be 
quite implausible. 
 The idea that we should allow rationality as mere capacity, then, seems 
unpromising.  But why is it so much less plausible than its counterpart?  One might 
suggest that if you think the mere capacity for rationality is enough for belief, then 
you must have misunderstood the nature of belief: beliefs just aren’t the sort of thing 
which you can have, but not have formed appropriately nor use to guide your 
thought and action even when you can and should do so.  This, however, appears to 
restate the problem.  Certainly, it does not seem to offer anything useful in 
responding to a person, if such there be, who finds the idea of a belief which is not 
actually rationally connected to anything else unobjectionable.  What we want is to 
understand why, if they are the sort of thing a subject can fail to display in their 
behaviour, beliefs are not also the sort of thing one can just fail to form or employ in 
a rational way. 
 I think that the interpretationist can answer this question by considering what 
is different when an interpreter considers the belief that does not result in action 
versus when he considers the belief that is neither formed nor used in accordance 
with rational norms.  When the interpreter thinks of a subject who is, in fact, failing 
to display behaviour which can be interpreted to reveal their mental states, the 
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interpreter takes the situation to involve the subject being, in whatever sense is 
required for interpretationism, rational.  Such situations involve subjects failing to 
act because they are paralysed, or producing misleading behaviour because they 
want to deceive.  For such subjects, not acting in a way which makes their beliefs 
interpretable makes sense, given their purposes, their limitations and many of the 
rules we think that rational thinking follows.  We can make sense of someone failing 
to act in an interpretable way precisely because it fits into our scheme for making 
sense of and understanding each other.  When we take a subject failing to achieve 
any degree of rationality with respect to a belief, however, this cannot fit into our 
way of understanding others.  Rather, the situation destroys the possibility of the 
sort of understanding we are looking for. 
 This is a distinctively interpretationist answer to the problem: it involves 
taking beliefs and other thoughts to be parts of a scheme89 that we use to understand 
and interact with others.  Because the scheme arises from/is embedded within our 
practices of understanding and dealing with each other, at least sometimes the 
application of the scheme must deliver determinate answers about what others are 
thinking. 90   Nevertheless, the scheme allows us to make sense of the idea that 
sometimes thoughts might be present, without there actually being enough evidence 
to allow interpretation in the real world.  Indeed, this idea is sometimes even useful 
in the process of interacting with others.91  The scheme cannot, however, allow the 
presence of a thought such as a belief in the absence of anything which would make 
it make sense, or allow it to contribute towards our making sense of the person, 
which is what the suggestion that rationality could amount to just a capacity and no 
                                                     
89 I say scheme, rather than theory here because I do not mean to align interpretationism with the 
theory theory.  With ‘scheme’ I intend to put in mind both theories and some kinds of practices. 
90 This is not an argument for the Availability Claim, but a consideration in favour of the idea that at 
least sometimes, people actually do display behaviour which allows us to interpret their thoughts. 
91 Indeed, cf. chapter 4, section 1 for the stronger claim that the scheme makes this unavoidable. 
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more in a particular thinker would involve.  This cannot form a part of the project of 
making sense of each other.92 
 An interpretationist, then, should not find the suggestion that the rationality 
of a thinker could be a mere capacity appealing; this does not fit well with his 
account of what psychological concepts depend on and the role that they play in our 
lives.  So, according to the interpretationist, the rationality of a thinker involves at 
least some degree of achievement.  The next question is what a thinker needs to 
achieve. 
 
2.  Sometimes getting it right 
 
Cherniak (1986) provides a suggestion about how much a thinker needs to achieve in 
the rationality department.  His first departure from the Standard Picture presented 
in chapter 8 is to introduce an emphasis on the actions of a creature, and the 
potential satisfaction of its desires.  Thus, Cherniak suggests the following as an 
ideal general rationality condition:  
 
 ‘If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would undertake all and only actions 
that are apparently appropriate.’ (7) 
 
He explains the apparent appropriateness of an action in terms of whether, 
according to A’s beliefs, the action would tend to satisfy A’s desires (1986: 7).  This 
notion will be considered in more detail shortly.  In addition to the general condition, 
Cherniak also specifies ideal conditions for certain aspects of thinking, for example 
the ideal consistency condition: ‘If A has a particular belief-desire set, then if any 
inconsistency arose in the belief set, A would eliminate it.’ (17) and the ideal 
                                                     
92 Note the focus on beliefs here.  I will consider other states, such as imaginings, in chapter 11. 
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inference condition: ‘If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would make all and 
only sound inferences from the belief set that are apparently appropriate.’ (13)  
 These conditions are not as demanding as my initial characterisation of the 
Standard Picture: Cherniak’s ideal rationality condition does not require even an 
ideally rational creature to achieve deductive closure, since inferences which do not 
lead to or prevent the creature acting in a certain way cannot contribute to the 
creature’s satisfaction of the ideal general rationality condition.  Cherniak envisages 
a creature performing only certain inferences depending on whether these look like 
they will help the creature to achieve its desires.  Nevertheless, Cherniak says that 
these conditions are still too demanding for us humans.  We do not, and moreover 
we should not try to satisfy these conditions. 
Instead of the ideal general rationality condition, Cherniak suggests that a 
cognitive theory should use the following: 
 
‘If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would undertake some, but not 
necessarily all, of those actions that are apparently appropriate.’ (9) 
 
Likewise, he suggests replacing the ideal consistency condition with a minimal 
consistency condition: ‘If A has a particular belief-desire set, then if any 
inconsistencies arose in the belief set, A would sometimes eliminate some of them’ 
(16) and offers a minimal inference condition: ‘If an agent has a particular belief-
desire set, he would make some, but not necessarily all of the sound inferences from 
the belief set which are apparently appropriate.’ (10)  Each of these conditions is to 
be supplemented by the further requirement that the creature must not make too 
many mistakes: it must not perform too many inappropriate actions or inferences, 
nor fail to eradicate too many inconsistencies.  Cherniak’s basic method for 
transforming ideal rationality conditions into minimal rationality conditions that we 
can satisfy is therefore quite simple: it is to replace ‘all’ with ‘some’ in statements of 
these conditions.   
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 Cherniak’s proposal could be seen as a very cut down version of the Standard 
Picture, on which ‘approximation’ to perfect rationality required only doing some of 
the right things.  However, we should note that Cherniak’s theory can allow that 
there might be kinds of good reasoning, or occasions of correctly responding to 
reasons, which can’t be captured in rules or principles at all, yet which still exhibit a 
creature’s rationality - performing these kinds of reasoning and these responses 
could be counted as things which help a creature fulfil the minimal general 
rationality condition.  This represents a very significant departure from the Standard 
Picture as presented in chapter 8, as well as an additional advantage of Cherniak’s 
theory.   
 
I will call a rationality claim which uses Cherniak’s notion of minimal rationality 
MRC.  Let us consider, then, whether an interpretationist could use MRC to produce 
interpretations.  Below, I first consider how using MRC helps us to avoid some of the 
deviant interpretations that troubled us when using CRC, and then consider three 
potential objections: that Cherniak’s account cannot provide enough for successful 
interpretation because (unlike the consequentialist picture) it does not allow us 
know that the creature is acting in a way which really does tend towards the 
satisfaction of its desires; that the notion of apparent appropriateness is unclear; and 
that Cherniak’s use of terms like ‘some’ introduces unacceptable ambiguity into our 
psychological concepts. 
Given the notion of ‘apparent appropriateness’, being rational has something 
to do with satisfying desires, just as some of the consequentialists in the previous 
chapter claimed.  But it only involves satisfying them by doing what, according to 
certain beliefs, will satisfy them.  The beliefs in question are those of the subject 
being interpreted.  The notion of apparent appropriateness, then, can help us to rule 
out some of the deviant interpretations that troubled us when we tried to use a 
purely consequentialist conception of rationality.  For example, I worried that the 
consequentialist could not rule out the following interpretation of the Analogoid: 
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When the creature sees a giant sea spider, it believes itself to be safe, desires to 
remain uneaten, and believes that swimming into the plants will put it in 
danger, it decides on the basis of this that it ought to swim forwards very 
quickly, and as a result of this intention swims slowly upwards. 
 
The addition of apparent appropriateness can help us to rule out this interpretation 
because it does not include the Analogoid doing what is apparently appropriate 
given its beliefs, but doing the right thing in spite of beliefs suggesting that other 
actions would be more appropriate. 
 Nevertheless, as it stands, Cherniak’s conception of minimal rationality 
certainly does not guarantee the production of sufficiently determinate 
interpretations.  Depending on what a subject believes, one set of movements might 
count as various different actions.93  Take the example of the Analogoid moving 
slowly upwards through the water in the presence of a giant sea spider.  This could 
be an act of escaping from a spider.  However, it could instead be an act of trying to 
escape from either of the other two predators, if the Analogoid is confused about 
both which kind of predator is present, and which predator can go where.  Or it 
could be an act of trying to attract a mate, if the Analogoid believes there is another 
Analogoid watching who will find such behaviour appealing.  Given the right set of 
strange beliefs and desires, it could even be an act of trying to arrange clothes in a 
wardrobe, or of attempting to steal a car.   
This is the first potential objection mentioned above.  As well as gaining 
information about how to interpret, it seems like we’ve lost something which the 
consequentialist account gave us: the assurance that the creature is probably (or 
sometimes) doing the right thing to satisfy his desires.  We have lost this because of 
Cherniak’s focus on creatures doing what is apparently appropriate, rather than just 
                                                     
93 Cf. Anscombe’s famous example of the man and the water pump in her (1957). 
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appropriate.  To respond to this problem, we must add to the list of things which a 
thinker must, at least sometimes, achieve.  I will consider two ways in which we 
might do this. 
 A first suggestion is that we could say that the creature must, at least 
sometimes, do what is really appropriate for the satisfaction of its desires, i.e. what 
really will tend to satisfy its desires.  This brings us up against a question which we 
need to ask with respect to the general rationality condition in any case: do the 
actions of a creature which are mentioned in such minimal rationality conditions 
need to be observable by an interpreter?  Or might purely mental actions, such as 
deciding to think about cosmology, count as well?  If the latter, then the condition 
that a creature must, at least sometimes, do what is actually appropriate for the 
satisfaction of its desires, will not help us to overcome the problem in interpreting, 
since we get no guarantee that any of the actions we can observe are among the 
genuinely appropriate ones.  On the other hand, if we say that ‘external’ observable 
actions are required, then observable actions become a condition of rationality, and 
we stop being able to count our locked-in cosmologist from chapter 5 as rational, and 
therefore as a thinker.  Since we want to count the locked-in cosmologist as a thinker, 
we should not make genuinely appropriate observable actions a part of what any 
thinker must achieve.  Instead, we need to find a way to ensure that for any thinker 
who does produce observable behaviour, some of that behaviour will be genuinely 
appropriate (i.e. a good way of getting them what they desire). 
 A second suggestion is that we add in conditions which ensure that the 
minimally rational creature has a fair number of true beliefs on which to act.  That 
any thinker must have mostly true beliefs is something that both Davidson and 
Dennett maintain.  Dennett says that one should ‘attribute as beliefs all the truths 
relevant to the system’s interests (or desires) that the system’s experience to date has 
made available’ (1987: 18) and that ‘the attribution of false belief, any false belief, 
requires a special genealogy, which will be seen to consist in the main in true beliefs.’ 
(Ibid.)  Davidson, on the other hand, makes attributing true beliefs a major part of 
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obeying his Principle of Charity.  Adding  this sort of feature to Cherniak’s account 
of rationality will involve adding conditions about the ‘upstream’ connections that 
thoughts such as beliefs are supposed to have, and saying that a minimally rational 
creature must sometimes get these things right.  Cherniak admits that he does not 
pay much attention to such upstream connections.  He is more interested in the 
‘forwards looking’, or downstream connections of thoughts, a focus which makes 
sense given that his primary interest is in prediction on the basis of existing 
knowledge of a creature’s thoughts.  For the interpretationist, however, the 
condition that creatures sometimes form the right beliefs given their environment 
will be very important.   
 The second potential objection to using MRC also focuses on the use of the 
notion of apparent appropriateness.  The problem is that it is not completely clear 
what ‘apparent appropriateness’ amounts to, and there are ways of developing this 
notion which would lead us into difficulties.  As I said above, Cherniak says that an 
action is apparently appropriate for a creature if according to the creature’s beliefs, 
that action would tend to satisfy the creature’s desires.  But which of the beliefs of 
the subject are being called upon here?  A first suggestion is that all of them are, but 
a subject’s beliefs might (indeed, are likely to) include some contradictions.  
According to some logical systems, everything then follows from the subject’s belief 
set; according to others, nothing does.  Both are unacceptable options. 
 A better suggestion is that the notion of apparent appropriateness directs us 
towards just those beliefs which the subject uses to decide upon their action.  
However, then the first objection surely returns to haunt us.  We can suppose that 
the Analogoid forms some beliefs as it should, but also forms other beliefs in 
completely the wrong ways.  We can then suppose that when it acts, it may only act 
on the beliefs it formed in silly ways.  And in that case, we don’t have any way to 
work out what the creature is trying to do, or what many of its beliefs and desires 
are.  To address this problem, we must look at how we should understand terms 
such as ‘some’ and ‘not too many’ in Cherniak’s minimal rationality conditions.  
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 This brings us to our third potential problem.  According to Heal (2003), 
Cherniak’s use of terms like ‘some’ and ‘not too many’ is problematic, because we 
could interpret these terms in different ways.  For example, when we say that a 
thinker must make at least some sound inferences, does this mean that some 
proportion of the inferences they make need to be sound (half, perhaps, or a quarter)?  
Or does it mean that they must at least succeed in making the more obvious sound 
inferences that they could make?   If we can give several reasonable interpretations 
of what counts as ‘some’ etc. in Cherniak’s definitions, or if different interpretations 
of these terms are appropriate for different situations of interpretation, Heal worries 
that there will be ambiguity in our concept of rationality.  Since the interpretationist 
hopes to illuminate or define thought by considering rationality, the worry is that 
our psychological concepts will then also be problematically ambiguous.  
It is certainly the case that people do achieve very different amounts with 
respect to keeping the rules of the Standard Picture, and moreover that we hold 
different people to different standards and assume different things about what they 
are capable of when we interpret them.  For example, we expect different standards 
from a professor and a three-year-old child, and this surely influences the way we 
then understand particular of their utterances and actions.  The question is whether, 
in employing the assumption that they are minimally rational, we then understand 
‘some’ differently for each of them.  If so, both will be minimally rational, but what 
we take them to do to achieve this minimal rationality will be quite different.  If this 
difference is quite radical we may then wonder whether the thoughts we attribute to 
each, such as beliefs and desires, should really count as being the same sorts of states. 
One response to this would be to say that drawing a distinction between what 
it means for a young child to have a belief and what it means for a professor to have 
a belief is a good thing: the states do, after all, have important differences between 
them.  Still, we want to retain at least some unity in our psychological concepts.  But 
on the current picture, we have a way to do this:  there remains an important sense 
in which we have unified concepts of rationality and belief etc., since these concepts 
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all depend upon the minimal rationality conditions, with a set of the words within 
these schematic conditions (some, not too many, etc.) interpreted in a cluster of 
different ways.  Perhaps this provides as much unity as we need? 
 Given the interpretationist’s purposes, however, this reply will be 
unsatisfactory if the lack of a single understanding of these terms creates problems 
for the process of interpretation.  The question here is whether we need to settle on a 
particular interpretation of ‘some’ etc. before interpretation can proceed, and if so 
how we are supposed to do this.   
 The standard to which we hold and which we expect from a given thinker 
clearly depends significantly on our previous interactions with the creature, and our 
knowledge of its capacities and limitations.  For the interpretationist, then, how to 
understand ‘some’ etc. in a given case cannot be decided before any interpretation 
has taken place.   The interpretationist must hope that we can settle on some 
understanding of ‘some’ during the process of interpretation, with this 
understanding determined holistically along with everything else.   In other words, 
the interpretationist must recommend that we find out which understanding of 
‘some’ etc. allows us to produce interpretations, and then use that understanding.  If 
this hope is warranted, then we can give a univocal account of rationality and 
psychological concepts in terms of what is needed for interpretation.  ‘Some’, for 
example, will mean ‘at least enough for the purposes of interpretation.’ 
 We might worry that sometimes, for one and the same creature, we will be 
able to produce different interpretations, using different understandings of the 
problematic terms.  We would then once again run into indeterminacy.  A possible 
solution to this would be to say that ‘some’ etc. must be interpreted to include as 
many as possible, such that the creature can still be counted as minimally rational 
overall.  There could then be a general presumption in favour of counting a creature 
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as getting things right whenever possible, and some justification would be required 
for counting a creature as wrong on a particular occasion.94 
 This would then also help us to address our first problem: that we have lost 
the assurance that we had on the consequentialist picture that a rational creature is 
doing those things which tend towards the satisfaction of its desires.  With the 
presumption in favour of counting the creature as getting things right unless there’s 
some reason to suppose otherwise, we can justifiably suppose that a subject is acting 
on beliefs formed in a sensible way unless there is reason to suppose otherwise.  
Take the Analogoid example.  We see that the Analogoid was just hanging out near 
the sea bed, not doing very much, until a giant sea spider inched out from behind 
the nearby plant life and began to scuttle towards it.  The Analogoid then swam 
quickly upwards, and the sea spider ended up standing alone on the sea bed where 
the Analogoid used to be.  In addition, we have seen other Analogoids consumed by 
giant sea spiders when they did not take this action when the predator approached.  
Given the presumption in favour of saying that a creature is getting things right, we 
hypothesise that the Analogoid responded correctly to its environment and formed a 
belief about a predator coming towards it.  This belief then allows us to explain the 
Analogoid’s action; we can say that the Analogoid combined this belief with others 
formed in a sensible way and with a desire to remain alive, and in another instance 
of getting something right it decided that the best thing to do was to swim quickly 
upwards. This further confirms our hypothesis about the Analogoid’s belief, and 
leaves us with no special reason to attribute false beliefs about other predators, 
mating practices, or the arrangement of wardrobes, despite the fact that these could 
also play a role in producing the behaviour that the Analogoid produced. 
Finally, we may consider whether there is a lower limit to the number of 
things a creature has to get right, below which creatures cannot be counted as even 
minimally rational or as having thoughts anymore.  The focus on rationality with 
                                                     
94 For one set of considerations which might lead to the attribution of error, see the next section. 
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respect to a given thought, introduced in section 1 above, will be helpful to us here.  
It implies that a creature must get some things right with respect to at least many of 
its individual thoughts.  Once again, the guiding principle will be how many things 
the subject needs to get right in order to justify a proposed interpretation of them. 
 
I conclude, then, that the notion of minimal rationality, if it can be suitably 
developed to include conditions on the upstream connections of thoughts, provides 
a promising candidate for use in the interpretationist’s Rationality Claim.  But does it 
give us everything we need in a rationality claim?  Does it really enable us to give 
good interpretations, or predictions?  Cherniak himself thinks not, and adds 
something to the conditions above in order to enable the predictions he wants: a 
feasibility ordering, which is, roughly, an account of the comparative difficulty a 
creature has in making the various possible transitions in thought.  I show how 
something like a feasibility ordering can be added to our account in the next section. 
 
3.  Patterns 
 
Minimally rational agents must perform some apparently appropriate actions and 
inferences.  However, on Cherniak’s account, there are no particular actions or 
inferences that a creature must perform, (or, presumably, inconsistencies they must 
eliminate) in order to be minimally rational.  For example, he says ‘it cannot be the 
case that a minimal agent is able to make no inferences, but the agent can be unable 
to make any particular one.’ (28)  This creates a problem for the person who wants to 
interpret or predict a subject: in any given situation, should you take the subject to 
be doing the thing they are succeeding at, or unsuccessfully trying to do something 
else?  Perhaps, at least in the case of interpretation, this problem is surmountable 
through employing the strategies suggested in the previous section for settling on an 
interpretation of ‘some’ and similar words.  It is not obvious that sufficiently 
determinate interpretation will be always be possible, however; and the strategy 
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proposed does not provide any help in predicting the mistakes of a subject, which is 
something we sometimes seem able to do. 
 This section considers what Cherniak proposes we add to his minimal 
rationality conditions in order to solve this problem, and then argues against three 
objections to the idea that an interpretationist can employ his solution.   
 
In addition to the minimal rationality conditions above, Cherniak thinks that we 
need information about which inferences a subject is likely to succeed and fail at.  It 
is obvious how such information would be useful in interpretation, and also clear 
that it would improve the situation of the person who wants to predict a subject. 
 Cherniak therefore suggests that we combine the assumption of minimal 
rationality with information about the particular reasoner we want to predict or 
interpret.  Most importantly, he suggests that we need a weighting of deductive 
tasks with respect to feasibility for a given reasoner, and that we need information 
about the memory capacities of that creature.  The question is then what such 
information looks like, and how we are to obtain it. 
Some, such as Hooker (1994) have suggested that this aspect of Cherniak’s 
account shows that our conception of rationality for a creature cannot precede an 
empirical study of that creature, so that ‘philosophical theory must ultimately be 
developed in interaction with empirical knowledge, not held aloof from it.’ (204)  It 
is not completely clear whether Cherniak does count his feasibility orderings as a 
part of minimal rationality, or as an essential addition to minimal rationality during 
prediction.  Either way, however, this poses a problem for the interpretationist: it 
seems that either our conception of rationality must be developed through empirical 
work, or empirical investigation and interpretation of its results must be necessary 
before we can starting applying our conception of rationality; yet, as discussed in 
chapter 7, the Rationality Claim, and therefore the interpretationist’s conception of 
rationality, are supposed to be needed before an empirical study of the creature’s 
thinking can begin. 
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As well as insisting that empirical study of a creature is necessary in order to 
develop a suitable conception of rationality for them, Hooker also suggests that we 
may need a certain kind of information: ‘It becomes essential to know the relevant 
architectural features of an agent’s cognitive equipment in order to make reasonable 
judgements about attributing beliefs and values.’ (189-90)  This suggests that the 
current proposal not only requires information to be available at the wrong time in 
the process of interpretation, but that it also requires information about a creature 
that the interpretationist wants to reject as necessary for interpretation, namely 
information about internal cognitive architecture that is not available to everyday 
interpreters. 
The interpretationist must therefore reject Cherniak’s proposal as interpreted 
by Hooker.  However, this does not mean that the notion of a feasibility ordering is 
useless to the interpretationist.  I will deal first with the objection that incorporating 
feasibility orderings requires granting an interpreter information at the wrong stage 
of interpretation, and then the objection that it requires granting the interpreter the 
wrong sort of information. 
 Instead of seeing the demand for a feasibility ordering as a demand for 
information at the wrong time, we may instead see it as an instruction for how 
interpretation should proceed on the assumption of rationality: it must proceed by 
establishing a feasibility ordering on inferences for the subject as well as working out 
their beliefs and (if such there be) the meanings of their utterances.  Working out 
what a creature thinks thus involves determining a third variable, not recognised by 
prominent proponents of interpretationism.  This appears to be the way that 
Cherniak thinks of the situation, as evidenced in the following passage:  
 
the holistic interdependence of beliefs, desires and meanings emphasised by 
Quine and Davidson in fact extends to another domain.  Beliefs, desires and 
meanings cannot be determined independently of at least a tacit theory of 
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another type: a theory of the agent’s cognitive psychology, of how the agent 
thinks. (48) 
 
Interpretation, then, can still begin from an assumption of rationality, but this 
assumption involves more than suggested in the previous section:  As well as 
assuming that if A has a particular belief-desire set, A would undertake at least some 
of those actions that are apparently appropriate, we must also assume that A has a 
feasibility ordering.   
 But what exactly does a feasibility ordering amount to?  If it involves 
information about the internal workings of a creature, it must still be unacceptable to 
the interpretationist.  This certainly is one way to understand the notion; however, it 
is not the only way.  I suggest that a feasibility ordering may be constructed by 
interpreting a subject in such a way that they display some consistency in their 
reasoning abilities and strategies, given certain situations and topics.  Thus, a 
feasibility ordering will say that a creature finds a certain mental operation difficult 
if our interpretation of them has them performing it rarely and only when the 
creature has a surplus of time to make their decision, even though it would often be 
useful.  It will say that a creature has a limited working memory if the creature 
performs well on problems which require it to consider a few factors, but 
increasingly poorly as more pieces of information need to be brought together 
simultaneously in order to solve the problem.  The feasibility ordering for a 
particular creature is thus developed during the process of interpretation, using only 
the information that is supposed to be available to the interpreter.  At later stages in 
interpretation, it may then be available for use in predictions. 
On this interpretation of the proposal, what we add to the minimal rationality 
condition in order to interpret is the same for each subject: we assume that the 
creature displays some consistency in their reasoning abilities and strategies.  We 
assume that there are patterns within their reasoning processes.  It is clear how this 
might restrict potential interpretations of a creature, and guide the process of 
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interpretation, despite not making things as easy as being given a ready-made 
feasibility ordering before interpretation began.  The latter, however, is not 
something that an interpretationist can allow.  I do not know whether this revised 
interpretation is more what Cherniak has in mind in suggesting the importance of 
feasibility orderings.  However, we may note that the idea that feasibility orderings 
etc. ought to be available to the ordinary person fits well with his emphasis on our 
everyday abilities to predict one another using our cognitive theory. 
 
So, the interpretationist could add feasibility orderings into his account of rationality.  
I have suggested that this might make the process of interpretation easier.  Now, I 
will consider whether this might cause a new problem by ruling out the possibility 
of one off mistakes in reasoning. 
Suppose that Nick finds that he has swollen glands, thinks ‘If I had glandular 
fever I would have swollen glands,’ and as a result swiftly concludes that he must 
have glandular fever.   However, Nick is in no way inclined to infer from ‘All cats 
are mammals’ and the fact that he is a mammal to the conclusion that he is a cat, no 
matter how little time he is given to consider the argument.  Indeed, he knows that 
that would be invalid because it would involve affirming the consequent, and he has 
recognised and criticised instances of affirming the consequent on many different 
occasions.  What then should we say about Nick’s patterns of reasoning?  That he 
has a tendency to affirm the consequent regarding matters of his own health, but a 
tendency to reject that operation in other matters?  What if, despite thinking about 
other health matters, Nick never affirms the consequent in such deliberations?  What 
if this really is a one off mistake?  If it is, then it won’t fit into any pattern, and one 
might worry that that is a problem for the current account.  In chapter 8, I presented 
the worry that the Rationality Claim could not cope with the systematic mistakes in 
reasoning that humans seem to make.  Here, we are having the opposite problem. 
 The simple answer to this is that a subject’s feasibility ordering, and their 
general reasoning and thinking capacities, must be manifested in discernable, but 
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not perfect patterns in the reasoning of a creature.  Thus, we should make use of the 
idea of imperfectly instantiated patterns most famously used by Dennett.  In his 
‘Real Patterns’ (collected in his (1998)), Dennett explains this idea using an analogy 
to patterns that we might see in an array of dots, despite ‘noise’ being present in the 
pattern.  However, this idea has been criticised, for example by Heal (2003).  I will 
therefore show that the current use of the idea does not suffer from the problem 
Heal identifies. 
Heal’s objection is that, given the demandingness of Dennett’s notion of 
rationality (she takes him to endorse something like the Standard Picture), our 
behaviour could not be said to instantiate the relevant pattern at all.  This is a way of 
expressing the central criticism of the Standard Picture that I endorsed in chapter 8: 
we humans fall so far short of perfect rationality that the notion is of highly dubious 
use in understanding us.  However, here we are not asking for the instantiation of 
perfect rationality.  We are not asking for the instantiation of any particular pattern 
at all: just some pattern for each individual, to be determined by what each 
individual does.  And any creature with any sort of moderately consistent reasoning 
practice will realise some pattern in their behaviour to a much greater degree of 
accuracy than any finite creature realises perfect rationality.  I therefore think that 
the interpretationist could insist on the existence of patterns within thought while 
also allowing for some mistakes, or indeed successes, which did not fit into the 
pattern.   
 In sections 5 and 6, I consider whether we need to add anything further to the 
account of minimal rationality given so far in this chapter.  However, given just the 
features described so far (i.e. sometimes getting things right and exhibiting patterns 
in reasoning), we can show how adopting this notion of rationality allows us to 
respond to facts about human limitations and the results of the heuristics and biases 
program, as I show in section 4. 
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4.  Back to heuristics, biases and limitations 
 
Since on this account being rational only involves doing some of those things 
(performing actions, making inferences, removing inconsistencies) that are 
apparently appropriate, some mistakes cannot disprove the claim that a creature is 
minimally rational.  Moreover, systematic mistakes of the creature may form part of 
the pattern that a creature employs, and can therefore contribute to one of the 
conditions of rationality.  Likewise, since being rational does not require removing 
all inconsistencies and deducing all consequences of beliefs, the fact that we cannot 
do this does not show that we are not rational. 
 The interpretationist who endorses MRC can join the consequentialist in 
saying that sometimes using a fast and dirty heuristic is actually a sign or an exercise 
of rationality: namely, in cases where a creature has decided to use such heuristics, 
because the use of heuristics is apparently appropriate given their beliefs and desires. 
 However, the interpretationist may also explain why we consider such 
patterns to be counter-normative, and our limitations to be unfortunate.  On this 
view, the rules of the Standard Picture represent our engagement in a practice of 
discussing and evaluating reasoning.  They are therefore the rules we think that it 
would be best for us to follow, if we had the capability, and if we would not lose 
other more valuable things by doing so.  In addition, as some of our best ideas about 
what good reasoning should involve, we must also often use some of these rules to 
decide whether or not a creature does, sometimes, get things right. 
 
5.  Additional achievements? 
 
Part III has been concerned with explaining the sense in which a thinker must be 
rational, and the initial justification for saying that a thinker must be rational was 
that this was surely necessary if thinkers were to be interpretable through an attempt 
to understand them in terms of their reasons.  However, so far in Part III, I have 
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focused on how thoughts needed to be related to each other, and to action and 
environment, rather than on the idea of thinkers as possessors of and actors upon 
reasons.  Now that we have a suggested account of rationality in terms of the former 
considerations, we must ask how the latter fit into the picture. 
 
One option is to say that getting some things right and exhibiting patterns in 
transitions between candidate thoughts (etc.) is enough to make a creature a thinker, 
with its own point of view, its own reasons for doing things, and the ability to 
respond to and act on those reasons.  We should note that the fact that exhibiting 
patterns is a part of this conception of rationality makes this claim a little more 
palatable than it might otherwise have been.    
If someone responds to a reason, they must have the capacity to do so, and 
having this capacity can be exhibited by the person acting in accordance with that 
type of reason on more than one occasion.  On the other hand, if a person is as likely 
to act against a type of reason as in accordance with it on any particular occasion, 
then this casts doubt on the idea that they respond to these reasons even on those 
occasions where they do act in accordance with them.  For example, imagine a 
person moving chess pieces around a board.  If they always move their knight two 
squares along one axis and one square along the other, then we will be inclined to 
say that they are responding to the rule for how knights move in chess.  If they 
sometimes move their knight like this, but on other occasions move it in all sorts of 
different ways, we will be less inclined to say they are acting on the rule, even on 
those occasions when they do happen to get it right according to the rules of chess.   
 The fact that a person moves their knight in the right way on many occasions 
does not prove that they are responding to a rule, as is shown by an example from 
Child (1994).  Child imagines a case where a person appears to play chess extremely 
well, and we are initially inclined to attribute beliefs such as ‘my Queen is in danger’ 
and ‘it is worth sacrificing this pawn’ to her, which we then take her to use as 
reasons for her moves.  However, we then find out that she is looking up what 
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moves to make using some form of giant look-up table, and that when questioned 
she has no idea why the moves she makes are a good idea, nor even that what she is 
doing is playing a game.  This is a case in which we could attribute certain thoughts, 
and their attribution would be useful in certain ways, but such attributions would be, 
on reflection, unsuitable.  There is a pattern to what this woman is doing, and she 
often gets things right, but that is all there is: attributing thoughts about chess and 
how best to play it isn’t appropriate. 
However, in Child’s example other attributions of psychological states to the 
very same woman are appropriate, and we can argue that this is what really makes 
the initial attribution inappropriate.95  The case does not then show that a pattern 
where things are often right is insufficient for thought, but that the right 
interpretation of a subject can sometimes depend upon accounting for a broader 
pattern than we initially consider.  The idea that being minimally rational in the 
sense developed so far is enough to make a creature a thinker with its own reasons 
has not, then, been shown to be implausible. 
Nevertheless, some will find the claim that this conception of minimal 
rationality suffices for thought unintuitive.  They may therefore prefer to say that not 
just any pattern of the sort described so far suffices for thought, but that there is 
some interpretationist-friendly thing which could be added to the account to 
guarantee that anyone who satisfies it is a genuine thinker.  There are various 
suggestions for what must be added to such patterns in order to produce thought.  I 
will provide a survey of some of them, before suggesting that we do not need to 
choose between these various options. 
One possibility is to say that patterns which are in some ways suitable for 
intentional description may nevertheless fail to consist of genuine intentional states 
because of the rigid nature of the behaviour and apparent reasoning they involve.  
This sort of line is pursued by Bennett (1976).  Bennett suggests that the creature 
                                                     
95 Cf. the case of Christian from chapter 7, section 3. 
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with genuine beliefs and desires must exhibit two qualities:  educability and 
inquisitiveness.  The former involves the disposition to revise the patterns in which 
it forms its belief-candidate states (Bennett calls these registrations) in light of its past 
experience, while the latter involves a disposition to seek information.  This option 
promotes a plausible connection between rationality and the ability to learn.  It could 
also be revised to include other ways in which a pattern might be dynamic, for 
example displays of creative thought and new ideas are also popularly considered to 
have a connection with what is required for genuine thought.  Bennett gives 
behavioural conditions for being educable and inquisitive, and so these would be 
easy to fit into the interpretationist account. 
Another suggestion may be taken from Heal (2003).  Heal suggests that being 
rational involves a ‘grasp on the high level and general notion of there being better 
and worse in inferential transitions between thoughts’ (237)  which is displayed in 
‘effective engagement in a… practice… of asking about and assessing inferences or 
reasoning.’ (Ibid.)  In addition to this, Heal suggests that particular thinkers have an 
inferential outlook, shown in the actual transitions the thinker makes, as well as the 
examples of good and bad reasoning she would cite and any explicit theorising 
about reasoning.   
Heal says that we should see rationality ‘as a capacity, rather than a particular 
achievement.’ (237)  However, her account does require the rational being to achieve 
certain things: they must have a particular idea (of better and worse inferential 
transitions), display this idea by making a certain kind of progress, and also 
displaying something which looks a great deal like the feasibility orderings and 
patterns I suggested were important to thought in the previous chapter.  Heal is not 
arguing that rationality could be a mere capacity in the sense I said was problematic 
in section 1.  Rather, she rejects the ideas that a pattern could count as involving 
thought despite failing to develop over time, and that obeying any particular norms 
is necessary for rationality.  We have already rejected the second idea, and we can 
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incorporate the idea that rational patterns need to be dynamic in some way without 
giving up the idea that it is patterns that we are interested in (as with Bennett). 
The interpretationist could therefore appropriate Heal’s ideas, and say that in 
order to count as responding to reasons, and therefore as a thinker, a being must be 
interpretable as having the idea of better and worse transitions in thoughts.  They 
could then say, along with Heal, that 
 
To credit someone with the... ability to engage effectively in the practice of 
asking about and assessing reasons for forming beliefs and intentions... is in 
effect to credit that person with a capacity for coming to know at least 
something about this realm of norms.’ (239)  
 
Another suggestion is offered in Moran (1994).  He suggests that rather than 
merely being subject to norms of rationality, a subject must intend his behaviour and 
reasoning to conform to such norms.  It is this which he thinks allows us to say that 
 
Invoking rationality in the first place thus commits the interpreter to a notion 
of justification, which means justification from the standpoint of the agent and his 
thought, rather than from the standpoint of the explanation or the explainers.’ 
(1994: 168) 
 
From an interpretationist perspective, Moran’s suggestion then amounts to the idea 
that a candidate thinker must display a pattern of behaviour which allows us to 
attribute to them a particular kind of intention. 
Finally, Davidson also suggests that a particular mental state possessed by a 
creature is key to their being a thinker: he suggests that a thinker must grasp the 
distinction between how things seem and how they really are.   He describes this 
idea variously, saying for example that ‘Someone cannot have a belief unless he 
understands the possibility of being mistaken’ (1984: 170) and must ‘command… the 
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contrast between what is believed and what is the case.’ (2001:105)  Davidson links 
this to creatures having the idea of belief at their disposal, and claims that this idea 
can only be acquired and used by creatures that are in linguistic communication 
with others.  However some, such as Verheggen (1997), have suggested other 
circumstances in which one might gain and apply this idea, namely cases when past 
experience conflicts with present experience, or cases when the information from one 
sense modality conflicts with another.  
 The idea that Davidson suggests as necessary for thought seems to be 
connected to the ideas and thoughts which Heal and Moran pick out as important 
and the behaviours which Bennett sees as important: it is in light of the idea that 
there is an objective truth which one might be right or wrong about that the idea of 
better and worse ways of finding out about that truth, and the intention to use 
certain ways of finding out about it make sense. 
 
All of these proposals have some promise, and, as presented thus far, all also face 
some problems.  For example, one might worry that Bennett’s proposal 
unreasonably rules out the possibility of a thinker who already knows all that it 
needs to know or has the capacity to remember about its environment, and which is 
able to achieve all of its purposes using this information.  With respect to the second 
proposal, one might agree that the creature to whom we could attribute the thoughts 
and capacities mentioned by Heal would be an eminently suitable candidate for the 
title of ‘thinker’; however, one might worry that her requirements are too 
demanding to be necessary.  In particular, if thinkers must engage in a practice of 
asking about and assessing reasoning, then only language users can be thinkers.  
Although congenial to a few (such as Davidson), this constitutes a highly 
controversial claim which does not accord with ordinary usage of psychological 
terms.  
 Various thought experiments might be used to test these proposals, but 
different people have different intuitions about when and how widely we want to 
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apply the concept of thought, and will be attracted to different proposals as a result.  
I will suggest that a definitive choice between the options canvassed is in fact 
unnecessary. 
We might say that static patterns of behaviour which allow us to give a 
reasonably determinate interpretation of a creature (because it is possible to interpret 
the creature as getting a reasonable number of the necessary sorts of things right) are 
linked to a very basic notion of a point of view.  They are linked to the idea of a thing 
which can prosper or fail to prosper, and we can see such a being as having projects 
to promote and thoughts which guide its behaviour in the fulfilment of those 
projects. 
 Learning and creative thought are clearly related to the notions of rationality 
and responsiveness.  However, why should we insist that they ground even the most 
basic notions of responsiveness and perspective, rather than being important 
extensions of them?  We could instead conceive of them as adding something to the 
basic notion of a point of view by being part of a less basic (and perhaps also more 
important) notion.  Self-awareness and explicit consideration of norms constitute 
another major development to the notion of a point of view.  However, they seem 
too demanding to cover all that we seem to mean when we talk about thought. 
The task of showing that one of these proposals provides what we need in 
order to be justified in applying the concept of responsiveness to reasons holds little 
promise, in my opinion.  I suggest that this is instead a case where it is not 
appropriate to make a decision and say that one notion of rationality, and therefore 
thought, is the correct one to use, even given the caveat that we are talking to 
interpretationists.  Rather, there could be different potential notions of rationality 
and thought which are better for different purposes, and thus far it is unclear why 
any decision must be made between them.  
 This then brings us to the question of what the purposes of interpretation are, 
an issue which I address briefly in section 6. 
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6.  The purposes of interpretation 
 
Interpretation involves attributing reasons to a subject in an attempt to gain an 
understanding of how things look from their point of view.  But what is the purpose 
of this exercise?  According to Dennett, the intentional stance is just one of three 
stances that we might adopt in order to fulfil the same aims of prediction, 
explanation and control.  One of the other stances is the physical stance, the stance 
taken up by the scientist.  Dennett therefore seems to suggest that interpersonal 
interpretation has the same purpose as scientific theorising.   
This chimes with a traditional view of the purpose of folk psychology, taken 
for granted by some of its supporters and critics alike. 96  However, it has been 
challenged in recent literature.97  I do not have space for an in depth consideration of 
the potential purposes of interpretation, but will briefly consider what 
additional/alternative purposes it might have and how this might affect 
interpretationism by considering and extending Heal (2003)’s suggestions.  I will 
suggest that this provides a way to show the connection between the different 
potential notions of rationality and thought suggested in the previous section. 
 
Having rejected the idea that our interactions with people are of the same basic kind 
as our interactions with inanimate objects, Heal (2003) suggests that interpretation 
may underpin kinds of interaction between people which were overlooked or 
distorted on the account which saw interpretation theory as having the same role as 
science.  She suggests that such interactions are many and various, but picks out two 
as particularly important: inviting and participating in joint consideration of a topic, 
and dealing with disagreement and excuse.  The first is supposed to make sense 
precisely in light of the idea that oneself and others are responsive to norms, while 
                                                     
96 In addition to Dennett (1987), see Churchland (1981) and (1991), Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997), and 
Jackson and Pettit (1993) for examples. 
97 See Heal (2003), Morton (2003) and Knobe (2003) and (2006) for some examples. 
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the second involves an attempt to find an account where although a person has 
made an error, arriving at that error nevertheless makes sense, and was an exercise 
of rationality.  In light of such examples, Heal claims 
 
Other people are not devices which we try to operate, endeavouring to cause 
them to do this or that useful manoeuvre.  Rather they are fellow human 
beings with whom we talk, with whom we cooperate on shared projects, from 
whom we ask help when we are muddled and with whom we seek to forge a 
jointly created and growing understanding. (245) 
 
The enterprises above could perhaps be redescribed in terms of the language of 
prediction and control.  However, the idea is that this would be a misleading, less 
helpful way to describe them.  There is an analogy here with the way in which any 
action can be redescribed to accord with a thesis of universal egoism.  Even if such 
redescriptions are possible, they introduce unnecessary complications or threaten to 
make the thesis vacuous. 
The interactions Heal mentions seem important, and she explicitly says they 
don’t exhaust the field.  However, it is noticeable that both of her examples seem 
particularly at home among language users.  We might therefore try to mitigate the 
impression that Heal’s proposal applies only to the interpretation of language users 
by giving a more general statement of the proposal.  For example, we might say that 
the purpose of interpretation is that the interpreter take up the point of view of the 
subject, with the result that additional interactions, projects and relationships 
become possible. 
The taking up of another’s point of view may be realised to very different 
degrees.  In particular, our ability to take up another’s point of view is affected by 
the difference between our knowledge and capacities and those of the subject.  A 
particular problem therefore arises with non-linguistic creatures.  The sorts of words 
and sentences we are inclined to use to state the content of psychological states are 
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those which we use to describe our own mental states, and the world as we see it 
from our point of view.  They gain their meaning by the place they have in our 
languages and lives, and as a result imply more than we want them to when we 
apply them to non-linguistic creatures.  However, we may see the degree to which 
we can take up another’s point of view as partly a function of the strength of the 
notion of a point of view that is appropriate to the creature in question.  Even if the 
psychological ascriptions we can give in our language are not completely 
appropriate in all cases, they may still capture something important, and enable the 
fulfilment of purposes that are important to us.  The fact that they do so is shown by 
the way applying them satisfies the second component of the condition above: 
certain interactions, projects, etc. do become possible only when we conceive of 
certain non-linguistic animals as a variety of thinker.  It is perhaps the suggestion 
that new relationships become possible through interpretation which differentiates 
its purposes most clearly from those which can be achieved by doing science alone.   
The interpretation of non-linguistic creatures is discussed further in the next 
chapter, where I argue that although we can attribute thoughts to them, the sorts of 
thoughts we can attribute may be limited in interesting ways.  The interpretation of 
beings who are different from us in other ways, including those who are much more 
intelligent than us, is also an important issue.  It is broached briefly in chapter 12. 
 
There is another way in which the consideration of the purposes of interpretation 
may be useful to the interpretationist: it might be used to further develop his account 
of when the ascription of thought is appropriate.  Given the suggestions of this 
section, we might argue that Dennett is correct that it is what you could gain from 
using the intentional stance that makes it appropriate to use in a particular case.98  
However, we might say that what you gain is not what Dennett suggests.  When the 
intentional stance is truly appropriate, you do not gain an ability to explain and 
                                                     
98 See his (1989) especially p. 22-27. 
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predict which you could also get by using the physical stance if you were smarter.  
You gain something, and make possible projects, that are not available from any 
other perspective.  Further discussion of the purposes of interpretation, then, may 
place extra constraints on what counts as a thinker.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
Something like Cherniak’s account of minimal rationality appears to combine 
elements from both the Standard Picture and the Consequentialist picture to provide 
a conception which makes rationality obtainable for ordinary humans, and which 
could be useful in interpretation.  This notion requires the rational creature to exhibit 
some achievements (they must get some things right, and they must display some 
pattern in reasoning) and it provides the basis for an interpretationist account of 
rationality. 
 Whether more should be added to this account of rationality is to some extent 
a matter of taste.  I propose that there are a group of notions of rationality in the area, 
with the one which adds nothing further connecting to a very basic notion of 
thought and the idea of a point of view, while others connect to more substantial 
versions of these notions.  These notions of thought and rationality are connected by 
their relationship to a central purpose of interpretation: taking up the point of view 
of a subject, with the result that additional interactions, projects and relationships 
become possible.  More elaborate interactions, projects and relationships of course 
become possible as we ascend to more complex notions of a point of view and of 
thought. 
 There are various ways in which the account presented in this chapter 
requires further development.  However, I hope that it provides the framework for a 
more detailed interpretationist picture of rationality.  The theory presented so far has 
also enabled us to answer the challenge that human limitations and the results of the 
heuristics and biases program pose for the Rationality Claim, and in the next chapter 
203 
 
I argue that it allows us to say something about the interpretation of thoughts that 
seem to have little to do with rationality. 
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Chapter 11 – Non-Rational Thought 
 
In this thesis, I have presented interpretation as a scheme for gaining a particular 
sort of understanding of others.  This form of understanding has involved making 
sense of  another, attributing reasons and responses to those reasons, seeing how 
things look from another point of view and working out why actions made sense 
from that point of view.  I have claimed that through this process we can attribute 
intentional states to others, and that it is within this scheme that thoughts belong. 
 In Part III, I have also argued that this process allows us to attribute instances 
of what, on some understandings of the term, we might call irrationalities.  We can 
attribute thoughts to creatures even though those thoughts involve one-off mistakes 
in reasoning, systematic mistakes in reasoning, and even purposeful employment of 
logically invalid procedures for coming to conclusions.  The idea was that as long as 
a creature displayed patterns in its reasoning, and got enough of the right sort of 
things right with respect to each thought, we would be able to identify the thoughts.  
For example, take Nick’s mistaken conclusion that he has glandular fever in chapter 
10.  He made a mistake in inferring it from the beliefs that his glands are swollen and 
that glandular fever includes swollen glands.  But suppose he then decided on the 
basis of the unfounded belief to look up treatments for glandular fever on the 
internet, as a result of a very sensible chain of thoughts.  This may then be one of the 
things that lead us to attribute to him the belief that he has glandular fever, even 
when we cannot see it as the outcome of a valid argument on his part. 
 But perhaps the focus on reasons will engender a feeling of unease.  All the 
thoughts we have looked at in this part of the thesis have been thoughts involved in 
traditionally rational kinds of thought processes: in trains of reasoning, both 
theoretical and practical.  However, these are not the only kinds of thoughts we have: 
not all of our mental life consists of a kind of argumentation.  What then should we 
say about other kinds of thoughts: is there a problem in determining their content, 
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because the Rationality Claim which is supposed to help us determine content has 
nothing to do with them?  Has the focus on reasons and rationality created a theory 
which leaves out a great swathe of our thinking? 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to consider two kinds of thought (dream thoughts 
and imaginings) and one kind of thinking (associative thinking) which do not seem 
to have very much to do with reason, and to suggest how these can be fitted into the 
suggested scheme of interpretation.   
 Section 1 introduces the issue above as a second problem with dreams.  I 
suggest that dreams may involve imaginings, but in section 2 I suggest that this 
merely widens the scope of the problem.  I consider and reject an account which tries 
to connect imaginings and rationality by seeing all imaginings as a kind of 
intentional action, done for reasons.  It is more plausible to suppose that some 
imaginings are produced through a different process: association, discussed in 
section 3. 
 In section 4, I present an account which allows us to identify and attribute 
these problematic thoughts to any language-user.  Section 5 then discusses whether 
such thoughts can also be attributed to creatures without language, and suggests 
that some can, although they will be less complicated and may also exhibit greater 
indeterminacy.  Finally, section 6 admits that my account makes interpretation 
explanatorily incomplete.  I explore the nature of this incompleteness, and use it to 
outline the relationship I believe the interpretationist should posit between 
interpretation and science. 
 
1.  Another problem with dreams 
 
In chapter 4, the problem identified with dreams was that they seemed to be hidden 
from interpreters.  They pose another problem as well: they are notoriously weird.  
Sometimes they are incoherent with what we ordinarily take ourselves to think, and 
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sometimes incoherent even within themselves.  Alternatively, while not actually 
incoherent, they can seem strangely disconnected from the rest of our mental life, or 
from other parts of the same dream.  Some have even characterised dreaming as a 
kind of madness.99 
Sceptical arguments sometimes proceed from the idea that one believes things 
that are false while dreaming.  If this idea is correct, then dreams also include beliefs 
which are inconsistent with our occurrent, waking beliefs and with standing beliefs 
which we might suppose to persist during sleep.  Such dream beliefs are also usually 
false and disengaged from our usual belief forming strategies. 
Perhaps the problem would be easier to deal with if we could at least reject 
the idea that dreams involve beliefs.  We could suggest instead that they are only 
cases of imagination.  This is not a new idea: it is suggested in Walton (1990), and 
explored in some detail by Sosa (2005) for the purpose of defeating scepticism.   
However, if this suggestion is to help the interpretationist, we must be able to give 
an interpretationist account of imagining.  Otherwise, we have merely identified 
another problem for interpretationism.  And indeed, imagining does seem to be 
another sort of mental state which has little to do with rationality. 
 
2.  Imagination 
 
Very little has been said about imagining by interpretationists.  This seems a 
significant oversight, since imagining sometimes involves intentional states, and 
seems to be importantly different from the sorts of states interpretationists have 
focused on, namely those which play the biggest role in reasoning.  For example, we 
may compare imagining with belief:  belief is supposed to be somehow constrained 
by what is true about the world; its formation is supposed to be regulated by 
principles; and it usually has effects on action.  Imagining, in contrast, seems 
                                                     
99 See Hobson (2005), chapter 7. 
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remarkably free, and although we may act out what we imagine, we can imagine 
without doing so.  Indeed, according to Hume, ‘Nothing is more free than the 
imagination of man’. (2007: 47)  It may therefore seem as if imaginings have nothing 
to do with rationality. 
However, Hume’s conception of human freedom does not involve the 
possibility of doing absolutely anything, regardless of whether or not you have any 
desire or reason to do it.  Rather, Hume thinks that a person is free when they are 
able to control what they do in accordance with what they want.  This suggests a 
way of explaining the freedom of the imagination without saying that imaginings 
fall under no rational constraints whatsoever: imagining can be free and done for a 
purpose.   In the rest of this section, I consider this proposal, but argue that it does 
not give a plausible account of all imaginings. 
One obvious purpose of imagining is wish fulfilment, but there are many 
other candidates as well.  Kendall Walton suggests the following purposes for 
waking make-believe: ‘[it] provides practice in roles one might someday assume in 
real life… it helps one to understand and sympathise with others… it enables one to 
come to grips with one’s own feelings… it broadens one’s perspectives.’ (1990: 12)  
We could add more: that we might imagine to crystallise for ourselves what we want 
to achieve, or equally what we want to avoid, or to fix things more securely in our 
memory, to escape from our current situation, or simply for pleasure.  If they are 
explained in this way, neither imaginings in general, nor the thoughts which occur 
within dreams, need to be seen as irrational or disconnected from reasoning. 
A striking feature of this account is that it proposes to characterise imagining 
as an intentional action, apparently done in accordance with beliefs and desires.  
This seems plausible for some cases of waking, purposeful imagining.  For example, 
it seems reasonable to explain a day dream in the following way: Nathan is bored, 
and desires to alleviate this boredom.  He believes that imagining being a superhero 
and swooping in to catch Amanda as she falls from a tall building will be 
pleasurable.  He therefore performs this imaginative exercise.   
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However, other cases of imagining are more resistant to this sort of treatment.  
Dreams provide one difficult case: if dreams include imaginings, then on this 
account they need to be at least partly composed through intentional actions.  But it 
seems far more problematic to posit beliefs and desires about how to achieve ends 
through dreaming, and so to say that genuine agency is involved in the production 
of dreams.  Many cases of waking imaginings also resist this sort of treatment: 
instances of imagining often seem to be quite spontaneous, their content unexpected, 
and their effects predictably unhelpful.  Consider for example the person who stands 
on the edge of a cliff, and who engages in a sudden and detailed imagining of 
deciding to step over the edge, which makes them feel frightened and dizzy. 
Although I borrowed from Walton in suggesting the purposes that a person 
might have in imagining certain things, Walton himself does not posit the purposes 
he mentions as purposes of the imaginer.  When he says that children’s make-believe 
games help them to prepare for assuming roles in later life, he is not saying that 
children have any beliefs about what will prepare them for their future.  The 
suggestion is certainly not that children explicitly plan such games.  Indeed, it seems 
very plausible that it is unnecessary for children to think explicitly about their future 
in order to play, and that they might not be able to say why they were playing 
particular make-believe games even if we asked them.  I think that we should agree 
with Walton on this, and that we should also say that adults who use their 
imaginations need not have particular purposes in mind when they do so.  This 
means that we should not see all imaginings as intentional actions, and so should not 
connect them to rationality in that way. 
Perhaps, however, we can still see imaginings as the result of reasoning if, 
rather than saying that creatures have conscious purposes in imagining, we attribute 
unconscious purposes to them.  So, for example, we might say that the man who 
imagines deciding to step over the edge of the cliff must have an unconscious death 
wish, and we might posit other unconscious states to explain the content of dreams.  
We would then also need to say that such states were difficult to access and 
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influence (at least in many cases, including the case of those thoughts which cause 
dreams).   This takes us into murky waters involving issues in the philosophy of 
psychoanalysis.  Positing such unconscious thoughts and chains of reasoning is quite 
a drastic step, and I will argue that it turns out to be unnecessary in order to solve 
the problems of this chapter.100  
Instead of positing unconscious desires to explain dreams and some 
imaginings, many would feel happier saying that dream thoughts and imaginings 
can be produced through a process of association.  This process is the subject of the 
next section. 
 
3.  Association 
 
In cases of association, one thought appears to cause another, but the first is not a 
reason for the second.  An example would be if I were to think ‘Herbert Hoover was 
very unfortunate to become president when he did’, and because of this my next 
thought was, ‘I need to vacuum the sitting room.’  It seems clear how a process of 
association might produce many of the features of dreams, and Hobson suggests 
that association plays an important role in determining the content of dreams in his 
Dreaming: A Very Short Introduction (2005).101   
As the example shows, it is not only dream thoughts and imaginings which 
may be produced through association.  We may therefore worry that association 
widens the scope of our problem even further, to cover even more thoughts.  
However, this worry is unjustified.  Although the belief about needing to vacuum 
the sitting room is caused to occur at the time that it does by another belief which 
isn’t a reason for it, it is nevertheless also caused by other thoughts that are reasons 
for it (a memory of what my sitting room carpet looks like, and a desire for it to look 
cleaner).  It may also go on to have rational downstream connections to an intention 
                                                     
100 There might be other good reasons for positing such states, but I will not discuss them here.   
101 See, for example, p22. 
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to vacuum the sitting room when I get home, and the action of doing so.  We don’t 
get a ‘rational’ explanation of when the thought occurred, but otherwise it does fit 
nicely into the project of making sense of another into terms of reasons. 
Thus the problem, of thoughts with intentional content which nevertheless 
seem disconnected from reasoning, does not seem to spread to all thoughts 
produced through association.  But imaginings and many of the thoughts within 
dreams remain a problem.  If they are indeed produced through association, and 
they need not possess other either upstream or downstream ‘rational’ connections, 
then it is hard to see how they can fit into the scheme of interpretation that I have 
proposed.  To solve the problem, we must return to an argument that I gave in 
chapter 10, section 1. 
In chapter 10, I argued that the interpretationist should conceive of rationality 
as involving achievements.  However, I argued for this by looking specifically at the 
case of belief, citing a conceptual difficulty in conceiving of a belief which had 
neither the right upstream nor downstream connections to other thoughts.  I 
suggested that beliefs just aren’t the sort of thing which you can have, but not have 
formed appropriately nor use to guide your thought and action even when you can 
and should do so.  We must now question whether these sorts of considerations 
apply to all thoughts. 
 
4.  Verbal reports 
 
Imaginings, entertainings and so forth do not seem to have the same strong 
connection to the norms of rationality as do beliefs.  This has been presented as a 
problem for the interpretationist who wishes to fit them into his theory.  However, it 
also suggests that such thoughts may not be vulnerable to the argument from 
chapter 10.  For such thoughts, then, we have no argument for the necessity of actual 
rational connections to other thoughts.  Even in the case of beliefs, the argument 
relies on the premise that there will be occasions when the belief should make a 
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difference to one’s other thoughts and actions.  This seems extremely plausible for 
many beliefs, but perhaps it is not plausible for all of them.  If beliefs do occur within 
dreams, then these seem good candidates for beliefs which one never has occasion to 
connect with other thoughts in a rational way. 
 Thus, in the case of the thoughts in question, the focus on actual achievement 
in the domain of rationality seems less important.  A mere capacity or disposition to 
employ such thoughts as part of a rational pattern of thought and action may be 
sufficient here.  Still, we need to show how such thoughts can be fitted in to the 
project of making sense of another creature, and how this can allow the 
interpretationist to account for their content. 
 The suggestion of this section is that we return to some of the ideas presented 
in chapter 4.  There, I argued that the possibility of a dream resulting in a dream 
report was enough to make dreams interpretable.  This possibility can also help us to 
understand how the attribution of dreams may fit into the project of interpretation. 
 If a person reports a dream, imagining or other thought produced through 
association, the interpretation of the thought in question will then have a place in the 
overall project of interpreting the whole person, just because the report occurs in a 
language which can only be interpreted due to many interactions with and 
observations of the person in question.  A variety of actual connections between 
thoughts then remain important: namely the relationships between thoughts which 
can be expressed using the same words and which involve the same (at least basic) 
concepts.  For example, on this account you could not have a person who only had 
thoughts about their village and the people in it while awake, but then had a dream 
which involved thoughts about quarks.  This must be impossible because, due to the 
fact that there is no connection between what his dream is about and what his 
waking thoughts are about, the interpreter who knew his language from interpreting 
his waking behaviour would have no chance of interpreting a report of his dream.102   
                                                     
102 The proposal therefore endorses the importance of the relationships between thoughts picked out 
as important by type C holists (see chapter 4). 
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Reasons also remain important on this view: the thoughts in question are 
counted as having a certain content due to their potential to result in reports, which 
may be seen as caused by a belief (formed in whatever way we find out about our 
own thoughts) and a desire to communicate this.  Reasons also still play an essential 
role in the interpretation of the whole person and their language. 
 This account suggests that dreams are importantly dependent upon the 
existence of certain waking thoughts and actions.  Dreams can count as thoughts 
only because of the role they play in a system which includes uncontroversially 
accessible and rational mental states.  Both dream thoughts and the other thoughts 
discussed in this chapter depend upon thoughts which stand in canonically rational 
relationships to one another.103   
 Given this account, the thoughts being considered in this chapter can fit into 
the project of making sense of another creature, and we can give an interpretationist 
account of why they count as the mental states that they do, without needing to posit 
unconscious states which can provide reasons for them.  This does not mean there is 
no reason to posit such states; it merely removes one reason for doing so. 
 
5.  Non-linguistic creatures 
 
I have argued that although dreams and imaginings may seem to have nothing to do 
with rationality, the connection the interpretationist needs between these thoughts 
and rationality can be found due to the potential for thinkers to report such thoughts.  
But what about creatures which cannot give such reports, because they do not have a 
language?  Must the interpretationist say that such creatures (including some 
humans) cannot have thoughts during dreams, nor imagine certain things?  This 
                                                     
103 Although this need not be a one-way dependence: one could hold a position according to which 
there was some sort of mutual dependence, perhaps because thoughts produced by association 
provide necessary material for the canonically rational processes to work upon, or form part of the 
canonically rational thoughts.  
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may seem particularly implausible in light of the fact that all mammals show brain 
activation during sleep, and young mammals, including pre-linguistic humans, 
exhibit the bodily signs which, in human adults, we might take to be signs of 
dreaming, such as movements and facial expressions.104   
I will start with the issue of dreams.  Initially, there seem to be two potential 
interpretationist-friendly replies to this problem: that languageless creatures do not 
have dream thoughts, but might have other, non-intentional mental states while 
sleeping; or that languageless creatures can have dream thoughts, but that these are 
massively indeterminate.  I outline each, but do not decide between them.  I then 
suggest that the situation is a little better in the case of waking imaginings, but that 
we must admit that the imaginings of languageless creatures are more restricted and 
less determinate than the imaginings of those with language. 
 
The first reply to the issue about animal dreams calls on the fact that, as outlined in 
Part I, the interpretationism I am interested in is an account of thought content, not 
an account of all aspects of the mental.  The kind of interpretationism that I am 
interested in therefore does not need to say that, in languageless creatures, brain 
activity, movements and facial expressions during sleep do not correspond to any 
kind of mental activity.  They may allow that such creatures can have a kind of 
experience during sleep, and can have emotions, depending on the accounts they 
want to give of such states.  However, they might say that the kinds of states that 
they are most interested in (those I have been calling thoughts, and which have 
intentional content) are ruled out because they could not possess the rational 
connections to other thoughts, the environment and action the possibility of which is 
required for belief.  They would then say that non-linguistic or pre-linguistic 
creatures may experience states related to our dreams, but that the interpretationist 
                                                     
104 Hobson (2005: 65-6). 
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shouldn’t attribute to them all the features that our dreams can have, including the 
features with which he is most concerned. 
Alternatively, the interpretationist could say that languageless creatures can 
have thoughts during sleep, and that these have the content they do because of their 
connections to the creature’s previously experienced environment and movements 
during sleep.  However, they will at least sometimes have to say that these thoughts 
are highly indeterminate.  How indeterminate a creature’s dream thoughts will be 
depends on how different the creature’s patterns of behaviour are in different 
situations (the more differentiated the creature’s waking responses to different 
situations, the more thoughts we can differentiate between on the basis of 
movements during sleep).  Still, for any creature without a language, it seems likely 
that their dream thoughts cannot be as determinate as those of a creature which does 
have a language and can report on their dreams, nor even as determinate as many of 
the thoughts we can attribute to it during its waking life.  Perhaps they will be so 
indeterminate we would prefer to refrain from counting them as thoughts at all, in 
which case this second option collapses into the first.  Or perhaps this will only 
sometimes be the case, in which case we should give different answers for different 
creatures, depending on the richness of their behavioural repertoire.105 
Next, consider wakeful imaginings.  Potential rational connections may 
certainly exist between wakeful imaginings and actions other than self-reporting, for 
example in the case where one acts out the things one is imagining during play.  In 
such cases, there is more for the interpreter to go on than in the case of dreams, 
                                                     
105 The choice between these two options, if such there be, will also be connected to an issue raised, 
but not decided, in chapter 3, section 4: the issue of the weight we should give to sleep behaviour as 
additional criteria (on top of dream reports) for the application of our concept of dreaming.  If we say 
that sleep behaviour has as much weight as dream reports in a decision on whether to apply the 
concept of dreaming, and that this is sufficient for the application of the concept, then I think we 
should go with the second option.  On the other hand, if we decide that sleep behaviour could count 
as evidence, but never conclusive evidence of dream thought, then the first option would be more 
appropriate.  As in chapter 3, I won’t decide between these two options. 
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because the creature will be able to exhibit a greater range of behaviour, and will be 
able to interact more with their environment as part of the exercise.  In such cases, 
the second suggested response to dreams seems appropriate: we may say that we 
can attribute thoughts, but that they will probably always be less determinate (and 
also less complicated) than the wakeful imaginings that language users can have, 
and may also be less determinate than some of that same creature’s other thoughts. 
 
As I suggested in chapter 10, I once again conclude that the words we use to describe 
the mental states of languageless creatures are in some ways inappropriate, because 
their primary place is within our practices of describing our own thoughts and those 
of other humans.  Still, they capture something important; a similarity between 
ourselves and languageless creatures, and thereby underpin the possibility of new 
interactions, such as playing together. 
I do not think that we need to say that all imaginative states are ruled out for 
creatures without a language.  However, such states are certainly limited by the sorts 
of things that can be shown through the actions of the creature.  For example, we 
almost certainly have to deny that an orangutan could make up certain sorts of story, 
which included the thoughts of protagonists etc.  However, this doesn’t seem 
unreasonable.  Putting restrictions on the thoughts said to be possible without 
language is not an unusual commitment even well outside interpretationist circles.
  
6.  Explanatory incompleteness  
 
I have shown how states such as dream thoughts and imaginings can be linked to 
rationality as I have characterised it.  The connections picked out as important are 
sometimes only potential, and they are downstream of the thought in question.  This 
latter feature in particular has an important consequence: it means that I have not 
shown that we can explain such states in the way appropriate to our scheme of 
interpretation.  On the account I have given, there need be no reason attributable to 
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the person, nor feature of thought in general, which tells us why a person had the 
particular dream, or made up the particular story, that he or she did.  There is 
therefore a kind of explanatory incompleteness to the view of thought and 
interpretation that I am offering.  
 This brings us to an issue about the explanatory ambitions of interpretation.  
Consider the following distinction, offered in Gardner (1993): 
 
On the Complete view, ordinary psychology is committed to there being in 
principle a full explanation in its own terms, or in terms congenial to it, for the 
psychological states that it cites as the proximal causes of action.  On the 
Limited view, by contrast, ordinary psychology leaves undecided, and is 
indifferent to the existence of, explanation beyond a certain distance from its 
immediate point of application. (1993: 33) 
 
The distinction is introduced in the context of a discussion about how to explain the 
traditional problems of irrationality, such as self-deception, and Gardner’s main 
concern is arguing that an acceptable account of such irrationalities must allow us to 
explain, in particular cases and in terms congenial to ordinary psychology, why a 
person’s thoughts take an irrational rather than a rational path.  I have not been 
concerned with these forms of irrationality, and will not discuss them in this thesis.  
Nevertheless, one might try to import Gardner’s distinction into the discussion of 
this chapter. 
By allowing that certain states can be genuine thoughts and causes of action, 
even though they are not susceptible to ordinary psychological explanation, my 
account rejects the Complete view.  It does not, however, thereby endorse the 
Limited view: it is not indifferent to any such explanations beyond a given point.  
Rather, it allows some unexplainable thoughts as long as they take place in the 
context of many explainable ones, and the question of how a state was caused and 
can be explained plays at least some role in the account of what sort of state it is.  If 
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we import Gardner’s distinction into our context, it therefore presents a false 
dichotomy.   
 
There is a second feature of my account of interpretation which might be referred to 
as explanatory incompleteness: interpretation certainly does not tell us how a 
process such as association works.  Such questions seem perfectly sensible, and they 
also seem to require something other than the sort of response one gets through our 
ordinary practices of interpretation. 
 Although this is a recognition of a kind of incompleteness, it is not the sort of 
incompleteness which worries someone like Gardner: he calls these mere ‘nominal 
gaps in ordinary psychological explanation’ (1993: 227) and says that ‘they do not 
betoken a missing piece in the pattern of personal understanding; ordinary 
psychology regards memory and powers of recognition as a level of given 
competences.’ (Ibid.) 
 I argue that, first, this does not mean that interpretation and interpretationism 
have nothing to say about such processes; second, it suggests the form of the 
relationship between scientific study of the mind and ordinary interpretation; and 
third, that we can also allow a kind of scientific explanation of the content of mental 
states. 
 First, although everyday interpersonal interpretation does not aim to given an 
account of how certain mental processes work, it is involved in determining what 
counts as a given kind of process.  To take the example of association, our scheme of 
interpretation demands that such a process result in thoughts which are caused by 
other thoughts which do not count as reasons for them, but which possess some sort 
of connection (from the point of view of the creature) to the thought produced. 
 In addition, we should recall that interpretation proceeds (according to 
chapter 10) through the identification of patterns in reasoning.  This includes 
measures of feasibility for a given creature for retrieving useful material from 
memory in certain situations, and also feasibility of holding certain amounts of 
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information together for consideration.  Interpretation could also include picking out 
patterns in a creature’s exercises of its associative powers.  It is unclear whether 
recognition of such patterns could actually be necessary for interpretation.  I will not 
try to resolve this issue, but maintain the claim that interpretation can allow us to 
describe the surface contours of a process like association in a given creature.   
 Interpretation, and therefore interpretationism, may therefore have something 
to say about mental processes like association.  However, there are plenty of things 
about the realisation of such processes about which interpretation tells us nothing.  
There can clearly be scientific investigation of how such processes work and why 
they occur in us, and these may form a part of a scientific account of how thought is 
(at least usually) realised in a given species.  Branches of science may also tell us how 
we humans came to have minds, and why this process resulted in us having the 
sorts of minds that we have.  This might well include explanations about how we 
came to be prone to certain sorts of mistakes (like those discovered in the heuristics 
and biases program) and irrationalities (such as the traditional problems of 
irrationality).  There may also be scientific explanations concerning the minds of 
particular people: different humans are more prone to certain kinds of thought than 
others, and we may discover explanations for why some find it more difficult to 
perform abstract thinking and others are prone to depression etc. 
 Ultimately, I think we should allow that there can be scientific explanations of 
why people have the particular thoughts that they do.  For example, the contents of 
states produced through association are determined by rational connections, but 
they are not explained by those rational connections, as I explained earlier.  It seems 
plausible to me that such explanations just aren’t available for these states.  But 
another sort of explanation, the sort given by science, may be available (although of 
course interpretationism in no way depends on or guarantees this).  Even the content 
of a mental state may be explained in this way: sometimes evolutionary explanations 
seem to do just this.  For example, we might suggest that thinking about eating the 
red sweets led Harry, through a process of association, to think about the time he ate 
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some red berries and was then violently sick, because connecting instances of new 
food consumption according to such similarities was evolutionarily useful to our 
ancestors.  This is a genuine explanation of a particular thought with a particular 
content.  It is just not the sort of explanation which directly determines what sort of 
thought the thought in question is.  There will be another, compatible explanation of 
that which calls on a particular way of making sense of Harry as an agent with 
reasons and on the sort of evidence which could be available to ordinary interpreters. 
 
I take interpretationism, then, to say that scientific investigation has the potential to 
tell us very interesting things about human minds in general, the minds of particular 
people, and particular thoughts.  It just doesn’t get to make pronouncements on the 
nature of thought in general, nor which of our mental concepts to apply in a given 
case.  This is what gives our beliefs about thought the protection from refutation that 
we wanted in chapter 1, section 3.1. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The process of interpretation that I have described through Part III does allow us to 
attribute dream thoughts (perhaps including beliefs), imaginative states and 
thoughts formed through association to thinkers.  Moreover, consideration of this 
issue has helped us to clarify the differences between the interpretation of and the 
thoughts attributed to language users and languageless creatures, and to say 
something about the explanatory ambitions of interpretation. 
 
There are a great many questions about the process of interpretation remaining.  
Notably, I have not considered the interpretation of certain kinds of irrationality, 
including the traditional problems of irrationality and some of the thoughts which 
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occur during mental illness;106 I have not established whether there are some kinds of 
irrationality which the interpretationist cannot countenance; and I have not 
established whether the interpretationist needs to posit unconscious mental states. 
 However, the account of rationality and interpretation developed in this 
thesis provides a framework for the consideration of these interesting issues, and I 
think that it should form the basis of any interpretationist account. 
  
                                                     
106 The idea that these may cause problems for interpretationism can be found in Gerrans (2004) and 
Bortolotti (2005). 
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Are there particular sorts of internal organisation which a being must have in order to 
count as a thinker? 
 
PART IV: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In chapter 1 considered the following question: 
 
 
 
 
I then offered three reasons why one might find the answer ‘No’ attractive.  I have 
tried to develop interpretationism with these reasons in mind.   
In chapter 12, I consider whether the theory presented in this thesis does 
exhibit the positive features that a position in the ‘No’ camp is supposed to have.  
There are complicated issues here, which cannot be treated fully in a concluding 
section.  I aim to make it plausible that the interpretationism developed does exhibit 
several positive features in this area, and to indicate the shape of some future 
discussions.  The conclusion will be that further development of interpretationism 
looks fruitful. 
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Chapter 12 – Fulfilling the Promises 
 
In chapter 1, I suggested that positions in the ‘No’ camp would find it easier to meet 
certain conditions than positions in the ‘Yes’ camp.  It would be far too large a task 
to compare how interpretationism fares on these issues in comparison with the large 
range of ‘Yes’ camp theories.  Here, therefore, consideration is confined to whether 
interpretationism does appear compatible with the origins and uses of our 
psychological concepts (section 1); what protection it gives to our beliefs about 
minds (section 2); and whether it allows us to avoid chauvinism (section 3).   
 
1. Origins and uses of psychological concepts 
 
The first issue to consider is whether interpretationism fits with the ways we learn to 
use psychological concepts and how we typically go about attributing psychological 
states.  There are certainly things to be said in interpretationism’s favour here.  First, 
it focuses on behaviour, which is definitely vital to us in learning to use 
psychological concepts and central in our application of them.  Second, it draws 
attention to some plausibly distinctive uses of psychological concepts and to a 
distinctive sort of understanding that is involved in employing them (chapter 10, 
section 6).   By doing this, it focuses our attention on the things which are most 
important to us about the creatures to which we want to apply such concepts, such 
as the sorts of interactions and relationships that are possible with them.  However, 
under this heading we must also consider an issue flagged in chapter 2, section 2: 
that of the relationship between the method of interpretation invoked by 
interpretationism and our real methods of finding out about other people’s thoughts.   
 The conclusions of this thesis so far have put us in a better position to address 
this question, because they have provided more details about what is involved in the 
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method called on by interpretationism.  In particular, we have refined our 
understanding of the sort of evidence that is relevant to the interpretation in 
interpretationism, and of what it means to use the assumption that a creature is 
rational in this context.  This puts us in a better position to work out if this is a 
process of interpretation that we use, or how it relates to the process we use.   
I hope that the process of interpretation that I have described through the 
thesis sounds familiar, and seems to be a method that we do, at least sometimes, 
engage in.  If so, this will help us to say that the process described is of relevance in 
understanding our method and answering philosophical questions about our beliefs 
about minds. 
Another point in favour of there being a close and illuminating relationship 
between the interpretation of interpretationism and our real method is that I have 
avoided at least some of the idealisations of our method that would have ignored 
important human limitations.  For example, in chapter 3 I emphasised that the 
important process of interpretation must not depend on information which couldn’t 
be available to the ordinary interpreter.  There is, however, a topic in this area which 
has received comparatively little discussion; namely how, given behaviour and 
environment, plus the assumption of rationality and perhaps other constraints, the 
interpreter reaches the best assignment of thoughts to their subject.  Here, we might 
ask whether interpretationism takes the process to involve generating some large 
number of interpretations, and then whittling them down through further testing 
and the application of various desiderata.  I have sometimes described interpretation 
as if this is involved.  Depending on how many hypotheses have to be generated, 
this may be a process the ordinary interpreter could not complete, and therefore a 
significant idealisation.  Alternatively, we might suppose that interpretationism 
should say that the process either must or could involve starting with an assumption 
of a very high degree of similarity between interpreter and subject, and then 
retreating from that assumption gradually if problems in interpretation arise.  This 
possibility is suggested in Moran (1994), and suggests a process that may be more 
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feasible for real interpreters.  Future investigation should consider this issue, and 
weigh its significance. 
 Two further avenues for future research on this issue could include 
comparisons with explanations of other skills and information gathering strategies, 
such as motor skills and ordinary ways of finding out about our environments, and 
an investigation of the general idea of a rational reconstruction.   
 
The question of the precise relationship between the process invoked by 
interpretationism and the way we really find out about other people’s thoughts has 
not been answered, then.  However, there are features of interpretationism which 
suggest a close relationship between the two, and the discussions in this thesis go 
some way towards making an investigation of the question more tractable. 
 
2.  Knowledge of minds  
 
Suppose that we can develop a good theory about the relationship between the 
interpretation in interpretationism and our everyday practices.  We should then 
move on to how interpretationism affects our epistemology. 
In chapter 1, section 3.1 I considered two sceptical worries: the traditional 
problem of other minds, which questions how we can know that others have minds 
and what they are thinking and the problem posed by eliminative materialism, 
which claimed that many of our central beliefs about the mind (both about general 
features of minds and about our own and others’ minds) might turn out to be false, 
and that our psychological concepts might turn out not to refer to anything.  I will 
take these in reverse order. 
 
If being interpretable is sufficient for thinking (and being interpretable as thinking 
particular thoughts is sufficient for thinking those thoughts) then eliminativism 
doesn’t get a foothold.  It doesn’t matter what is going on inside our heads, or what 
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neuroscience might find out about how our brains work, because the application of 
our psychological concepts, and the truth of our beliefs about thinking, don’t depend 
upon things that we can’t already find out about.107 
The sort of interpretationism developed in this thesis also supplies a response 
to another of the Churchlands’ criticisms of our everyday thinking about minds.  The 
Churchlands complain that folk psychology is a stagnating research project which 
hasn’t advanced its ability to help us predict and control for thousands of years.108  
We can reply that this claim is based on the mistaken view that our ideas about the 
mind have just the same purpose as a scientific theory.   
 
Interpretationism also gets rid of some epistemological concerns we might have 
about our knowledge of other minds.  In the first instance, it does not allow the 
worry that we might know all about a creature’s history, see them behaving in just 
the ways that we would behave given certain thoughts, and yet, because we can’t see 
inside to the states that cause the behaviour, or to certain epiphenomenal states, still 
be wrong about that creature being a thinker.   
Moreover, since the sorts of behaviour a creature could produce and the 
interpretations that could be given as a result are the criteria for having certain 
mental states, it seems that our methods should often be good ways to find out what 
others are thinking.  There is more to think about here, however, if we are to 
determine the reliability of our everyday beliefs about other people’s minds.  In 
particular, this discussion must depend upon the precise form of the answer to the 
question which dominated the previous section.   Still, there are several things we 
can say as a result of the arguments of this thesis about the ways in which we might 
be ignorant or wrong about minds and thinkers. 
                                                     
107 At least, this is so in normal cases.  Special cases, such as those involving locked-in patients, show 
that there is a good sense in which we can’t always find out what someone is thinking without some 
change in them which we ordinary interpreters can’t bring about by ourselves.  However, this 
concedes no ground to eliminativism. 
108 See Churchland (1989). 
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 In chapter 3, I suggested that the interpretationist need not claim that 
interpretation gives real human interpreters any way of determining exactly when 
mental states occur.  The thoughts about holism presented in chapter 4 suggest that 
we may not always know whether the information we have about a subject and their 
interactions with others and their environment suffices to allow us to determine all 
of their thoughts.  Chapter 5 suggested that even when we know a lot about the 
history of an individual, there is still the possibility of deception.  In the same 
chapter, we encountered a case where the ordinary human might not know they 
were in the presence of a thinker, because that thinker was paralysed.  Chapter 6 also 
suggests that a thinker we’re acquainted with could turn out to be very different 
from us in unexpected ways, for example because it does its thinking on Mars, or 
because someone else planned that it should think the thoughts it does.   
 Failures of general and self-knowledge have not been explicitly discussed in 
this thesis, but they must also be possible. For example, we could allow for some 
mistaken general beliefs about minds by allowing that the ordinary interpreter 
might not fully realise some of the possibilities for certain mental states, because 
when explicitly formulating beliefs about the mental they focus too much on the 
typical cases and not enough on the wide range of possibilities for interpretable 
behaviour.  For example, we might initially suppose that beliefs have to be 
responsive to reasons, but after considering, for example, pathological cases, we 
might realise that our concept of belief was a bit more flexible.   
None of these possibilities for ignorance and error seem at all unreasonable.  
Rather, interpretationism appears to make our beliefs about minds fallible in just the 
ways that we ordinarily suppose that they are fallible.  As I pointed out in chapter 1, 
section 3.1, the thought that our beliefs about minds enjoy protection from refutation 
could be taken too far.  Interpretationism does not do this.  I suggest that it may offer 
just the right amount of protection for our beliefs about thought. 
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3.  Avoidance of chauvinism 
 
Finally, we must consider whether interpretationism avoids being a chauvinist 
theory, i.e. whether it avoids unfairly denying some being the status of thinker 
because of factors that ought to be irrelevant.   
The worry in chapter 1 was that positions in the ‘Yes’ camp would deny that a 
being, like one of the Analogoids in the example of that chapter, could be a thinker, 
just because it had the wrong sort of physical stuff inside its head (or equivalent), 
despite what was claimed to be far more important evidence of thought, such as 
complex behaviour and successful interpersonal interactions.  Interpretationism was 
designed to meet this problem, and it does: to use Dennett’s phrase, it is ‘maximally 
neutral about the internal structures that accomplish the rational competences it 
presupposes’.  (2009: 346)  Some would even say that it meets the problem a little too 
well, and lapses into liberalism (counting too many things as thinkers).109    
However, there is another potential problem of chauvinism: a worry that we 
might unfairly deny a creature the status of thinker because it thinks rather 
differently from us.  One might suppose that interpretationism makes this problem 
more pressing, rather than helping us to overcome it.   
One source of this worry is the interpretationist’s focus on rationality.110  One 
might worry that this will lead the interpretationist to place too much emphasis on 
our standards for good thinking, and to unreasonably rule out the possibility of other 
thinkers who have substantially different concepts, principles, standards, intuitions 
and habits of thought from us.  This worry is linked to the debate about the 
                                                     
109 This was the problem discussed in chapter 7, where I argued that the interpretationist should 
accept the possibility of certain strange thinkers, and tried to mitigate or discredit the intuitions that 
some people have against them. 
110 That this might lead to chauvinism is a concern expressed in Stich (1990). 
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possibility of differing conceptual schemes, and a full discussion of the issue would 
need to address the nature and possibility of such schemes.111   
Given the conclusions of this thesis, however, we can note reasons to be 
optimistic that interpretationism need not commit us to this second sort of 
chauvinism.  This charge of chauvinism would look most plausible if we had 
adopted something like the Standard Picture of rationality, which saw being rational 
as a matter of following certain rules.  However, I have suggested that the 
interpretationist adopt an account closer to that of Cherniak (1986).  This demands 
that thinkers get at least some things right, but these need not be things that we find 
it at all easy to get right.  It also demands that thinkers display some patterns in 
reasoning and acting, but allows that this might be quite different from the patterns 
we display.  Such differences between us and other thinkers might make 
interpretation extremely difficult, but interpretationism need only claim that 
interpretation is possible, not that it is easy.  The possibility is open that with the 
right interactions and probably quite a lot of imagination and creativity, we could 
come to understand subjects who think very differently from us. 
 This brings us to another source of the worry, however: the intuition that 
there are possible cases where there would be a very good sense in which we 
ordinary humans couldn’t come to understand many of another thinker’s thoughts 
because we lack, and could not through ordinary means gain, the cognitive 
resources necessary.  An example might be the case of a thinker who was 
substantially more intelligent than us.  There appears to be a problem with calling 
such a thinker interpretable without removing our theory too far from our limited 
human perspective. 
  This is a significant problem, but the discussion in this thesis suggests that it 
might also be tractable.  In chapter 5 I argued that the sense in which an interpreter 
                                                     
111 Davidson’s thoughts on the subject are to be found in his ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme’, where he famously denies that alternative conceptual schemes are possible and therefore 
urges us to abandon the notion altogether.  For an account of conceptual relativity which may be 
compatible with interpretationism, see Button (forthcoming), chapters 18 and 19. 
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‘could’ interpret a subject might be quite weak, and yet the subject still count as 
interpretable in the sense relevant to interpretationism.  A similar strategy might be 
available here.  For example, the interpretationist might say that the important thing 
is that interpretation be possible using the same basic method as that usable by the 
ordinary human interpreter: i.e. employing the assumption that a subject is at least 
minimally rational, and attempting to attribute thoughts through the attempt to 
understand the subject substantially in terms of their reasons using information 
about the subject’s behaviour and environment.  Thus we may be able to allow the 
possibility of thinkers too clever for the ordinary, or even the cleverest of humans to 
fully interpret by saying that our methods of interpretation are up to discovering 
their thoughts, although we are not up to employing those methods as they should 
be employed in some importantly limited range of cases. 
Again, this potential response needs further development, but indicates at 
least that the possibility of thinkers who we humans are too stupid to fully interpret 
does not obviously show that interpretationism is a chauvinist theory of mind. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Evaluating the extent to which interpretationism exhibits the advantages claimed for 
a theory in the ‘No’ camp is not an easy task; and I have not offered a complete 
discussion of the issues involved.  Nevertheless, the account developed through the 
course of this thesis is of use in answering such questions, and shows promise in 
each of the areas discussed.  The discussion has also served to indicate important 
areas for future research. 
There are many ways in which interpretationism needs further development.  
Given the advantages of the theory as developed so far, I suggest that further 
research on the subject would be worthwhile. 
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Appendix 1: Sitting on the Fence 
 
In chapter 1, section 2 I suggested that there was a position which resisted 
classification in terms of the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ camps I distinguished in answer to the 
question 
 
In order to count as a thinker, must a being possess particular sorts of inner 
states, mechanisms, events and/or structures? 
 
This awkward position might count as a version of interpretationism, since it accepts 
the claim that reflecting on interpretation has an important role to play in 
elucidating thought.  It does not, however, agree with the interpretationism I have 
characterised about what exactly about the mental interpretationism can help us to 
understand.  Here, I outline what this theory says, and then explain why I do not 
consider it in any depth. 
 There could be an account according to which a creature is a thinker iff it can 
be identified as a thinker by an interpreter, and at least some of its thoughts can be 
identified by that interpreter.  However, this account might say that there may 
nevertheless be some thoughts which an interpreter cannot identify.  According to 
such a position, being a thinker would always involve having some interpretable 
thoughts, but not every thought would need to be interpretable in any sense of the 
word.  The position I have in mind is at least similar to that suggested in Block (1981) 
as a behaviourist conception of intelligence. 
 Such a position must say something about why the partially interpretable 
creature counts as having the non-interpretable mental states that it does.  Such an 
answer might refer in some way to the internal physical organisation of the creature.  
For example, it might suggest that the interpretable behaviour of a creature 
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determines what internal stuff is relevant to the creature’s mental setup, but the 
arrangement of this internal stuff can then go on to determine the existence of 
thoughts which are not interpretable.  On such a theory all thoughts would 
ultimately depend on the existence of interpretable thoughts, but what goes on 
inside the creature would also be important.  For this reason, this position appears to 
straddle the fence between the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ camps. 
 It is possible that an interesting position could be developed along these lines.  
However, I do not consider it further in this thesis for three reasons: first, because 
the problem of explaining why a creature counts as having certain non-interpretable 
thoughts seems substantial; second, because it does not seem to be a position 
espoused by any real interpretationists; and finally, because my stated aim is to 
consider what the most plausible view within the ‘No’ camp should look like. 
I will call the theory suggested here partial interpretationism.  Throughout the 
thesis, when I just use the word ‘interpretationism’, I refer to the view which I 
outline in chapter 3: the one which does fit more neatly into the ‘No’ camp. 
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Appendix 2: Table of Varieties of 
Interpretationism 
 
Type Derivative Analytic Dependence Cartographical 
Aim To analyse 
thought 
using 
independent 
terms, and 
then to show 
that this has 
the 
consequence 
of making 
thought 
interpretable 
To analyse 
thought in 
terms of 
interpretability 
To analyse 
both thought 
and 
interpretation/ 
interpretability 
in 
independent 
terms 
To illuminate 
the concept of 
thought, along 
with other 
concepts 
including 
interpretation, 
without giving 
an analysis of 
any one or 
arranging 
them in a 
hierarchy 
Constitutive vs. 
Non-
constitutive112 
Non-
constitutive 
Constitutive Constitutive Constitutive? 
Where 
rationality fits in 
In the 
analysis of 
thought 
As a 
consequence 
of the analysis 
of thought/ as 
part of our 
account of 
interpretation 
In the joint 
analysis of 
thought and 
interpretability 
It will appear 
in the account 
on the same 
level as 
thought and 
interpretation 
                                                     
112 As these terms are defined by Child (1994). 
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Ambition as a 
form of 
interpretationism 
Low High Moderate? High 
Problems Giving the 
analysis 
Giving the 
analysis, 
particularly 
without 
circularity 
Showing that 
thought and 
interpretability 
can’t be 
analysed 
separately; 
giving the 
analysis 
Avoiding 
vicious 
circularity and 
achieving 
illumination. 
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Appendix 3: The Worth of the 
Cartographic Approach 
 
As I have explained, cartographic interpretationism does not attempt to explain 
exactly what thought amounts to using independent terms.  It can therefore use a 
notion like rationality to illuminate the concept of thought, and then go on to explain 
this notion of rationality by talking about particular kinds of thoughts or mental 
states or ideas, characterised as such.  It might seem that this makes cartographic 
interpretationism a much easier project to pursue.  It also opens the theory up to a 
very obvious criticism: that it will be circular, and therefore uninformative.  If one 
does not understand the notion of thought already, then an explanation of it which 
invokes that very concept surely will not help you.  Moreover, putting forward such 
an account can only distract us from the genuine explanations that are available: it is 
worse than useless. 
 A famous example of a circular explanation comes from Molière: he presents 
us with a doctor who explains why opium has a soporific effect by saying that it has 
a dormitive virtue in it whose nature is to cause the senses to become drowsy.113 
However, this is a causal explanation.  A better parallel to cartographic 
interpretationism would be given by the following statement: What it means for 
something to have a soporific effect is for it to contain a dormitive virtue. 
In the original example, we can at least understand the temptation for 
someone to give such a response if they don’t know why opium is a soporific.  And 
the claim does at least contain the assertion that there is a cause, and that it involves 
a property of opium.  The revised version, on the other hand, just seems completely 
pointless.  If cartographic interpretationism makes a claim like this, it too will be in 
                                                     
113 From Le Malade Imaginaire (1879). 
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serious trouble.  I will therefore consider what makes the revised statement so bad, 
and will argue that the cartographic interpretationist account of the mind does not 
share these flaws. 
There are at least three reasons why the statement ‘What it means for something to 
have a soporific effect is for it to contain a dormitive virtue’ should count as 
viciously circular: 
i) It introduces a new concept to define the one the questioner is confused 
about, and this new concept has no content beyond the one it’s supposed 
to be defining. 
ii) The statement has no consequences. 
iii) There is a much more illuminating answer readily available.  If someone 
speaks English, but doesn’t know what it means for something to have a 
soporific effect, we can just tell them that it means the thing will send you 
to sleep. 
Cartographic interpretationism fails to share these feature as follows: 
i)  If the cartographic interpretationist adopts the suggestions I have offered through 
this thesis so far, then he will try to illuminate what it is to have a thought or be a 
thinker by calling on a lot of different concepts.  He will call on rationality, getting 
things right, responsiveness, reasons, points of view, patterns in behaviour, patterns 
in reasoning, inference, consistency, goals, achievements, disagreement, excuse, 
interpretation, interpretability, and sincerity, to name a few.  These are not new 
concepts; they are ones which we use often, and usually quite successfully114, even 
though it may be difficult to state precise rules for how they should be used.  
Moreover, these concepts do not all just amount to the same thing, and we use them 
in quite different ways.  Cartographic interpretationism will aim to show how they 
                                                     
114 A possible exception to this is the notion of interpretability.  However, Part II aimed to define this 
in terms of other concepts which are more familiar. 
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relate to one another, and thus to provide a better understanding of many of them, 
without identifying them with each other. 
 Thus, if we want to say that the cartographic interpretationist’s answer to the 
question ‘What does it take to be a thinker?’ is circular, we should note that it does at 
least provide us with a very big circle.  We should also note that, although the 
project will not face exactly the same problems as an analysis, and we will have 
different tools to deal with the problems we do face, nevertheless it is clearly a 
difficult job to map out relationships between so many substantial concepts.  
Particular proposals will face objections other than circularity, and the cartographic 
interpretationist will have to meet them. 
ii)  The theory does have consequences.  Two in particular have been prominent in 
this thesis: the anti-chauvinism of interpretationism, leading us to count some 
perhaps quite unexpected things as thinkers (cf. chapter 6); and the protection the 
theory offers us against eliminativism, with a corresponding suggestion for how to 
view the relationship between interpersonal interpretation and scientific 
investigation of the mind, and thus also between the philosophy and the science of 
the mind.   
iii)  Finally, the question ‘What does it take to be a thinker?’ does not have another 
easy and obvious answer, as ‘What makes something soporific?’ did.  There are 
indeed other potential answers: there are the answers provided by the positions in 
the ‘Yes’ camp, and there are interpretationist analyses like the one suggested in 
section 1.  Cartographic interpretationism will only provide the best and fullest 
available answer to the question if there is something wrong with these other 
projects.  However, it is far from clear that the other projects will work, and so we 
have no reason to conclude against cartographic interpretationist on this basis just 
yet.  
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This short discussion cannot give a complete account of a way of engaging in the 
philosophy of mind.  However, if you are a person who thinks that there can be 
informative philosophical projects which do not count as analyses, and philosophical 
accounts which provide us with virtuous and informative circles, then I commend 
cartographic interpretationism as a candidate for just such a project. 
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